CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM TO MANIFEST RELIGIOUS BELIEF UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS by Ghazi, Ghasem Z.
University of Huddersfield Repository
Ghazi, Ghasem Z.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM TO MANIFEST RELIGIOUS BELIEF UNDER 
ARTICLE 9 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
Original Citation
Ghazi, Ghasem Z. (2018) CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM TO MANIFEST 
RELIGIOUS BELIEF UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. Doctoral thesis, 
University of Huddersfield. 
This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/34744/
The University Repository is a digital collection of the research output of the
University, available on Open Access. Copyright and Moral Rights for the items
on this site are retained by the individual author and/or other copyright owners.
Users may access full items free of charge; copies of full text items generally
can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any
format or medium for personal research or study, educational or not­for­profit
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided:
• The authors, title and full bibliographic details is credited in any copy;
• A hyperlink and/or URL is included for the original metadata page; and
• The content is not changed in any way.
For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please
contact the Repository Team at: E.mailbox@hud.ac.uk.
http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/
 
 
 
 
TITLE: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM TO 
MANIFEST RELIGIOUS BELIEF UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 
 
 
 
 
GHASEM ZORAB GHAZI 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the University of Huddersfield in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
The University of Huddersfield 
 
 
 
 
September 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
                                             Copyright statement 
i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns 
any copyright in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Huddersfield 
the right to use such copyright for any administrative, promotional, educational and/or 
teaching purposes. 
ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts, may be made only in accordance with 
the regulations of the University Library. Details of these regulations may be obtained 
from the Librarian. This page must form part of any such copies made. 
iii. The ownership of any patents, designs, trademarks and any and all other intellectual 
property rights except for the Copyright (the “Intellectual Property Rights”) and any 
reproductions of copyright works, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), 
which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be 
owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property Rights and Reproductions cannot 
and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the 
owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property Rights and/or Reproductions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I, Ghasem Zorab Ghazi confirm that the material contained in this thesis has not been used in any 
other submission for an academic award and that there is full attribution of the work of any other 
authors. 
The word count for this thesis is 99,781 words (without references) – to the nearest 500 words. 
Ghasem Zorab Ghazi 
Signed: ...................................... 
Date: .......................................... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights. 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights. 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. 
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council. 
ICESC International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1996. 
1981 Declaration Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981). 
HR Human Rights 
HRC Human Rights Committee  
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1996 
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly 
UN United Nations 
UNCHR United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
US United States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Abstract 
 One of the key causes of disharmony on a global scale, throughout human history, has been the 
disregard for the protection of religious expression. This goes some way to explaining why the 
international community in the post-war era, particularly after World War II, have enacted legal 
instruments and implemented policies aimed at promoting religious freedoms at global and 
regional levels. Regionally, the ECHR with implementation mechanisms has led the way in terms 
of upholding the protection of religious rights and freedoms. Having progressive and effective 
mechanisms to protect human rights does not mean that decisions of the ECtHR as a judicial body 
are free of criticism. For example, the ECtHR has ruled in the number of cases against the practice 
of religious expression, particularly in cases relating to the wearing of the headscarf. These 
decisions, the ECtHR argues, were taken on the grounds of secularism and prevention of 
fundamentalism and intolerance. This research, unlike others written on the subject, examines the 
concepts of fundamentalism and tolerance through a historical and philosophical approach, which 
will be used to argue that a restriction on the headscarf cannot legally or logically be justified as 
the bases used by the court to provide a rationale for the rulings are undefined, ambiguous and 
often in conflict with the principle of religious expression. The ECtHR often prioritises national 
policies and political considerations such as secularism over the personal right to freedom of 
religious expression. Notably, recent polices in Turkey which now allow and encourage the 
wearing of headscarf in public places call into question the validity of previous judgments of the 
ECtHR supporting the ban on wearing of the headscarf.  
As a part of the qualitative methodology the researcher has chosen three methods to conduct this 
research including black-letter, historical and comparative themes. 
This thesis is critically analysis ECtHR cases relating to freedom of religious expression in the 
context of the wearing of the headscarf. In doing this thesis further explores the relationship 
between Article 9 ECHR, the wearing of the headscarf, and the concepts of fundamentalism and 
intolerance. The researcher argues that the link between the wearing of the headscarf and intolerant 
or fundamentalist behaviour is a difficult one to prove, and that by supporting the ban on wearing 
of the headscarf on grounds including intolerance, the ECtHR’s decisions are in effect validating 
intolerance of religious expression.    
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CHAPTER ONE 
Background to the study 
 
1.1. Introduction  
The preservation of religious freedom and freedom of expression are key factors in 
promotion social cohesion and societal harmony; Religion is considered one of the most vital 
elements that constitute the identity of believers and define their concept of life.1  In other words, 
religious freedom does not only refer to the freedom to hold religious beliefs, but also to the public 
practice of religion and its associated customs. By protecting private convictions, religious 
freedom means little if it does not also refer to public religious practice. If one looks at the 
traditional causes of conflict internationally, religion is a common thread; this has been the case 
since the beginning of organized religion.2 This cause has been observed recently in conflicts 
between Islamic groups and Christian communities, a phenomenon which stretches back to the 
Crusades, and the long-standing struggles between Palestine and Israel. Centuries ago, conflict in 
Europe saw a thirty-year religious war, which only ended in 1648 via the signing of The Peace 
Treaty of Westphalia; this treaty formed the beginning of the protection of religious freedoms for 
the sake of harmony in Europe.3  
  The 1900’s brought about further agreements on religious freedom and religious practice, 
which has seen this right constitutionalized internationally, by the signing of conventions and 
treaties in which governments have pledged to protect these rights regionally and globally. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)4 and The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966)5 are perhaps the best known of the international instruments on this 
freedom. As far as regional agreements are concerned, the European Convention on Human Rights 
                                                          
1 Kokkinakis v. Greece (App no 14307/88) (ECHR 25 May 1993) 17 EHRR 397. 
2 Sara Silvestri and James Mayall, The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding (British Academy 2015). See 
also: Christopher A Bayly, ‘The Pre-history of ‘; Communalism’? Religious Conflict in India, 1700–1860’ (1985) 
19.02 Modern Asian Studies 177.  
3 Gordon A Christenson, ‘Liberty of the Exercise of Religion in the Peace of Westphalia’ (2012]) 21 Transnat'l L. & 
Contemp. Probs 721. 
4 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) 
5 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
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(ECHR) maintains the preservation of religious freedom6, as does the American Convention on 
Human Rights (1969)7 and The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990). The Cairo 
Declaration, importantly, is religion specific and protects religious freedom in an Islamic context; 
Article 10 of the Declaration states that Islam encompasses “true” nature, while the 22nd article 
denies any freedom of expression which contradicts Shariah law.8 Regarding regional mechanism, 
it is widely accepted that ECHR and its accessional protocols are the most effective mechanisms 
in the world by virtue of the obligations which it places on European countries to implement all 
treaties and instruments related to human rights, including freedom of religion9. However, it should 
be noted that the legal obligation and commitment contained in the ECHR and its protocols do not 
per se prevent the violation of human rights in Europe. 
1.2. Thesis statement 
 The rise of globalization and the ease with which people can migrate has seen a rise in 
migrants of various religious and cultural backgrounds entering Europe in search of a higher 
quality of life and, in some cases, a more liberal society. The ECHR, and state legal systems, have 
seen an increase in the number of cases which involve allegations of human rights abuses relating 
to religion; this is largely to do with the increasingly diverse European society, particularly the 
growth of the Muslim population. In an eight year period beginning in 2004, 1060 cases were 
brought to the French Independent Administrative Authority (FIAA); based on allegation of FIAA 
attacks on religious freedom; in 2009 alone, cases brought before FIAA which dealt with religious 
practice constituted 2% of all claims.10  In view of the role of the European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinafter ECtHR) in relation to the promotion, protection and guarantee of human rights in the 
member states of the ECHR, this thesis will aim to outline and assess previous cases involving 
claims of religious freedoms being impinged upon. This is in the light of the judicial rules of the 
                                                          
6 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental freedoms (adopted 4 November 
1950, entered into force 3 September 1953). ETS 5; 2013 UNTS 221 (ECHR). 
7 American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force July 18, 1978) 
O.A.S.Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
8 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam: Done at Cairo, 5 August 1990 Refugee Survey Quarterly (2008)27 
(2):81-86doi:10.1093/rsq/hdn020. 
9 Carole J Petersen, ‘Bridging the gap: The role of regional and national human rights institutions in the Asia 
Pacific’ (2011) 13 APLPJ 174, 184. 
10 Amnesty international, ‘Choice and Prejudice’ Discrimination against Muslim in Europe’ (2012) available at: 
<http://www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/REPORT.pdf> accessed 15 February 2017.  
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ECtHR and its duty to support, preserve and ensure that human rights are upheld across ECHR 
members of states; the majority of the cases examined in this thesis consist of cases pertaining to 
the wearing of the headscarf in the context of religious practice, most notably bans on the 
headscarf, which many consider an affront to international human rights standards, particularly 
religious freedom.11 Courts have stated, in defense of their decisions regarding the headscarf that 
they were acting in support of secular society, against fundamentalism and, counter-intuitively, 
addressing intolerance, all of which can be difficult concepts to define in practice. The controversy 
surrounding these concepts comes from the fact that it can be challenging to provide evidence that 
religious freedoms have been infringed upon. This is not helped by the apparent lack of consistency 
in rulings of this kind and the contrary to judicial precedent.12 
It also seems that cases related to banning the wearing of the headscarf disregard religious 
freedoms and limit the actions of the religious community or individual. Furthermore, the decisions 
of the court appear at odds with the outlined international obligations of ECHR states, as part of 
their commitment to human rights progress and the protection of religious freedoms.13  
Thus, in order to provide a thorough analysis of the legal framework under which the ECtHR 
operates in cases pertaining to religion, one must first of all outline the contexts and basic 
information of the relevant cases; here, the international perception of the headscarf will be 
addressed. As the headscarf has long been considered representative of Islam and, for others, a 
symbol of gender, it is important to approach the headscarf from a feminist and an Islamic 
perspective, as will be attempted in the final section of this chapter.  
1.3: Aim and Objectives 
 
 1.3.1. Aim of the Thesis 
1. To critically examine and to elaborate on the terms ‘freedom of religion’ and ‘freedom of 
manifestation’ in light of international human rights law. The purpose of a conceptual grounding 
for research is to provide an understanding of those concepts named in the work. This research 
                                                          
11 Dahlab v. Switzerland (Application no 42393/98) (ECHR 15 February 2001) ECHR 899; Sahin v Turkey 
(Application no. 44774/98) (ECHR, 10 November 2005) ECHR 819; Refah party and other v Turkey (Application 
nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98) (ECHR, 13 February 2003) ECHR 491, ECHR 87, ECHR 495. 
12 Handyside v. United Kingdom (Application No.5493/72, A/24) (07 December 1976) ECHR 5. 
13 Raihon Hudoyberganova v Uzbekistan Communication no. 931/2000[2004] U.N Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000.  
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addresses ‘religious freedoms’ and elaborates on the discourse surrounding this term in order to 
embark on an examination of human rights organisations and apparatus. This activity seeks both 
to give a context and a background to the work, and to outline the philosophical dimension to the 
research. To elaborate, this process reveals the role of the term ‘religious freedom’ in a wider 
context, such as in international instruments and previous research, to give a more detailed picture 
of the subject of freedom of religion. A component of human rights, the freedom of religious 
expression is comprised of a few parts; these are internal, external and accepted justifications. 
Having examined and analyzed the right to religious freedom enables the researcher to examine 
the wearing of headscarf under related category of the right to religious freedom. In other words 
conceptual framework helps researcher to organize research design and find a way to solve the 
problem. This aspect of the research is present through the chapter three of the thesis. 
2. A critical evaluation of the decisions of the ECtHR regarding the wearing of the headscarf 
following the illustration of the concepts of fundamentalism and tolerance from a historical and 
philosophical perspective. The issue is discussed in the fourth and fifth chapters; in the former, the 
research will address concept of fundamentalism using a historical lens, while bringing to the fore 
its ill-defined usage in legal proceedings. By branding all who wear the headscarf an extremist or 
a holder of fundamentalist views, the ECtHR decisions have raised legal questions. While it may 
be close to the truth to argue that all Muslim women who preach fundamentalist ideology wear the 
headscarf, this is by no means an indication that all who wear the headscarf are extremists. 
Intolerance, a term frequently cited by the ECtHR, has also been outlined here with an aim to put 
it in historical context, as well as determining its legal usage and philosophical implications. This, 
it is hoped, will highlight the vagueness of the term, particularly as pertains to its legal usage. To 
equate the headscarf to intolerance, then, cannot have a solid legal grounding. Therefore, applying 
the term of intolerance to the wearers of headscarf while they express no intolerant behavior is 
legally problematic.   
3. A critical evaluation and comparative analysis of the ECtHR decisions related to the wearing of 
the headscarf by Muslim females with a focus on the inconsistent judicial precedent of the ECtHR, 
as well as other international and national decisions. Judges often rely on the technique of 
comparing legal systems and cases in order to identify a precedent for cases similar to their own. 
This process has been termed the ‘comparative method’, and has also broadened the insight of 
readers and researcher to deal with the subject of research. This approach can reveal the disparity 
15 
 
between the different rulings of courts in this area, and consequently allows the researcher to put 
forward useful suggestions for providing harmonization and unification in terms of the wearing of 
the headscarf. This aspect of the research is present throughout the thesis. 
   
4. To make recommendations based on the findings of the research (in the concluding chapter). 
1.3.2. Objectives of the Thesis 
A critical analysis and discussion of the term “freedom of manifestation of religious belief” 
in the context of the wearing of the headscarf based on the international human rights standards 
and the ECHR criteria, with a consideration of the decisions of the ECtHR and other international 
judicial bodies. 
 
1.4. Research questions 
1. What are the difficulties involved to prove the criteria and concepts which are used as 
justifications for a ban on the wearing of the headscarf in ECtHR decisions through a legal 
procedure? The researcher attempts to answer this question in chapters four and five as a main 
contribution of the current research.  
2. Are the decisions of the ECtHR, in terms of the wearing of the headscarf, compatible with 
international human rights norms and the judicial precedent of ECHR member states? This 
question is relevant to all chapters of this work, as cases pertaining to the headscarf must be taken 
from different court proceedings in order to gain a cross-jurisdictional picture of the issue.    
3. Is there a harmony and uniformity in the interpretation and application of the ECHR in member 
states with regard to the freedom of religious expression? 
 
1.5. Factual Background to the Cases 
  A number of cases have been brought before to ECtHR which deal with the relationship 
between religious attire and religious freedom. The first case is related to a teacher who had 
converted to Islam and chose to wear Islamic attire14; the other case deals with a devout student in 
Turkey15 who faced difficult choices in terms of having to choose between removing her headscarf 
and continuing with her study, or leaving her study to search for another institution which would 
                                                          
14 Dahlab v. Switzerland (Application no 42393/98) (ECHR 15 February 2001) ECHR 899. 
15Şahin v. Turkey (Application no. 44774/98) (ECHR, 10 November 2005) ECHR 819. 
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allow her to practice her religion fully. In another case, the court presented the ban of wearing the 
headscarf as a requirement for protection of secularism and prevention of fundamentalism.16 
Explanation of these cases with different contexts and backgrounds has provided a better 
understanding of the legal perspective. In all three cases the applicants based their defence of their 
right to wear the headscarf on Article 9 of the ECHR deals with religious freedom. The following 
is its full text: 
9.1. ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes the freedom either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
9.2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief shall be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others’.17 
 
1.5.1. Dahlab v Switzerland 
The first of the abovementioned cases involving religious freedoms (specifically, wearing 
the Islamic headscarf) was Dahlab v Switzerland18, in which the Court handed down its judgment 
in 2001. The case concerned a teacher at a primary school in Switzerland, who converted to Islam. 
After her conversion, she felt the need to change the way she clothed herself by wearing longer 
and looser clothes and a scarf to cover her hair, but not her face. She dressed in this way for more 
than four years, including the period during which she was on a maternity leave.19 
During those years, neither her colleagues, nor the children or their parents complained 
about her appearance. When asked by the students, she said her headscarf was a means of keeping 
her ears warm. Apparently, the issue of conversion was a very sensitive topic to her, even to the 
                                                          
16 Dahlab v Switzerland (Application no 42393/98) (2001) ECHR 899; Şahin v Turkey (Application no.44774/98) 
(2005) ECHR 819; Refah party and other v Turkey (Application nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98) 
(ECHR, 13 February 2003) ECHR 491, ECHR 87, ECHR 495. 
17 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental freedoms (adopted 4 November 
1950, entered into force 3 September 1953). ETS 5; 2013 UNTS 221 (ECHR). 
18 Dahlab v Switzerland (Application no 42393/98) (15 February 2001) ECHR 899. 
19 Dahlab v Switzerland (Application no 42393/98) (15 February 2001) ECHR 899. 
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point where she made up an excuse so that she did not have to reveal her Muslim religious beliefs 
to the students.20  
The situation changed when an inspector became involved. In reaction to his report 
regarding Ms Dahlab’s clothing, the Director General of Public Education took action. After 
attempting to settle the matter by mediation, the Director General demanded that she should stop 
wearing the headscarf having refused the demand, Ms Dahlab took the action in the national courts 
and eventually lost.21 
The Court partly justified the fact that she was sacked despite the absence of any law 
explicitly prohibiting the wearing of religious clothing by saying that it was impossible for the law 
to comprehensively cover all the required behaviours by teachers. It was also stated that allowances 
could be made in cases where the behaviour was generally considered by the average citizen to be 
of ‘minor importance’. This raises questions as to who, exactly, the average citizen is and how the 
average citizen interacts with religion and cultural conduct, particularly religious attire.22 
Decisions regarding the issues of human rights, if made on the basis of asserting a majority’ 
beliefs about the importance of a particular matter, can seriously impact religious freedoms, as 
these are only seldom considered in the judgments. To illustrate the foregoing, one can consider 
the example of the ban on building minarets in Switzerland.23 
The Swiss Court continued that it was ‘scarcely conceivable’ that schools could ban 
crucifixes from being displayed in state schools, as had been the case previously, while allowing 
religious clothing.24 The fact that teachers were allowed religious pieces of jewelry was considered 
an issue that did not require further discussion; this may have been because further discussion may 
have drawn attention to the fact that crucifixes worn by an individual reflect the beliefs of the 
individual, while a crucifix hung on the wall of an institution reflects the cultural views of the 
                                                          
20Dahlab v Switzerland (Application no 42393/98) (15 February 2001) ECHR 899; see also: Oren Fliegelman, ‘The 
European Court of Human Rights Goes to School: The “Headscarf Cases’ (Leyla Şahin v. Turkey and Dahlab v. 
Switzerland) as Unjustified Restrictions of Religious Practice’ (2015) IV. 3. UCULR 134, 140.  
21 Dahlab v Switzerland (Application no 42393/98) (2001) ECHR 899. 
22 Cochav Elkayam-Levy  ‘Women's Rights and Religion--The Missing Element in the Jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights’ (2014) 35.4 Journal of International Law University of Pennsylvania 1175, 1184  
23 Lorenz Langer ‘Panacea or Pathetic Fallacy? The Swiss Ban on Minarets’ (2010) 43.4 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 863, 867. 902.907.  
24 Dahlab v Switzerland (Application no 42393/98) (2001) ECHR 899. See also: Lautsi and others v. Italy (Application 
no. 30814/00) (2011) E LR 633, (2011) ECHR 2412, (2012) 54 EHRR 3, (2011) ELR 176, 30 BHRC 429. See also:  
Claudia Morini ‘Secularism and Freedom of Religion: The Approach of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 
43.03 Israel Law Review 611, .624-625. 
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whole school. It is undeniable, however, that both are religious symbols. The same rationale may 
be applied to the case of the headscarf. 
In the ECtHR, the case was approached as a question of jurisdiction. According to 
Switzerland, the nature of the case was too “manifestly ill-founded” to be allowed to proceed to 
the merits phase.25 The Court approved of the Swiss arguments. After years of wearing clothes 
according to her religious beliefs without objections from anyone, a woman was dismissed from 
her job on the basis of her religion despite her flawless employment record.  
The ruling of the Dahlab case, it has been pointed out, has major inconsistencies with that 
of Lautsi and Others v Italy26, despite both involving a supposed violation of religious freedoms. 
In the Lautsi case, the ECtHR deemed a prominently displayed crucifix in a school as representing 
merely a passive symbol of Christianity, with no impact on the attitudes of the school as an 
institution. It was argued by the court that there was no way to prove that the crucifix would 
indoctrinate students or affect their behaviour in any way. When one examines the Dahlab case, it 
is clear that the courts attitude towards Islamic expression is very different. If one considers the 
former example merely a passive emblem, then it is difficult, if one follows a comparative and 
deductive argument, to assert that the headscarf is anything other than a passive symbol too. As 
with Lautsi, the court was unable to prove, in the Dahlab case, that the headscarf (here worn by a 
teacher at a school) had any impact on the religious convictions of the student body. It is interesting 
to note that the teacher in this case did not express the view that the headscarf was worn as a 
religious act, instead telling her students that she used the headscarf to protect her ears from the 
cold.27 Furthermore, in the case of Lautsi the court stated that the display of the Crucifix is not 
associated with compulsory teaching about Christianity. Following the logic of the court it can be 
said that wearing of the headscarf does not imply Islamic teaching in school. Moreover, in the case 
of Lautsi the Court argued that in reality, whether the state opted to authorize or banned the display 
of crucifix in an educational institution, the significant factor is the degree to which the curriculum 
contextualized and taught students pluralism and tolerance; it can be argued that this logic can be 
applied to the Dahlab’s case as well.  
                                                          
25 Dahlab v Switzerland (Application no 42393/98) (2001) ECHR 899. For further information see: Isabelle Rorive 
‘Religious Symbols in the Public Space: in Search of a European Answer’ (2008) 30 Cardozo L. Rev 2669, 2679-
2680.  
26  (Application no. 30814/00) [2011] E LR 633, [2011] ECHR 2412, (2012) 54 EHRR 3, [2011] ELR 176, 30 BHRC 
429. 
27 Carolyn Evans ‘The Islamic Scarf in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2006) 7 Melb. J. Int'l L 1, 8. 
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From comparative perspective an American case comes to mind. In respect of restriction 
on religious manifestation the Supreme Court of the U.S.A in the case of Jehovas’ Witness stated 
that it is not justifiable to restrain religious expression as long as there is no clear and immediate 
necessity to protect more important interest of the democratic society which over unrestricted 
freedom of religious expression.28 As already mentioned before the decision of the Court, Dahlab 
had taught at school for four years; during this time no complaint had been made against her. 
Taking into account the Supreme Court criteria for restriction of religious expression it can be 
pervasively argued that there are no compiling grounds for expelling Dahlab from the teaching 
staff. 
It was the attitude of the court in the case of Dahlab v. Switzerland29 that it would be 
difficult “appears difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with message of 
tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and nondiscrimination that all teachers in a 
democratic society must convey to their pupils”30  
In this case, as far as the concept of tolerance is concerned, the Netherlands’ committee on 
Equal Treatment has asserted that “wearing a headscarf as such as does not imply that a teacher 
misses the required open attitude”.31 The expulsion of the teacher or student would only be 
justified when the wearer has displayed intolerant ideas or behavior.  It can be submitted that the 
headscarf is not symbol of intolerance, but it is religious symbol. If the headscarf is against 
tolerance and if it is discrimination against women and girls, the government needs to take strict 
measures to prevent wearing it in all public places not just in public institutions. 
1.5.2. Şahin v Turkey 
The Şahin v Turkey32 case, the second one of the above-mentioned was approached more 
expeditiously by the Court and a decision came from the Grand Chamber almost immediately. 
The case involved Leyla Şahin, a student of the fifth grade of medical studies who, after four years 
of studying at Bursa University in Turkey, transferred to Istanbul University. She stated that she 
                                                          
28 Leo Pfeffer ‘The Supreme Court as Protector of Civil Rights: Freedom of religion’ (1951) 275 Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social science. Civil Rights in America 75, 78.  
29 Dahlab v Switzerland (Application no 42393/98) (2001) ECHR 899. 
30 Dahlab v Switzerland (Application no 42393/98) (2001) ECHR 899.p 13. 
31 Aernout Nieuwenhuis, ’European Court of Human Rights: State and Religion, Schools and Scarves. An Analysis 
of the Margin of Appreciation as Used in the Case of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, Decision of 29 June 2004, Application 
Number 44774/98’ (2005) 1.03  European Constitutional Law Review  495,505 Şahin v. Turkey (Application no. 
44774/98) (ECHR, 10 November 2005) ECHR 819. 
32 (Application no. 44774/98) (ECHR, 10 November 2005) ECHR 819. 
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wore the headscarf during her studies at Bursa University and at the beginning of her studies in 
Istanbul. After a few months, the Vice-Chancellor of the University released a circular instructing 
the teachers not to allow students with a beard or wearing the Islamic headscarf to attend lectures, 
tutorials, and exams. As she refused to stop wearing her headscarf, Ms Şahin was banned from 
sitting several exams and was even excluded from certain subjects.33 After attempting to attend 
several lectures, she was warned by the Dean of Medicine. As she was engaged in an activity that 
the Court depicted as “unauthorised assembly” (a protest of students against the dress code related 
regulations outside the faculty’s deanery), she was suspended for one semester.34 Even though this 
penalty was later reverted by a general university amnesty, she decided to leave the university and 
complete her studies in Austria. In the official complaint that she raised against the Turkish 
government she stated that by excluding her, the university had violated her religious freedoms. 
As opposed to the case of Dahlab, the Court did not consider the claim manifestly unfounded and, 
her action was therefore, admissible. Nevertheless, the claim of violation of religious freedom was 
dismissed by both the Court and the Grand Chamber.35 
One may infer from the decision of the court that one may consider the headscarf synonymous 
with fundamentalist, and that veiling constitutes an attack on democratic values and human 
freedoms, when the court observes that  
‘The situation in Turkey and the reasoning of the Turkish courts showed that the Islamic 
headscarf had become a sign that was regularly appropriated by religious fundamentalist 
movements for political ends and constituted a threat to the rights of women.’ 36  
In 2007, a questionnaire found that just over 60% of Turkish Muslim women veil 
themselves and so, if we follow the logic of the court, this equates to nearly two thirds of Muslim 
women harbouring fundamentalist inclinations.37 The headscarf, argues Aydin, is nothing more 
than a religious garment, within the scope of Article 9 of the ECHR; associating it with radical 
thought is problematic, as the concept of fundamentalism is undefined and highly politically 
charged.38 As Toprak points out, women who cover their heads are “aware that secular, 
                                                          
33Şahin v. Turkey (Application no. 44774/98) (ECHR, 10 November 2005) ECHR 819, Para 15, 16, 17. 
34 Şahin v. Turkey (Application no. 44774/98) (ECHR, 10 November 2005) ECHR 819, para 23. 
35 Şahin v. Turkey (Application no. 44774/98) (ECHR, 10 November 2005) ECHR 819, para 117. 
36 Şahin v. Turkey (Application no. 44774/98) (ECHR, 10 November 2005) ECHR 819, para 93. 
37 Hasan Aydin ‘Headscarf (Hijab) Ban in Turkey: The Importance of Veiling’ (2010) 6.1 The Journal of 
Multiculturalism in Education 1, 11. 
38 Carolyn Evans ‘The Islamic Scarf in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2006) 7 Melb. J. Int'l L 52, 2. 
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democratic and plural states guarantee the recognition of their identity rights”.39 Moreover, the 
court presented no evidence for its reasoning that there may be strong link between wearing 
headscarves and increasing fundamentalism. Further, while basing rulings on the assumption, the 
relationship between fundamentalism and the veil or hijab is unproven and unfounded. 
Hypothetically, even if the assumption were true that an individual who wears the hijab or covering 
has fundamentalist inclinations, it will be difficult to produce evidence for this for use in court. To 
discern whether or not an individual thinks a certain way or has an allegiance to a fundamentalist 
view, it is necessary to compel persons to disclose their political and religious convictions and 
some of the most intimate aspects of their life. However, according to ECtHR any measure to 
compel a believer to disclose detailed information regarding their religion and philosophical 
conviction possibly constitutes a violation of Articles 8 (right to respect for private and family life) 
and 9 ECHR.40 Furthermore, human rights organizations criticized the headscarf ban as “an 
unwarranted infringement of the right to religious practice” 41 ; the International Humanity 
Foundation said it is not the place of a state to discern which expression is legitimate as long as it 
does not violate other people’s basic human rights. 
In the Şahin v Turkey case, it was stated that:  
‘…the Court considers that, when examining the question of the Islamic headscarf in the Turkish 
context, it must be borne in mind the impact which wearing such a symbol, which is presented or 
perceived as a compulsory religious duty, may have on those who choose not to wear it’.42 
 The court has attempted to approach the headscarf from an Islamic stance, speaking on the 
relationship between the religion and acceptance, and the way it interacts with democratic values: 
“sharia, which faithfully reflects the dogmas and divine rules laid down by religion, is stable and 
invariable…it is difficult to declare one’s respect for democracy and human rights while at the 
same time supporting a regime based on Sharia”43. 
                                                          
39 Metin Toprak and Nasuh Uslu ‘The Headscarf Controversy in Turkey’ (2009) 11:1 Journal of Economic and Social 
Research 43, 53. 
40Folgero and others v Norway (Application no.15472/02) (ECHR, 29 June 2007) 15472/02, [2007] ECHR 546, 
[2011] ECHR 2148, [2011] ECHR 2189 para 96. 
41 Krassimir Kanev ‘Muslim religious freedom in the OSCE area after September 11’ (2004) 15.4 Helsinki 
Monitor 233,236. 
42 Şahin v. Turkey (Application no. 44774/98) (ECHR, 10 November 2005) ECHR 819, para 108. 
43 Refah party and other v Turkey (Application nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98) (ECHR, 13 February 
2003) ECHR 491, ECHR 87, ECHR 495, para 72. 
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Furthermore, the court stated that the introduction of Sharia thus cannot be compatible and 
reconcilable with “the fundamental principles of democracy as conceived in the convention taken 
as a whole”. In addition, the court believes that Sharia interferes in all aspects of private and public 
life.44 
There has been much academic discussion as to whether the headscarf, from the Islamic 
point of view, is a religious choice or a religious obligation; this has divided liberal and traditional 
scholars on the topic. Sharia is considered by the court to be authoritarian and strict; however, the 
majority of those who follow Islam acknowledge that the Qur’an is open to constantly changing 
interpretations and should not be taken concretely, which the court often fails to consider. In other 
words, the Qur’an may be reinterpreted in line with social development; this has been termed 
Ijtihad, or ‘interpretation’, which is a constant process. Sharia is interpreted only by a religious 
expert, named the Mojtahid; notable academic Ibn Aqil observed that “it is not possible for an age 
to be devoid of a Mojtahid”.45 The ECtHR is largely responsible for upholding the standards of the 
ECHR. Almost all members of the courts are probably non-Muslim and they are legal experts’ not 
theologians. Consequently, the members of the Courts should exercise restrained in passing 
judgment on religious texts.  It is not obvious which legal mechanisms were used by ECtHR 
judges, in contrast to Islamic scholars to reach the common view that Islam cannot be compatible 
with tolerance and human rights. In coming to this conclusion, the court has disregarded its own 
rationale set out in the case of Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria.46 Here the court determined that it 
is outside the jurisdiction of the public authority to determine whether religious belief or the means 
that are used to express such belief are legitimate.  
1.5.3. Refah Party v Turkey 
One of the most high profile cases involves the Refah Party and their legal battle with the 
government of Turkey47. Since their inception in 1983, the Refah Party have run for a number of 
elections, winning 10% of the votes in 1989; it was in this year that representatives of the Refah 
Party came to hold prominent positions, such as town mayors. The percentage of votes gained by 
                                                          
44 Refah party and other v Turkey (Application nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98) (ECHR, 13 February 
2003) ECHR 491, ECHR 87, ECHR 495, para 72. 
45 Wael B Hallaq ‘Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?’ (1984)16.01 International Journal of Middle East Studies 3,34 
46(Application no.30985/96) (ECHR, 26 October 2000) 34 EHR55. 
47Refah party and other v Turkey (Application nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98) (ECHR, 13 February 
2003) ECHR 491, ECHR 87, ECHR 495, para1. 
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the party began to rise annually, eventually reaching 35% in the 1996 general election. A survey 
in 1997 concluded that if a general election had been held at that time it was predicted that Refah 
Party would have won 38% of the votes. Another opinion poll in the same year predicted that 
Refah would obtain 67% of votes in the next election due in 2001. Due to this impressive showing, 
and in collaboration with the ‘True Path’ Party, the Refah Party became part of the coalition 
government in Turkey in 1996. The following year, the Refah Party encountered opposition from 
the Principal State Counsel, who argued that the Party failed to uphold the separation of religion 
and state, and called for the dismantling of the party; public declarations made by party leaders 
were cited as the foundations of this opposition. The Constitutional Court of Turkey, having 
weighed the arguments, chose in favour of the State Counsel; the Refah Party was dissolved in 
1998.48 This decision was supported by the ECtHR in 2003. This has a relationship with legal 
rulings on religious attire as, under this same protection of the separation of religion and state 
(secularism), items such as the headscarf may be subject to bans and restrictions on the ground of 
preventing the spread of extremist views.  
 
1.6. Wearing the headscarves:  The perspective of International Human Rights Committee        
  At the level of international law freedom of religion has been incorporated in several 
international conventions. Most of these conventions have particular mechanism to interpret and 
to implement the content of the conventions. One of the most important conventions is 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which has dedicated Article 18 to 
freedom of religion.49 This covenant has a committee which is composed of 18 independent legal 
experts who are persons of high moral character, and of recognized competence in the field of 
human rights.50 The Human Rights Committee (hereinafter the HRC) is responsible for providing 
technical assistance to improve of human rights and it has the jurisdiction to made 
recommendations based on the standards outlined by the covenant. 
                                                          
48 Refah party and other v Turkey (Application nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98) (ECHR, 13 February 
2003) ECHR 491, ECHR 87, ECHR 495, para 23. 
49  49 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) Available at:<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx> 
accessed 1 December 2013.  
50 Available at :<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/Membership.aspx> accessed 1 December 2013). 
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  With regard to religious rights the HRC in General Comment number 22 has emphasized 
that this freedom includes the right to wear religiously distinctive clothing or head covering.51 
Furthermore, the first optional protocol to the covenant gives the HRC competence to examine 
individual complaints with regard to alleged violations of the covenant by states parties to the 
protocol.52  Regarding religious manifestation, in the case of Raihon V. Uzbekistan53 the HRC 
stated that rejection of Muslim girl who wore the veil by the Institute of Foreign Languages is 
considered to be a violation of Covenant rights. In the view of the HRC, Uzbekistan violated article 
18, Paragraph 2 of the covenant which guarantees freedom of religious expression. In this case the 
HRC declared that no valid reason was given by the state authority in order to apply the necessary 
restriction measure in the light of article 18, paragraph 3, with the aims of protecting public Safety, 
order, morals or fundamental rights and freedoms of others.54 On a related note, the UN Special 
Rappoteur on religious intolerance who identifies general criteria to assist national and 
international bodies in their analysis and reviews of laws and draft legislations relating to freedom 
of religion or belief stated that55 “dress should not be the subject of political regulation and calls 
for flexible and tolerant attitude in this regard, so as to allow the variety and richness of . . . 
garments to manifest themselves without constrain.”56 It could be argued that The ECHR, then, 
has adopted an alternative approach to religious expression than that stated above, deviating from 
the UN approved view. The ECtHR, then, may have deplored from international standards 
pertaining to religious freedom, as European states are members of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.  
In summary, it may be deduced that the arguments of the court regarding the wearing of 
the headscarf and the states of the Refah Party are potentially in conflict with international human 
rights standards. It could also be argued that arguments based on “possibilities”, “hypothesis” and 
ambiguous terms such as protection of “secularism” and prevention of “totalitarian movement”, 
“Islamic fundamentalism” and ‘intolerance’ which seem to be difficult to define and to prove in 
                                                          
51 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18, CCPR/c/21/rev.1/Add4 (30 July 1993) para 4. 
52Available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPCCPR1.aspx> accessed 20 Jaunary2014). 
53 Raihon Hudoyberganova v Uzbekistan Communication no. 931/2000[2004] U.N Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000. 
54 Raihon Hudoyberganova v Uzbekistan Communication no. 931/2000[2004] U.N Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000. 
55 Michael Wiener ‘The mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or belief- institutional, procedural 
and substantive legal issue’ (2007) 2 Journal of Religion and Human Rights 3, 8. 
56 Bahia Tahzib-Lie ‘Applying a Gender Perspective in the Area of the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief’ (2000) 
3 BYU L. Rev 967, 983. 
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the legal context. Furthermore, it seems that passing judgment on the nature of the headscarf in 
Islam and Islam itself as a religion are beyond jurisdiction of the legal body such as the ECtHR.57 
 
1.7. Position of the Hijab from an Islamist and Feminist Perspective  
Discussions surrounding the Hijab, sometimes referred to as a ‘modesty’ and often more 
than just a headscarf, have long been ubiquitous in academic literature surrounding Islam. The 
percentage of Muslims residing in the West is rising, and the September 11th attacks in 2001 has 
brought the Hijab, considered a symbol of Islam, to the forefront of journalism and academia. 
Academics writing on the topic of religion range from orthodox Muslims, to reformists, to feminist 
scholars, both Muslim and non-Muslim; each of these groups, and many more, are in dialogue 
regarding the wearing of the hijab and its significance. If one were to consider the dichotomy in 
the discourse, one perspective considers the hijab a spiritual obligation outlined in the Qur’an, 
while the other sees it as a symbol of oppression and an infringement on women’s rights and human 
freedom.  
The discourse surrounding the hijab does not end with academia; those working in the legal 
sector have had to ask similar questions due to the ECtHR in supporting of the prohibition of hijab 
use. The ECtHR argues that these decisions were based on the belief that the hijab and other 
coverings are not in accordance with modern principles, such as democracy and freedom, and 
asserted that prohibiting the wearing of the headscarf was an attempt to check fundamentalism and 
uphold secular values. On the other hand, a number of academics58 consider the ban an affront to 
personal freedoms and an attack on faith. The researcher would argue that, in order to properly 
evaluate the necessity of the ban and its relevance, one must first gain an understanding of Islam 
and of feminism to validate any judgement on the Court’s decision. The first section of this 
research will address the basics of the hijab, and its function and symbolism as a religious garment, 
while the second will include an overview of feminists’ analyses of the hijab. 
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1.7. 1.  The Hijab in Islam 
The wearing of the hijab, and the act of covering, is a core practice of Islam. It has become 
one of the most contentious issues of our era, in part due to the ambiguity surrounding its Qur’anic 
basis. A process of ‘ijtihad’ must be undergone then, which involves defining the use of the hijab 
from the Qur’an and other religious sources, whilst placing it in a cultural and national context. 
The magnitude approaches to the hijab, from feminist discourse to Euro centric arguments has 
meant that the topic has a garnered a high profile globally.   
It is important to note that there are no direct references to head coverings in the Qur’an, 
though large numbers of Muslim women choose to wear them across the world as an act of faith 
and to engage with their cultural and religious identity. As a part of research, the researcher will 
attempt to discern the relationship between Islam and the Hijab and other head coverings; in order 
to do this, the term ‘hijab’ will be examined. The term comes from an understanding of a verse in 
the Qur’an, which has been interpreted as an encouragement for Muslim women to cover their 
hair. Notably, however, the hijab did not originate with Islam but instead began as a cultural 
practice in the Byzantine Empire and amongst Persian Sassanids.59  
The term comes from the oral ‘hajaba’ (root: h-j-b) which can be interpreted a number of 
ways both theistically and linguistically. One common interpretation of hajab is ‘veil’, though it 
can also be taken to mean ‘seclude’, ‘conceal’, or ‘mask’. Hijab, more specifically, is interpreted 
commonly as ‘cover’ or ‘veil’, but it can also mean ‘curtain’ or ‘obstacle’. Interestingly, the word 
has also been used to refer to talismans carried as a protection against ills, a common gift for 
children. An alternative interpretation of ‘hijab’ is ‘eyebrow’, more literally ‘protector of the eye’, 
while the similarly rooted ‘hajib’ is the word historically used to describe the individual 
responsible for choosing those suitable to meet the caliph.60 
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It is important to point out that the term ‘hijab’ is expressly referred seven times the in 
Qur’an; two of these uses are in the form ‘hijiban’, with the remaining five in the form ‘hijab’ 
(noun). Despite this, none of these instances in the Qur’an refer to the modern hijab nor to a head 
covering of any kind, prescribed or otherwise. Rather, ‘hijab’ is primarily employed in the Qur’an 
to refer to the abstract nature of creation. One notable example of Qur’anic use of the term is as 
follows: ‘Until (the sun) was hidden in the hijab (of Night)’ (38:32). Here, the term is metaphorical, 
conveying a covering of the sun and a transition into night. The Qur’anic meaning is twofold; hijab 
may refer either to something which covers, conceals or protects, or to something which acts. An 
example of the latter is offered in 41:5: ‘they say: Our hearts are under veils, (concealed) from that 
to which thou dost invite us, and in our ears is a deafness, and between us and thee is a hijab’ 
(41:5). Here, hijab refers to a symbolic inhibitor which prevents the unreligious from hearing or 
seeing God’s word.  Later in the Qur’an, ‘hijab’ is mentioned again in terms of a metaphorical 
veil: ‘between them shall be a veil, and on the heights will be men who would know everyone by 
his marks: they will call out to the Companions of the Garden, peace on you: they will not have 
entered, but they will have an assurance (thereof)’ (7:46). Here, the veil, or hijab, constitutes a 
figurative divide between the types of people wishing to enter paradise after death. The hijab has 
been used to denote both a protector role and a hindrance; which one of these two usages being 
referred to depend upon the context. Importantly, it is never used in the holy text to describe a 
garment or a physical covering for women, Muslim or non-Muslim.61 
One factor which complicates the debate surrounding the hijab is the synonymous use of 
‘veil’ and ‘hijab’ in modern discussions of the topic; El Guindi observes that in  the Arabic 
linguistic there is no one equivalent to the English term veil. It is pertinent, then, to separate the 
two terms; one must consider ‘veil’ a generalised term and ‘hijab’ a term intrinsically linked to 
Islam.62 Further, the work of Fernea63 and Roald64 suggests that the international conception of 
‘hijab’ is very different across different regions and communities; while the term now universally 
refers to a headscarf or veil worn by Muslim women, the word and its derivative garment may 
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vary.  The Encyclpedia of Islam cites over 100 words which refer to coverings for women, 
including the ‘izar’, ‘burqu’, ‘abayah’ and niqab’. Often, then, across different cultures, certain 
forms of veil will be referred to using alternate words, substituting niqab where it would otherwise 
be called a hijab, for example. Across nations, then, different variations on the veil are commonly 
referred to as a ‘hijab’.  For Example, a Saudi woman may wear a niqab and call it hijab, an 
American woman could use a headscarf and also identify it as a hijab.  Thus, the veil may be used 
to refer to any head covering, especially in Western society; however, this does not embrace the 
intricacies of the issue when it comes to Islam.  
Over all, those passages in the Qur’an which seek to prescribe female dress and similar covering 
can be found below: 
1. ‘And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their 
modesty; that they should not display their beauty and ornaments except to their husbands, fathers, 
their sons, their brothers,…. that they should draw their veils over their bosoms and not display 
their beauty. . . And that they should not strike their feet in order to draw attention to their hidden 
ornaments.’ (24: 31) 
2. ‘O Prophet! Tell thy wives and daughters, and the believing women, that they should cast their 
outer garments over their persons (when abroad): this is most convenient, that they should be 
known (as such) and not molested. And God is oft forgiving, most merciful’. (33: 59)  
3. Verse ‘oh you who believed, do not enter the house of prophet except when you are permitted 
…. is known as the a’yah (verse) of the hijab, in which God says, and when you ask [the Prophet’s 
wives] for anything ye want, ask them from before a hijab: that makes for greater purity for your 
hearts and for theirs’. 33:53.65 
The first of these verse makes use of the term ‘khomoore henna’ (from khimar), which 
translates as being covered, erased or veiled. Asad notes that the derivative, ‘khimar’ is less of a 
covering and more of an adornment, worn in the pre-Islamic era; it lay languidly behind the 
woman.66 The trend at the time was for the top of a tunic to lie loosely and openly in the front, 
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exposing the breasts; this was popular during the time of the Prophet, and the holy text makes a 
point of asserting that breasts are part of a woman’s body which should not be seen publicly, which 
explains the use of the term ‘khimar’.67  
The second verse includes term ‘jalabib’ (jilbab), which refers to an external robe or gown 
which extends the entire length of a person, or which covers the breasts and neck. Along with the 
aforementioned ‘khimar’, ‘jilbab’ indicates a Qur’anic basis for the practice of covering, which 
most frequently manifests itself in modern times as the wearing of the hijab.68 
A number of academics, however, have read these terms differently; Al-Tabari points out 
that traditional scholars interpret the first verse as saying something completely different to the 
second, and that these scholars disagree amongst themselves as to how they relate to modern day 
veiling practice within Muslim communities. He argues that, according to a number of critics, the 
first suggests that Muslim women can reveal their faces and hands.69 With regard to the second, 
the same scholarly community argues that this verse advocates a full body covering for women, 
with the exception of a single eye. It has been argued by Ibn Kathir that the terms ‘khimar’ and 
‘jilbab’ refer to this latter interpretation, in favour of a full body covering.70 When one examines 
the claims of Qur’anic scholars, common approaches are referenced against one another in order 
to determine their similarities and differences.71 Professor Mustafa Benhamza, a Moroccan 
academic, criticised the practice of citing the Qur’an without the required depth, context or 
religious knowledge. Benhamza argues that the necessity of veiling, for both genders, and the 
covering of the head for women, is a staple of Islam and its related texts, which is why it has 
become such a prevalent concept to those practising and studying Islam. Roald argues that ‘among 
                                                          
67 Marnia Lazreg, Questioning the Veil: Open Letters to Muslim Women (Princeton University Press 2009) 20-22 
Tabassum F. Ruby, ‘Listening to the Voices of Hijab’ (2006) 29 Women’s Studies International Forum 54. 
68 Hanisa Hassan, Biranul Anas Zaman, and Imam Santosa ‘Tolerance of Islam: a Study on Fashion among Modern 
and Professional Malay Women in Malaysia’ (2015) 5.5 International Journal of Social Science and Humanity 5.5, 
454. Also see: Dima Dabbous-Sensenig, ‘To Veil or not to Veil: Gender and Religion on Al-Jazeera’s Islamic law and 
life’ (2006) 3.2 Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 60, See also: Ziad Elmarsafy and Mustapha 
Bentaïbi, Translation and the World of the Text: on the Translation of the Word h Hijab in the Qur’an’ (2105) 21.2 
The Translator 210.  
69 Cited in Valerie J Hoffman-Ladd ‘Polemics on the Modesty and Segregation of Women in Contemporary Egypt’ 
(1987) 19.01 International Journal of Middle East Studies 23, 30. 
70 Cited in Tabassum F. Ruby ‘Immigrant Muslim Women and the Hijab’ (2004) CUISR, University of Saskatchewan. 
See also: T Zulfikar ‘Understanding Muslim Identity Trough Multiple Lenses: Insights from a minority group in 
Australia’ (2017) 1 Aricis Proceedings 619. 
71 Cited in Tabassum F. Ruby ‘Listening to the Voices of Hijab’ (2006) 29 Women’s Studies International Forum 54–
66. 
30 
 
Islamic scholars there is a consensus with regard to female covering but there is no consensus for 
the actual form of the covering’.72  
The argument in favour of the veil takes numerous forms; according to verse 33:59 of the 
Qur’an, the hijab is a form of self-preservation, as it claims that covering oneself prevents rape 
and assault. To elaborate, this passage refers to the era in which Saudi men in Medina would abuse 
the female slaves; some of these women were Muslim women, unbeknownst to the Saudi men. 
Women should wear coverings, so it is argued in this passage, so that it is apparent that they are 
Muslim women, which, theoretically, protected them from sexual abuse.73 
It has been argued that the opposite sentiment is true today, particularly in the wake of the 2001 
terror attacks on the US; this argument is no longer applicable. The figures indicate that Muslim 
women who wear a hijab or other covering are far more likely to experience verbal abuse and 
violence74, negating its supposedly protective function. 
For other commentators, the hijab is a symbol of freedom from the lustful gaze of men, 
and an act of autonomy over their own body; it is a prominent claim by those women who wear it; 
rather than a symptom of the patriarchy, the hijab acts as an emancipation from male 
objectification, aiding women in efforts to go about their lives with comfort and ease.75     
An alternative view is that provocative clothing and the prevalence of nudity and 
sexualisation in the Western media creates ‘fitnah’, or ‘temptation’; the Qur’anic interpretation, 
here, indicates that women must take some responsibility for an impure and adulterated culture.76 
The researcher argues that the hijab or veil will not protect women, change society or promote 
purity, as there are numerous other issues involved. The researcher has resided in Iran and 
Kurdistan for a number of years, later residing in the UK; this experience has uncovered that, for 
even covered women, being outside of the home after dark can be unsafe in Islamic states. This is 
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not so much the case in the UK, as women have more freedom when it comes to how to dress. It 
is also true that wearing a veil or hijab does very little to prevent abuse, sexual or otherwise, and 
has no effect on the male gaze. Bangladesh and Pakistan are Islamic nations considered amongst 
the most culturally traditional in the world, particularly in terms of the treatment of women due to 
the prevalence of Sharia law; despite this, rates of sexual assault and rape are still high.77 El Fadl 
a Muslim scholar, argued against ‘fitnah’ prevention as a motive for the prescription of the hijab, 
noting that, in the Qur’an, the term denotes non-sexual seduction, usually relating to ‘turbulence, 
disorder, enticement and opening doors to evil’.78 Further, he posited that the veiling was uncalled 
for on these grounds, as the fault is with the men who succumb to their desires and covet women, 
as opposed to anything inherently sexual with regard to women’s bodies. In other words, those 
Islamic jurists who support the act of veiling based on the theory of ‘fitnah’ acknowledge that a 
woman’s body is inherently sexual and reinforces the female body as an object of lust, which 
requires the prescription of modesty in the form of the veil.   
El Fadl goes on to assert that the prescription of bodily covering addressed to women, to 
prevent fitnah, is un-Islamic. He points out that fitnah is never referred to in the Qur’an as 
indicative of womanly lust, nor does it relate fitnah to the female body. According the Qur’an, 
both males and females should avert their gaze when encountering the opposite sex for reasons of 
modesty and so this negates the requirement that women cover themselves; a modest society 
requires from men these standards, rather than from women dressing.79 
Those strongly in favour of the hijab claim that the garment is not strictly religious, but 
represents a cultural division along gender lines based on traditional conceptions of Islam and 
personal faith. The argument goes that if the hijab was merely religious, it would be worn privately 
as well as publicly, instead of being worn primarily in the presence of non-familial men. To support 
this, proponents of this view turn to the Arabic root of the term ‘hijab’, which translates more 
closely to a separation than a covering. Notably, this interpretation is supported by the desires of 
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those European nations wishing to prohibit the hijab and other coverings; the separation of genders 
by dress is, they argue, at odds with civilised values.80  
Al-Qaradawi and El Guindi, both important Islamic writers, advocate the hijab on grounds 
of ‘modesty’. Linguistically, modesty relates to the Arabic word ‘awra’, which translates as 
‘inviolate vulnerability’ or that which must be covered; this includes those parts of the body not 
deemed appropriate for public exposure. For men, ‘awra’ refers to the portion of the body 
spreading from the bellybutton to the lower thig. This becomes more complicated when applied to 
a woman’s body; in a setting where non-familial men are present (those aside from the mahram), 
the awra consists of all but the hands and the face.81  
 
On the other hand, some have82 argued in favour of a less conservative approach which allows for 
the protection of women’s rights, while following an interpretation of the holy text.  
With regard to 33:53, academics have pointed out that this verse references only the wives 
of the Prophet, and so it may not prescribe that all women must cover themselves at all.83 The 
wives of the Prophet are presented as separate from the rest of womankind, as they must follow 
certain standards outlined by God; these include the refusal to remarry once widowed, and the 
doubling of reward and sanction for sin, as well as rules on bodily coverings.84 Traditional scholars 
of the Qur’an oppose this approach, arguing that the wives act as the standard to which all women 
should aspire; this begins with the wives, extends to the daughters, and then to all Muslim 
women.85 It also seems that this proclamation hails from Allah rather than the Prophet, due to the 
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usage of ‘say’, which does not usually appear in the teachings of the Prophet. ‘Say’ it is an 
unnecessary word if the Prophet just needs to convey this information to his family himself. 
Furthermore, applying the word of ‘say’ to some extent is logical when somebody believes that 
the Quran is not the words of God. This lends support to the argument that the Prophet is but a tool 
of delivery, rather than a source, of holy command. The family of the Prophet consists of all 
Muslims, so the command extends to all Muslims.  Within this, women are referred to using the 
term ‘nisa’; notably, there is no singular form, and so the implication is that the command is 
directed at all women.86  
The verse contains the proclamation ‘Let down upon them their over-garments’, which is 
indicative of jussive Arabic; this refers to commanding a second group, suggesting that this 
sentiment extends to all Muslim women.  The direct command from Allah, then, uses “say” (direct 
to the Messenger) , followed by the passage which begins ‘let down’ for the next group; the second 
acts (they may be recognized and not annoyed) as an answer to the first, as discussed in the Surah 
Al Hajj (Qur’an 22:27). All three groups (wives, daughters, and all Muslim women) are the 
recipients of the command, and so if they do not cover themselves, their personal iman is 
diminished. Dannia, which translates as ‘low and near’ serves as the root for the passage ‘let down 
upon them their over-garments’; this suggests a preference for low hanging clothing, which runs 
down to the wearers feet. This is supported by the use of ‘aleihin’, which means that the whole 
body must be covered, to the floor. The jilbab lies over the top, and hangs loosely and opaquely 
over the woman’s body. The command is them justified by proclaiming that women of Islam must 
be represented in their clothing, and this must convey modesty.87 
The head of the Minaret of Freedom Institute in Bethesda, Imad ad Dean Ahmad, rejects 
traditional interpretations of the Qur’an with regard to the hijab. He argues that “it’s an inference 
on the part of Islamic jurists to say that because modesty in the Prophet’s day meant covering the 
hair, it is therefore immodest for women today to leave hair uncovered”.88 Similarly, modern 
interpretations and progressive scholars such as Shahrour do not consider a failure to cover an act 
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of defiance against God.89 Further, Haida Mubarak, the head of the US Student Union of Muslims 
cited the Qur’an when she argued the following: ‘It is ultimately each woman’s prerogative to 
decide whether or not she will cover her hair…No one – not a father, husband, or brother – can 
ever force a woman to cover against her will. For that in fact violates the Qur’anic spirit of ‘‘let 
there be no compulsion in religion’’ (Qur’_an 2: 256). This, it has been argued, is a landmark 
statement in popular Islamic culture, and signifies a change in attitude towards the Qur’an and its 
position on women (l _ a ikr _ ah f_ı al-d_ın). Another an example often cited in debates of this 
nature is the article of the Madina Constitution following: ‘all citizens in the Islamic state constitute 
one political ummah, although they may belong to a plurality of religious affiliations.90 Mubarak 
interprets the supposed rejection of coercion (ikr-ah) present in the Qur’an as in opposition to the 
prescription of the veil, and this is important in the change in attitude that is being undertaken in 
academic circles, in both the student body and the teaching staff. However, in reality, many view 
this interpretation as a slight on the traditions of Islam which stretch back centuries. Despite this, 
it seems this new interpretations of the holy texts are becoming increasingly popular among 
educated Muslim women, particularly those in the US.91 
In sum, the agreed upon view amongst traditional commentators and scholars with 
reference to the Qur’an is that women should cover themselves, though there is disagreement as 
to the extent to which the body, face or hair must be veiled. The prevailing view among orthodox 
interpreters is that the whole body must be covered, with the exception of one eye; others maintain 
that the hands and face may remain uncovered. On the other hand, more liberal approaches to the 
holy text acknowledge the vagueness present in the verses which relate to covering; thorough 
analysis is required, argue these scholars, in order to apply the Qur’an to the modern era, 
particularly with regard to religious dress. These modern scholars92 do not take the hijab related 
verses as untouchable, choosing to ignore the traditional, surface level interpretations of these 
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excerpts. Modern day Islamic scholars have also focuses on the absence of any explicit mentions 
of face coverings, or hair coverings, for that matter, in the Qur’an, and suggest that Muslim society 
rethink their rigidity towards prescribed dress based on these reinterpretations.93 As identified by 
Asad, there are a number of legitimate justifications for not stating the precise rules on covering; 
he states that the nature of society and humanity is under constant development, and asserts that 
the Qur’an verses may be considered a collection of ethical standards and guidelines which remain 
applicable over time and across centuries.94 
 
1.7.2. Feminism views on the hijab in Islam 
The Topic of covering or veiling is not merely a legal issue, as it has been the subject of 
much debate amongst feminist commentators and academics.95 The non-religious approach to 
feminism has been evident in these debates, even in Muslim states, with regard to promotion of 
women’s rights. That is not to say that feminism inspired by Islam is not gaining ground. This new 
trend advocates for the coexistence of religious practice and progressive values of gender equality. 
Secular feminist, sometimes called Western feminists, have asserted that the headscarf or 
veil representative of patriarchal values and should be prohibited internationally on human rights 
grounds.96 However, it has been pointed out that this approach assumes that Western values are 
universally applicable, which may not be the case.97 In addition, feminist scholars have put forward 
this view that freedom for women lies in secular education arguing that a complete ban on the 
hijab would complete this process.98 
                                                          
93 Dima Dabbous-Sensenig, ‘To Veil or Not to Veil: Gender and Religion on Al-Jazeera’s Islamic Law and Life’ 
(2006) 3.2 Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, University of Westminster, London, 60. 
94 Muhammed Asad, ‘The message of the Quran’ available at :< http://muhammad-asad.com/Message-of-Quran.pdf> 
accessed 08 June 2017. See also:  Tabassum F. Ruby, ‘Listening to the Voices of Hijab’ [2006] 29 Women’s Studies 
International Forum 54, 57-58. 
95Linda Duits, & Liesbet Van Zoonen, ‘Headscarves and porno-chic: Disciplining Girls' Bodies in the European 
Multicultural Society’ (2006) 13.2 European Journal of Women's Studies 103. See also: Charles Hirschkind, & Saba 
Mahmood, ‘Feminism, the Taliban, and politics of counter-insurgency’ (2002) 75.2 Anthropological Quarterly 339. 
See also: Myfanwy Franks, ‘Crossing the Borders of Whiteness? White Muslim Women who Wear the Hijab in Britain 
Today’ (2000)23.5 Ethnic and Racial Studies 917. 
96 Rachel Anderson Droogsma, ‘Redefining Hijab: American Muslim Women's Standpoints on Veiling’ (2007) 35.3 
Journal of Applied Communication Research 294. See also: Jasmin Zine, ‘Unveiled sentiments: Gendered 
Islamophobia and experiences of veiling among Muslim girls in a Canadian Islamic school’ (2006) 39.3 Equity & 
Excellence in Education 239. 
97 Jane Freedman, ‘Women, Islam and rights in Europe: Beyond a Universalist/Culturalist Dichotomy’ (2007) 33 
Review of International Studies 29. 
98 Hiadeh Moghissi, Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Limits of Postmodern Analysis (Zed Books 1999) 
117. See also: Norani Othman, ‘Muslim Women and the Challenge of Islamic fundamentalism/extremism: An 
36 
 
In France in 1989, for example, a prominent feminist solicitor and predecessor deputy Gisele 
Halimi stood down from the radical group called SOS-Racisme when this organization first 
supported the girls who were disallowed education due to wearing hijab in Creil. She argued that 
‘there cannot be integration without respect for the laws of the receiving country. There cannot be 
a change in mentalities without women’s dignity equalling that of men.’99 Similarly, the former 
Minister for Women’s Rights argued that any attempt to tolerate the headscarf is ‘equivalent to 
saying yes to the inequality of women in French Muslim society’.100 With regard to the hijab, 
secular feminism, whether from a Western scholar or one from the Middle East, posits that the 
headscarf is symbolic of inequality along gender lines. During a speech in Rome, Egyptian Islamic 
feminist Sha’rawi cited not the hijab but the burqu’ (burqa), which covers the entire neck, face, 
hair and body, as an obstacle to progress in terms of equality.101 Within feminist groups, there have 
been disagreements as to whether the hijab should be prohibited entirely in the name of liberty, or 
whether this view disregards the wishes and experiences of Muslim women who choose to cover 
themselves. The academic consideration of the issue has also come under scrutiny simplifying the 
issue; under secular feminism, it can be argued, all Muslim women become homogenised, spoken 
for by a group of Western women who know little of their lived experience. To remedy this 
problem of representation, general perception is that Muslim women who wear the hijab should 
have their voices heard on the matter, because these women can provide the deepest insight into 
the issue. In this regard, Edwin points out the importance of Western women listening to the 
religious factors inherent in the practice before attempting to speak on the subject.102 
Some such as Hayette Bounjema from SOS-Racisme and Zahia Ramani and Nadia Amioni 
from France Plus organizations have said that there is very little to distinguish the secular approach 
to that of racist ideologies, as the practise of refusing education to women and girls who wear the 
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hijab, as in the French example above, only seeks to marginalise these women further, almost 
punishing faith.103   
Islamic feminists have, in recent years, taken a similar approach to secular feminist in their 
attempts to preserve freedoms for women and promote women’s legal and social rights, in 
conjunction with interpretations of the Qur’an. Where they differ is that Islamic feminists are 
against the idea that feminist thought need to incorporate Western culture in order to be valid; the 
cultural and religious texts of Islam, argue this group, may provide a sound foundation for feminist 
arguments, particularly within a Muslim context.104 These feminists argue for the coexistence of 
feminist values and Muslim values. The proponents of the phrase ‘Islamic Feminism’ include Laila 
Ahmed105, Riffat Hassan, and Fatima Mernisi; these scholars advocate the above position. 
Moghadam argues that feminism is not inherently negated by Islam, as the religion is 
fundamentally in favour of the equal rights of men and women. It is only due to misinterpretation 
and misapplication that these values have been ignored in favour of an incorrect interpretation 
which permits the subjugation of women.106 This sentiment has been supported by Majid, who 
argues that the two approaches are not at odds, or inherently contradictory.107 Islamic feminism is 
built upon a desire to see women govern their own lives, and to interpret the holy texts 
independently. 
It can be argued, therefore, that Islamic feminism is in line with modern approaches to 
Islam, which attempt a constant reassessment and reinterpretation of the Qur’an for legal and 
cultural use. These scholars are often human rights activists and are pushing for a law which 
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respects these human freedoms; they claim that these values are rooted in Islam and do not 
necessarily require the input of Western feminism or secular ideology.108 
The Iranian feminist writer, Afsaneh Najmabadi, explained this perspective as a “radical 
decentring of the clergy from the domain of interpretation, and the placing of woman as interpreter 
and her needs as grounds for interpretation”.109 Muslim feminist have countered the traditional 
Islamic approaches which limit women to the sphere of the home and the family; this approach, 
dictated by Islamic rule, strips women of marital rights and limits female inheritance, to name but 
two restrictions of women’s rights. In the words of Nayereh Tohidi, this form of feminism is “a 
movement of women who have maintained their religious beliefs while trying to promote 
egalitarian ethics of Islam by using the female-supportive verses of the Qur’an and holy texts in 
their fight for women’s rights, especially for women’s access to education”.110  
In relation to the hijab, both Fatima Mernissi and Leila Ahmad, Moroccan and Egyptian 
respectively, have been prolific on the subject; the former argues that the rules governing the veil 
were only designed to be applied to the Prophet’s wives, while the latter disregards the headscarf 
as entirely unnecessary for Muslims’ women.111 
Much as non-religious feminism has been the target of religious criticism, Islamic 
feminism has been criticized for being too liberal with the concrete rules and traditions of Islam, 
which are dictated, argue the traditionalists, by the holy texts. A number of academics disagree 
that the veil can be reconciled with women’s rights and autonomy; the veil is a symbol, argue these 
critics, of cultural and religious imprisonment.112 Advocates of this view assert that the rigidity of 
the codes of Islam prescribes the behaviour and duties of women without objection. These roles 
limit women to the home, to their husband, to their children, disadvantages them in court 
proceedings and limits their societal rights. Any notion of women finding their own feminist 
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meaning in the Qur’an is overpowered by traditional conceptions of Islam, which are deeply 
rooted. 113 
The incompatibility of feminist thought and Islamic teaching is further exemplified by the 
difference in the fundamental approach; feminism is a term free of religion, while the former is 
based on faith. Speaking on the concept ‘Islamic feminism’, Hammed Shahidin argues that this 
phrase constitutes a contradiction in terms.114 
   Consequently, traditional Muslim groups have set themselves up in opposition to feminist 
thought, both Islamic and secular feminism. The former argue in favour for women’s rights from 
the perspective of Islamic culture and Qur’anic interpretation, while the latter takes the 
traditionally Western view of feminist arguments. 
It is concluded that in terms of the hijab within a Muslim context, it is a matter of debate 
as to whether this garment is a something which all Muslim women are required to wear as an act 
of religious dedication, or simply a personal choice made by women to represent their beliefs. This 
debate has divided opinions among both sides, by both liberal and traditional commentators. Even 
within traditional factions, there have been disagreements over the extent to which women should 
cover themselves. 
On the other hand, a more liberal readings of the Qur’an reveals a significant vagueness as 
to the intent of these verses, and the desired interpretations. The Qur’an requires deep linguistic 
analysis in order to glean any sort of clear interpretation, which is difficult to achieve with any 
holy texts. As for the sections which refer to veiling, they often negate and contradict traditional 
teachings when it comes to religious covering; there are no direct references to head, face or hair 
covering in these religious texts. Thus, a number of critics have argued for a new interpretation of 
Muslim dress with a focus on a newer, more linguistic approach to Qur’anic exegesis.115 
The feminist approach, on the other hand, is formed of two main perspectives, that of 
Muslim feminism and that of secular feminism, both of which has been vocal in the debate 
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surrounding the hijab. It is also true that both perspectives have been the subject of much criticism 
themselves; secular feminists views on the subject have been challenged by more traditional 
commentators and even by other religious feminists who argue that the secular view is poisoned 
by Western values and is unfairly biased against Islamic faith, some going as far as to say that this 
is a conspiracy act. Muslim feminism also has its critics, with traditional interpreters branding 
these feminists a defecting group who are attempting to bend the rules outlined in the Qur’an. The 
influence of traditional Islamic voices has limited the impact made by voices for equality; 
feminism has been largely ineffectual in this matter, as Muslim society is still conditioned by a 
patriarchal and suppressive culture.  
Following on from an exploration of the headscarf as it exists in Islamic ideology and 
feminist ideology, it is clear that the veil, hijab or headscarf is nothing more than a symbol of faith, 
with no tangible links to intolerance or fundamentalism; this renders the rulings of the ECtHR 
questionable. On the other hand, it has been put forward by some feminist schools of thought that 
some women who wear the headscarf are victims of a fundamentalism regime which strips them 
of their autonomy, such as that imposed by Islamic State or the Taliban. 
 
1.8. Methodology of the research 
One of the most important requirement of conducting successful research is choosing an 
appropriate methodology. Methodology is considered a road map during the process of doing 
research; in other words, without clear and appropriate methodology, academic research cannot be 
conducted successfully. Methodology is defined as a “systematic way to solve a problem.”116 It is 
also defined as “a science of studying how research is to be carried out.”117 The researcher in this 
thesis critically analyses the ECtHR’s decisions related to the freedom of religious expression. 
Therefore, this research is library based and employs the black-letter law, historical and 
comparative themes. The use of these themes included the review of literature, and comparing the 
decisions of the ECtHR with international and national approaches related to the freedom of 
religion.  In other words the qualitative methods have been used for this thesis. 
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 The researcher also considered, but discounted quantitative research or analytic statistics. 
The quantitative methodology relies on statistical data in order to measure particular events or 
phenomena, and then the researcher analyses the data to discover and test the relationship between 
the variable by using a deductive approach. This method is produces legitimate and scientific 
answers related to the subject of the research.118 However the main purpose of the current research 
is not identifying the figures involved in the decisions of the ECtHR regarding freedom of religion 
and whether or not they guarantee or violate religious manifestation. In fact, the main goal of 
conducting this research is to critically analyse the decisions of the ECtHR in terms of the freedom 
of religion in the legal framework. Although some statistics data have been used in this research 
study, they have not greatly influence the outcome of the research, which is why these statistics 
are taken from secondary sources and they are not generated by the researcher in the form of 
primary data. 
 It should be noted that the ECtHR’s judges often have varying perceptions and 
interpretations of cases under investigation. Consequently, there are often dissenting views in some 
of the cases. To put it in another way, there is no single reality, despite the claims of quantitative 
research in the natural sciences.119 Thus, the causal model, which is applied in the natural sciences, 
cannot be applied to analyse and reach conclusion about legal cases. As aforementioned, judges 
often hold differing views on the same case. The judgments of the ECtHR and the findings of the 
research, as human actions and social interaction, probably cannot be predicted or replicated like 
research in natural science would require. Due to this fact, contrary to the quantitative method, the 
findings of the current research cannot be considered an absolute truth and also cannot be 
generalized.120  
In the quantitative approach, the reality is external and objective; therefore, this method 
ensures that there is no relationship between the subjective biases of the researcher and the 
objective reality that he or she investigates. Therefore, in this kind of approach, the research is 
conducted as much as possible in a value-free way. In the quantitative paradigm, the researcher 
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attempts to explain and describe reality as it exists, not as what it ought to be.121 To put it another 
way, a researcher avoids normative analysis. It cannot be denied that part of this study describes 
and explains the reality or the situation of religious manifestation based on the decisions of the 
ECtHR, or in the some legal systems in the ECHR member states. However, this study has not 
restricted itself to just describing reality. The main purpose of this research is to critically assess 
and apprise of the decisions of the ECtHR in terms of religious expression. Through this critical 
analysis, the researcher makes normative recommendations to improve the situation of religious 
manifestation among the European members of the ECHR. 
As a part of the qualitative methodology the researcher has chosen three methods to conduct this 
research. 
Firstly the researcher has chosen Black–Letter law method as one of the most appropriate 
approaches to conduct this research. This legalistic approach focuses on analysing the primary 
sources of law, namely case law, statutes, and, to a lesser extent, academic commentary. In contrast 
to the social and natural sciences' methods, which are concerned with empirical data or 
experimentation, (either as a basis for its theories, or as a means of testing them), the black-letter 
theme deals with the analysis and seeks understanding of theoretical legal concepts in research.122 
Furthermore, the findings of black-letter law are not validated based on the empirical effects in the 
real world. Instead, its validity relies on developing a consensus among the academic 
community.123 It can be said that this methodology focuses on the law in the books rather than the 
law in action. The Black-Letter approach concentrates on the rules of law in the particular context 
of how they have been applied in particular cases. In this type of research, the questions take the 
form of asking, “what is law?" in particular context.124 Furthermore, this approach critically 
examines the contradiction between case law and the claimed societal purposes of the law. 
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Moreover, the critical aspects of black-letter research also emanates from exploring internal 
inconsistencies within the body of case law. Based on this fact, it seems that applying Black-Letter 
law is the best approach for this particular research topic. The thesis claims that there is 
inconsistency in the judgments of the ECtHR relating to interpretation of article 9 of the ECHR. 
Furthermore, the researcher highlights the potential of the some of the court’s judgments to be 
restriction on the freedom of religious expression which is enshrined in article 9. These decisions 
damage the relation and peaceful coexistence of different religions groups in the European 
community. 
  The black-letter law enables investigators to analyse religious expression from a legal 
perspective by overlooking the sociological and political implications while focusing solely on 
judicial pronouncements. Furthermore, analysing the decisions of the ECtHR and legal statutes in 
terms of the freedom of religion helps the researcher to understand what the law is in the context 
of article 9 of the ECHR. Understanding the legal dimensions of concepts such as freedom of 
expression, fundamentalism and tolerance, which are included in this research, clears a pathway 
to conduct logical and legal research. It should be noted that this research is not based merely on 
the black-letter law method; at the same time, in order for legal research to have a potential 
practical value, the researcher use historical themes and comparative legal methods alongside with 
the black-letter law theme.  
Another research methodology applied in this research is the historical theme. This 
approach, as a scientific method, examines the developmental and evolutional process of the 
selected area of the law in a chronological and systematic way.125Analyzing historical and 
philosophical developments in the past, in order to grasp the main basis of a legal regime and to 
profoundly examine different approaches towards the law, not only extends one’s insights but also 
improves one’s skill as a critically thinking researcher.126 In other words, in this approach, a 
researcher examines documents and other sources that include facts in terms of the research subject 
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with the aim of achieving a better understanding of current trends and future possibilities.127 The 
background of the decisions of the ECtHR and legislation in terms of religious manifestation must 
be taken into consideration when interpreting existing cases because the current law or fact is a 
combination of old and new endorsements. In the historical theme, an investigator is able to 
understand the context and backdrop for current legal issues. This method proves that law is not 
simply a trade but a discipline with a rich tradition.128 Whilst utilizing the historical theme, the 
researcher puts a legal stipulation in the context of its traditional roots, which helps the researcher 
to understand the exact means and purposes of the legal rules and texts.129 Thus, studies that 
interpret legal concepts in the historical context and provide a deeper understanding of these 
concepts are not only useful for historians, but also useful for a legal researcher. Moreover, this 
method explains why the law has assumed its present form, which adds a philosophical approach 
to the research.130 Therefore, this method concurs with the nature of this thesis. This Research 
attempts to explain and analyse the historical context and development of the freedom of religion 
in international documents and disputes that appeared during preparation of drafts, adoption of the 
instrumental and international documents in terms of religious freedom. 
   The third theme that can be applied to this research is the comparative approach. The 
comparative method of legal research is that systematic and jurisprudential method which we apply 
to gain new knowledge about the legal systems in respect of which we apply it, by taking 
cognizance of the similarities and differences of those legal systems.131 Among other methods, 
such as survey, participation, observation, and life history, the comparative method has been 
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regarded as the core method of social science. So far it can be said that all empirical social research 
deal with a comparison of some sort.132 
 Like other methods of legal research, the comparative method attempts to obtain rich legal 
information. This method presupposes that there are different legal rules and institutions in 
different legal jurisdiction. In other words, it believes in the pluralism of law. 133 Comparatists 
believe that, in order to understand law, it is not sufficient simply to study law as set forth in black-
letter law (treaties, legislation, and case law). Alongside this, a researcher needs to consider beyond 
the law as written formally in text. In other words, a researcher has to examine precisely the sub-
structural elements that influence law. These substructures, or invisible powers, include history, 
religion, geography, morals, customs, philosophy, and ideology.134 In order to compare legal 
systems neutrally and critically, researchers need to keep a distance from their own culture and 
prejudices, from the society under study, and the biases of their informants.135  
As aforementioned, comparative law has not focused only on the words on the pages but it 
also focused on the context. A contextual trend investigates the interpretation and application of 
law in action, or the law in practice. Through the analysis of the substructure of law, an investigator 
is able to understand and analyze law in a more comprehensive manner. A law in action, or a 
functionalist comparative approach assumes that law has social purposes. Due to this fact a 
functionalist comparative examination attempts to discover how different legal systems deal with 
the same kinds of problems in the context of their own societies.136 With the proliferation of 
regulatory regimes at the international level, this methodology has expanded its focus to include 
international law.137 With this explanation, this methodology can be applied to compare regional 
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regimes' handling of human rights in terms of the freedom of religion to how ECtHR handles such 
matters as a universal regime which is reflected in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights by the Human Rights Committee. In order to compare these two legal systems, the 
researcher needs to answer some questions beyond the legal framework. In other words, the 
comparative approach must concentrate upon the law in action, not simply the law in the books. 
This might be considered as a call for deeper research into legal sources and the social context 
around legal rules.138  
Researchers need to study background, history, structure, social, political, moral, and 
cultural justifications behind the ECHR and ICCPR in terms of religious manifestation. It is 
obvious that the decisions of the ECtHR regarding religious expression are different from those of 
the HRC. To compare these two legal regimes, a researcher cannot ignore the effects of elements 
such as geography, religion, and the history of the members states to both treaties. For example, 
the majority of the members of the ECHR are Christian, and the political systems of these countries 
are inspired by the concept of secularism. In contrast, the members of the ICCPR are composed of 
different religions, and they are states with different political systems. All of these elements can 
affect the insights of the ECtHR and the CCPR in terms of religious manifestation. Furthermore, 
among members of the ECHR, different approaches are followed regarding religious expression. 
For instance, in the UK the right of religious manifestation is politically and legally guaranteed. 
However, in France, in order to protect secularism and preserve the neutrality of the government, 
religious expression is restricted by law. In order to compare these two legal systems, researchers 
must go beyond considering the letter the law and examine the spirit of law as well. A researcher 
needs to analyse legal rules and practices in terms of the freedom of religion based on the social 
function and cultural contexts, such as historical background, and culture. It can be argued that 
simply comparing two legal systems without considering these subjects would detract from the 
value of the thesis, making it incomplete. It would also appear naïve not to do so.  
The main aim of comparison between ICCPR and ECtHR decisions is to extend awareness and 
insights to the ECtHR judges about the way that the other system deal with the cases related to the 
wearing of the headscarf. As long as, in the both systems, wearing the headscarf is a main subject 
of dispute, in comparing the reasons of judgments by the ICCPR as a near universal mechanism 
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with ECtHR as a regional mechanism, we may be able to pave the way for unification and 
harmonization in a way that guarantees and protects the rights and freedom of the wearer based on 
human rights criteria. 
 
1.9.  Ethical dimensions of the research 
As with all human activities, social research is subjected to individual, community, and social 
values. It is a necessity that researchers be aware of the ethical dimensions of the research and 
apply them in appropriate ways. Ethical aspects of the research examine what normally and legally 
should be done during the conducting of the research.139  It can be said that research ethics include 
the “moral principles guiding research from its inception through to completion and publication of 
results.”140  The degree of importance and effectiveness of ethical principles, depending on the 
subject, are different. For instance, with research where humans are the subject of the study, ethical 
principles play an important role. In this type of research, ethical principles emphasize that research 
is not a collection of data, but is also concerned with the dignity, rights, safety, and well-being of 
participants in research.141   
Nowadays, awareness of ethical principles and applying them proficiently in the research are 
as critical as being able to think creatively and logically when planning, conducting, completing, 
and validating research.142 In order to collect data regarding religious manifestation, the researcher 
does not plan to utilize interviews, questionnaires, focus groups, and ethnography methods. Instead 
of collecting this type of primary data, the researcher attempts to critically analyse the decisions 
of the ECtHR through the study and identification of secondary data such as cases, conventions, 
statues and review of secondary scholarly literature. A critical review and analysis is an example 
of secondary data with no participants intervention involved. However, there are several ethical 
principles that need to be observed in all research.143 For example, a researcher needs to strive to 
                                                          
139 Marilyn Aita and Marie‐Claire Richer ‘Essentials of Research Ethics for Healthcare Professionals’ (2005) 7.2 
Nursing & Health Sciences 119, 119, see also: Stephen D. Lapan, Qualitative research: An Introduction to Methods 
and Designs (1. Aufl .1; ed, Hoboken: Jossey- Bass 2011). 
140 The British Psychological society, Code of Human Research Ethics (2010) Leicester.p.5. 
141 Jane Stuart and Jacqueline Barnes, ‘Conducting Ethical Research’ (2005) National Evaluation of Sure Start 1, 5. 
142 Marilyn Aita, Marie‐Claire Richer, ‘Essentials of Research Ethics for Healthcare Professionals’ (2005)7.2 Nursing 
& health sciences 119,119. See also: H. Russell Bernard, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches (Sage Publications, Inc 2000) 659.  
143 Robert L. Miller, John D. Brewer, The A-Z of Social Research (Sage Publications Ltd 2003)345, 97-99. See also: 
Kenneth D. Bailey, Methods of Social Research (The Free Press 1994) 456. 
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avoid personal bias and opinions that may affect the study. Also, the findings of the research must 
be presented as accurately as possible. The present research is guided by these principles.  
1.10. Scope of the research 
One of the first tasks of a researcher is to define the scope of the area of study; having 
narrowed the scope of study can be time-consuming and lets us clarify the problem and study it at 
greater depth. This thesis aims to critically analyse the decisions of the ECtHR regarding the 
headscarf only, but it has not examined the other religious symbols like burga and niqab which are 
both highly concealing religious attires as a result of them being less common in the ECHR 
members and justifiability of the ban them in academic sphere due to the importance of facial 
expression and eye contact in the process of teaching and learning. In its decisions the ECtHR used 
the concepts of fundamentalism and tolerance as justifications to ban the headscarf in the 
educations sittings. The main concern of this study is not like previous scholars to prove whether 
the applicants of the cases were fundamentalist or intolerant, but the research will examine whether 
it is possible to apply above-mentioned concepts in these specific legal cases. To conduct this 
research, qualitative methodology has been used as the most suitable approach. 
 
1.11. Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into six chapters: 
In Chapter One, after an introduction and general statement on the decisions of ECtHR regarding 
the wearing of headscarf, the factual background of the relevant cases will be presented, followed 
by an outline of the view of international bodies, such as the HRC of, on the wearing of the 
headscarf. The headscarf is a religious and gender-specific symbol and so the researcher examines 
the view of Islamic scholars and feminists on the wearing of the headscarf.  
 Chapter Two reviews the key literature resources on the research topic. This chapter analyzes 
the views of female scholars, Islamic scholars and non-Islamic scholars on the background of the 
relationship between freedom of religion and the wearing of headscarf. In order to identify 
knowledge gaps, literature from authors regarding religious expression, particularly in Muslim 
cases, will be critically analyzed and reviewed. Unlike the first chapter , which focused on the 
issue of the headscarf using both Islamic and feminist ideology, this chapter addresses the legal 
applications of arguments surrounding the headscarf and assesses the legitimacy of rulings by the 
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ECtHR on the matter. To this end, the researcher hopes to draw attention to the existing gap in 
literature relating to cases of this kind. In the existing literature, many argue that the rulings of the 
ECtHR are problematic, as they are in themselves intolerant of religious expression and are an 
affront to freedom and liberty. Further, this research asserts that the use of fundamentalism and 
intolerance as terms which justify the decision to restrict the headscarf cannot have a legal 
grounding. This is discussed further in Chapters four and five of this thesis. It could be said, then, 
that this chapter outlines the evidence for research problem. 
Chapter Three attempts to shed light on the distinction between two aspects of the freedom of 
religion. The first is freedom to adopt and hold a religion. This is considered the ‘internal aspect’ 
of the freedom of religion. The second involves the freedom of practice, teaching, worship and 
observance, or the ‘external aspects’ of religious freedom. Furthermore, this chapter will include 
an analysis of debates and disputes which have emerged with regard to the term ‘freedom of 
religion’ during the preparation of drafts and international treaties. This chapter is primarily aimed 
at presenting a conceptual framework for understanding the underlying philosophy of the research. 
It is essential for one to first understand these in order to fully comprehend the research as a whole.   
Chapter Four includes a critical analysis of the decisions of the ECtHR on the wearing of the 
headscarf in educational institutions. First, the concept of fundamentalism will be examined from 
its historical and philosophical backgrounds. Then, based on this discussion, the decisions of the 
ECtHR regarding the wearing of the headscarf will be critically analyzed. This complement the 
literature review exercising in chapter two in providing of the research problem and putting in the 
context judicial influence and development of this area of law.  
Chapter Five discusses and critically analyzes the concept of tolerance used as a justification to 
ban the wearing of the headscarf by Turkey, Switzerland, and France. In this chapter, the researcher 
explores the concept of tolerance from a historical and philosophical perspective. Then, based on 
the findings, the decisions of the ECtHR are critically analyzed. Alongside these decisions, the 
judicial decisions of a number of secular and non- European countries will be analyzed and 
compared, acting as supplementary support and clarification to criticize the decisions of the 
ECtHR. In this chapter the researcher attempts to determine whether it is possible to prove 
tolerance view in the related cases through court proceedings.  After the historical and 
philosophical approach of the concept has been outlined, this research will assess the legitimacy 
of the rulings of the Court in cases pertaining to the headscarf. 
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 Chapter Six concludes the thesis, by exploring some of the major implications of the analysis 
undertaken in the preceding five chapters. Here, the main finding and recommendations are 
together with a mapping of the research contributions.   
 
1.12. Contribution of the Research 
The existing literature on the topic of the headscarf and religious expression as addressed 
by the ECtHR is largely fixed on legal process, largely ignoring the concepts cited and the 
historical background.144 This thesis attempts to address the ambiguity of tolerance and 
fundamentalism, both of which have been used as a justification by the court for restriction. This 
has been aided by an ideological and wider historical and social exploration of the concepts 
involved. The previous literature, then, has too frequently attempted an argument against the 
decisions of the courts without examining the language of the court or defining the concepts they 
are attempting to argue for or against, namely fundamentalism and intolerance. Therefore, this 
thesis set out has to outline the key definitions and their history, ideological implications and 
generally accepted meaning.  In this way, the legal aspects of the issue can be addressed with the 
knowledge of the origin of these arguments and the contexts which are being drawn upon by all 
parties; Thus, interpreting these and other legal terms whilst considering their historical contexts 
can be particularly useful not just for legal historians but also for researchers of legal matters. This 
benefit is compounded by presenting a philosophical dimension of these terms that helps one to 
understand how these terms have developed into their current form. In other words, this method 
adds a philosophical approach to the research.  In more direct terms, the conclusions reached in 
this thesis could be considered by judges in order to come to decisions which are more in line with 
human rights standards and true tolerance.  
 
 
 
                                                          
144 Discussion on concepts see, Henrik Palmer Olsen, ‘The Right to Freedom of Religion: A Critical Review’ (2000) 
Scandinavian Studies In Law 228. For further see: Alice Donald, and Erica Howard, ‘The Right to Freedom of 
Religion or Belief and its Intersection with other Rights’ (2015) A Research Paper for ILGA-Europe. School of Law, 
Middlesex University 1. See also: Sylvie Langlaude, ‘Indoctrination, Secularism, Religious Liberty, and the ECHR’ 
(2006) 55. O4 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 929-944. Also see: Dawn Lyon, and Debora Spini, 
‘Unveiling the Headscarf Debate’ (2004) Feminist Legal Studies 12.3: 333-345. 
51 
 
 
 
CHAPER TWO  
Review of Literature on ECtHR Cases Relating to the wearing of the 
Head Scarf as a Religious Symbol. 
2.1. Introduction 
The main aim of this chapter is to review the existing publications and materials pertaining 
to the topic under examination, in order to create a conceptual basis for further study and place the 
current work in its academic context; this exercise will aid the researcher in gaining a fuller 
understanding of the research area. A literature review also provides sources for the research, 
allowing a well-informed investigation and the ability to identify research gaps; the latter is the 
key aim of the literature review in this research, focusing on approaches neglected when tackling 
the issue of the headscarf under the context of the ECtHR. Until now, most of the research has 
revolved around the rulings of the court on cases involving the headscarf. The researcher found 
that most of the existing research has neglected to consider the historical and philosophical context 
of the concepts of ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘intolerance’ which are used as justifications for the 
restrictive rulings. This research, then, aims to assess the rulings of the ECtHR through an 
assessment of these terms using the aforementioned approaches.  
Not respecting religious freedom, especially in the context of religious manifestation of a 
person’s beliefs, has been at the core of a plethora of conflicts in the history of humankind. Out of 
necessity to address this issue, a number of agreements were reached by European powers in the 
17th and 18th centuries, namely the Peace of Westphalia (1648) the Treaty of Vienna (1606) and 
the Treaty of Paris (1763).145  In the more recent history, more specifically in the aftermath of 
World War II, we can observe focused efforts within the international community to establish more 
universally applicable and upheld guidelines regarding religious freedom. Consequently, the 
subject of religious freedom has been mentioned in various conventions and declarations both at 
the regional and global level. Regarding the former, one convention stands out above others in 
                                                          
145 Javid Rahman, ‘Accommodating Religious Identities in an Islamic State: International Law, Freedom of Religion 
and the Rights of Religious Minorities’ (2000) 7 International Journal on Minority and Group rights 139, 142. 
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terms of the relative effectiveness of its mechanism: the ECHR (1950). 146 This convention and its 
principles are institutionally implemented by the ECtHR thereby promoting some degree on 
consistency and uniformity in its member states- hence the reason for its perceived effectiveness. 
 In this context, the author’s aim is to evaluate seemingly contentious decisions of the 
ECtHR with respect to cases involving Muslims.147 As it will be demonstrated, the attribute of 
contentiousness can be ascribed to these cases based on the notion that violation of one’s religious 
freedom is considerably difficult to prove given the current procedural requirements under which 
ECHR operates. Furthermore, the analysis of the pertinent cases will highlight the posited view 
that the ECtHR’s decisions based on prevention of fundamentalism and intolerance actually 
indirectly assist in restricting and violating religious freedom of an individual or even a 
community. Additionally, such decisions can be perceived as not adhering to the international 
standards and obligations of ECHR’s member states regarding the protection of human rights and 
religious freedom.148 Given the importance of the aforementioned issues, it is obvious that 
numerous studies have attempted to analyse the existing decisions of the ECtHR concerning cases 
revolving around religious freedom.   
Having critically analysed the existing body of literature concerning the decisions of the 
ECtHR, the researcher has been able to provide a sound justification of his decision to conduct 
legal research regarding this very specific area of law. In addition, it is important to highlight how 
the present study complements the previously conducted studies. In terms of the time period which 
is covered in the present study, the researcher has decided to analyse pertinent literature published 
since 2000, as this is a year when the ECtHR issued decisions regarding the wearing of headscarf. 
Analysing studies conducted in this period has allowed the researcher to assess the depth and width 
of the existing research on the topic in question. Furthermore, the researcher has been able to 
identify with greater clarity the research problem that should be focused on within the existing gap 
in the literature. Finally, by evaluating the previously conducted studies, the researcher has gained 
a valuable insight into the choice of the most suitable research design for the present study.  
                                                          
146 Carole J Petersen, ‘Bridging the gap: The Role of Regional and National Human Rights Institutions in the Asia 
Pacific’ (2011) 13 APLPJ 174, 184. 
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148 Raihon Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan (2004), Communication No. 931/2000 U.N Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000. 
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  Another important function of the literature review is to identify and formulate the link 
between the existing body of literature and the research problem whilst also assisting the researcher 
in narrowing the focus on issues and aspects revolving around the wearing of religious symbols 
that have not been previously dealt with. Therefore, unlike the previously conducted studies, the 
present study explores in greater deep the concept of tolerance and fundamentalism taking into 
account also the development and evolution the meaning of these two terms over the time. To put 
simply, the researcher aims to clarify the relationship between the individual and the concept of 
fundamentalism and tolerance. The researcher seeks to question and to challenge the idea of using 
these concepts as a justification for banning the wearing of headscarf by the ECtHR. This is 
particularly due to the failure by the Court to present a convincing ratio decidendi supporting its 
decisions to justify its rulings by employing the abovementioned terms. Besides this, to go one 
step further, the researcher also debates the possibility of limiting one’s religious freedom purely 
due to having ideas of fundamentalism or intolerance whilst not causing any harm to other people. 
To evaluate thoroughly the existing body of literature, the researcher analysed relevant 
studies in several phases. In the first phase, given the main subject of the present study, the focus 
was on female researchers, followed by analysing the work of authors form non-Muslim countries. 
In the final phase, the researcher reviewed studies conducted by Muslim authors with respect to 
the question of religious freedom and a woman’s right to wear a headscarf.  
Across every stage, the researcher examines the rulings of the ECtHR on cases pertaining 
to the headscarf using different approaches. It has been put forward by some of the authors 
reviewed that the rulings of the court contradict with principles of gender equality and non-
discrimination, while others argue that the rulings of the court fall short of the requirement for 
‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ set out by the ECR in article 9. Western liberalism aims to 
promote diversity and harmony, though the ECtHR enforces this to a somewhat extreme degree, 
and ends up restricting the freedoms such religious manifestation which it claims to protect. A 
number of academics reviewed in this chapter have argued against the rulings of the ECtHR, 
claiming that terms such as extremism and tolerance are used without proof whether the wearers 
of the headscarf are members of any fundamentalist groups or not.  
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2.2. Female scholars’ views on religious expression in the context of the wearing of the 
headscarf 
Since the core subject of this dissertation comprises of a set of issues related to women’s 
right to wear a headscarf, it is appropriate to commence the literature review by analysing the 
views of female scholars regarding this very issue. The sample of analysed scholars includes both 
female researchers in general and also those who have been directly affected by a particular 
decision regarding the legality of the ban on wearing a headscarf.  
One of such scholars is Hilal Elver who elaborated on her experience and other issues 
related to wearing a headscarf in her book ‘The headscarf controversy: Secularism and freedom of 
religion’. 149 This book consists of two parts. Following the introductory part presenting the basic 
context the book’s topic, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 deal with the development of the Turkish 
government’s polices and the debate within the public regarding wearing a headscarf covering the 
period from 1980 together with an analysis of pertinent decisions by both national and 
supranational courts, namely ECtHR.  In the second part framed by Chapter 5 and Chapter 9, Elver 
shifts her focus away from the Turkish experience towards global perspectives and trends. For 
instance, Chapter 5 deals with the strong anti-Islamic sentiment that emerged post 9/11 and that 
redefined the essentially liberal framework in which wearing a headscarf was discussed, towards 
an environment which is informed by a sense of fear, Islamophobia and intolerance. The next three 
chapters within the second part of the book analyse how the question of legality of wearing a 
headscarf has been approached in three different countries: the USA, Germany and France. The 
last chapter of the second part concludes the whole book. The following section will examine each 
part of the book in more details. 
In her introduction, Elver outlines the issue of wearing a headscarf and how it is positioned 
within a wider discourse of human rights, secularism, and Islamic fundamentalism with ensuing 
Islamophobia, gender discrimination and the world’s governments’ legal responses to various 
issues within this context. The author does not shy away from clearly defining her own position in 
the pertinent debate by stating her rejection of the decisions made by both Turkish courts and 
ECtHR. She accuses these institutions of prioritizing the over-arching concepts of secularism and 
prevention of fundamentalism over one’s religious freedom, whilst maintaining that international 
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55 
 
law has acted contrary to its core principles by failing to uphold the rights of Muslim women to 
manifest their beliefs. 
In Chapter 2 the author details the context in which the headscarf controversy has been 
unfolding in Turkey. The main point emphasised by the author in this regard is the strong 
opposition of the Constitutional Court towards any effort of the political parties to strike a balance 
between the countries’s founding principle of secularism and the right of its citizens to religious 
freedom. Elver documents the institutionalised opposition towards certain aspects of religious 
freedom in Turkey by highlighting cases where Turkish women or even men faced repercussions 
based on their or their spouse’s wearing of a headscarf. In concluding chapter, the author 
formulates an argument maintaining that institutionalised secularism in Turkey is anti-liberal and 
poses a threat to women’s right in the country. 150 
Within Chapter 3, the author criticises ECtHR’s decisions regarding cases involving 
religious freedom and its manifestation by duly analysing the logical and legal framework in which 
European and Turkish secularism has been historically positioned. In this context, she maintains 
that the presence and influence of secularism in Turkey is informed by different historical 
experience than in case of other European countries. More specifically, the secularisation in the 
West originated from a complex transformation of Western society and thus represented a 
continuous, down-top process which mostly guarantees right to religious manifestation. On the 
other hand, the secularisation in Turkey was imposed on the society as essentially a political 
decision by the ‘founders’ of modern Turkey, namely Kemal Ataturk, whereby secularisation was 
supposed to be the key for emulating the power and progress of the West. 151 As a top-down 
process, the secularisation process in Turkey has never been truly integrated into the Turkish 
society as one of its cornerstones, or at least not by the majority of Turks.152  
The author then moves on the main subject of the book – the issue of wearing a headscarf 
as an expression of Turkish women’s specific religious beliefs. The analysis of this issue is 
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supported by the author’s academic background and is further enriched by her own personal 
experience and observation as a Muslim scholar. As a result, the author’s findings have significant 
value in terms of their validity. In the core of her argument, the author asserts that although wearing 
a headscarf can be a manifestation of not only specific religious but also cultural, political or social 
values and beliefs, none of these factors constitutes a reason to justify institutionalised 
discrimination of women wearing headscarf in the way it can be observed in Turkey.153 The chapter 
concludes with an analysis of ECHR’s decision from the perspective of the Turkish legal system, 
whereby the author emphasises the absence of any legal document or custom authorising the ban 
of wearing a headscarf in Turkey. 
Having analysed the legal system in Turkey, Chapter 4 is devoted to the criticism of certain 
ECtHR’s decision from a legal point of view. More specifically, the author evaluates the role of 
the court in various cases, namely Dahlab v. Switzerland154, Şahin v. Turkey155, Dogru v. 
France156, Kervanci v. France157, and El Morsli v. France158. First, Evler criticises the factors 
considered by the court as decisive in the process of arriving at a decision that favoured the banning 
of wearing of a headscarf. Some of these factors include considering the headscarf a means of 
proselytization, as a way to instigate gender inequality, as promoting a tendency towards 
fundamentalism, or as an expression of disrespect and intolerance towards the dominant culture. 
Another problematic aspect of the above-mentioned cases is the tendency of the court to favour 
national legal systems in case of a discrepancy between a national and supranational law – a 
phenomenon called the margin of appreciation.159 The author furthermore argues that decisions 
taken by ECtHR with respect to the cases mentioned above were substantially governed by a set 
of prejudices, stereotypes, presumptions and politically infused considerations. Moreover, the 
court seems too often to neglect or even to ignore the nuances of each case, evidence of which can 
be found in the uniform approach taken by the court in explaining its decisions.160  
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To put simply, the author maintains that the court has adopted “one size fit all” attitude in 
dealing with the pertinent cases.161 Finally, she argues that in the post 9/11 era, the court’s 
decisions in cases dealing with Islam or Muslims can no longer be considered entirely objective 
and neutral. 162 Additionally, the factor that the ECtHR is located in France, which has shown 
inclination towards the banning of wearing a headscarf, should be also taken into account.163 She 
duly observes that the justification for the ruling in the case of the Refah Party, which centred upon 
the prevention of Islamic fundamentalism, could not possibly be applied in states with a non-
Muslim majority population, unlike Turkey. 
In light of the questionable commitment demonstrated by Turkey in the arena of human 
rights, the author has criticized the ECtHR for allowing the ‘margin of appreciation’ to the national 
courts of Turkey over these cases.  The author argues that margin of appreciation’ only worsens 
the human rights landscape of Turkey, arguing that the ECtHR as a supranational body should be 
more proactive in such controversial cases, including those pertaining to the headscarf. 
 In Chapter 5, Elver provides a comprehensive summary of the development of a strong 
anti-Islamic sentiment that is currently permeating the wider discourse regarding the freedom of 
manifestation of one’s religious beliefs in general and the wearing of a headscarf in particular. The 
author rightly points out that such sentiment is in stark contrast with the values on which modern 
European states are based.   
Chapter 6 discusses the current socio-economic conditions in France. In this context, the 
author highlights that there is a popular narrative concerning a headscarf being a symbol of 
fundamentalism, radical Islam and aggressive Islamism. Furthermore, she underlines the fact that 
Muslims in France often face problems of social and economic exclusion and have to deal with 
widespread manifestations of racism. Elver analyses the work of the Stasi Commission in France 
and emphasises the way in which political secularism can be held responsible for introducing the 
ban of a headscarf in French public schools in 2004. To put simply, the rationale for passing this 
law is according to Elver purely political.164 Not shying away from using strong words, the author 
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claims that this law originated the widespread Islamophobia that fuels the hysteria that Islam and 
Muslims aim to destroy French culture and the foundations of the French republic. 165 
Using France as her first case study, Elver continues by analysing the situation regarding wearing 
a headscarf in Germany whilst comparing and contrasting both countries. The fundamental 
difference in this regard is, according to the author, the fact that relevant cases in Germany 
revolved around teachers rather than students and converts rather than the second or third 
generation of Muslim immigrants. Her analysis of the case Ludin v. Germany166 is particularly 
illuminating. In this case, although the German Federal Constitutional Court first accepted the 
arguments of a Muslim school teacher,167 it later provided states with a right to ban the wearing of 
a headscarf in schools. The author also duly stressed the fact that as people of Turkish origin 
constitute the biggest minority in Germany, the pertinent discourse is considerably shaped by the 
relationship between the Turkish minority and the state. Another difference between Germany and 
France stems from the character of their political systems, whereby the federal system in Germany 
provides individual states with a significant degree of autonomy. She concludes this chapter by 
arguing that since ‘German values’ are less institutionally defined than ‘French values’, there is 
more of an opportunity in Germany than in France to create more pluralistic environment that 
would respect religious freedom.   
The last country to be analysed by Elver is the USA where there is not such a direct focus 
on wearing a headscarf, as this is rather an element of a broader discussion regarding Islam’s 
position in the country. And yet, in the post 9/11 America and with two wars waged in Muslim 
countries – Iraq and Afghanistan – a strong current in this discussion revolved around the USA’s 
‘mission’ to liberate oppressed Muslim women, with the headscarf seen as an outer manifestation 
of this oppression. On the other hand, American Muslim women perceive headscarf as the symbol 
of their American Islamic identity which has so far been respected by the American judicial 
system. In this regard, the author emphasises that although no case involving wearing a headscarf 
has been discussed by the Supreme Court, American Muslims have to face various forms of deep-
seated Islamophobia that is spreading across the country with an increasing intensity.168 
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To conclude the book, Elver once again underlines her key argument that there is an 
institutionalised effort expressed through judicial, legislative and administrative decisions and 
policies that represent a form of discrimination against women based on what they wear. As a 
result, these women are often prevented from fully participating in the social and economic life of 
a given country.169  
 Based on the overview in the section above, it can be argued that the core of Elver’s 
argument considers secularism and fear of fundamentalism as the main instigators in this regard. 
According to the author, secularism inevitably introduces elements of inequality and 
discrimination against women and accuses Muslims women of fundamentalism and intolerance; 
whereas it could be argued that these women merely wish to manifest their religious beliefs. 
In this context, she extrapolates from her own experience of being a Turkish woman, thus 
she condemns not only Turkish but also Western secularism. However in doing so, she fails to 
recognise the existence of more liberal and tolerant secularism. Similar notions can be observed in 
Denli’s argument that secularism is not neutral in its approach towards all religions and beliefs 
active within a given society170. Rather, as she maintains, secularism is ‘a normatively prescriptive 
model that favours certain forms of modern religion at the expense of the religions that are equally 
legitimate.171  
Furthermore, there are some paradoxes in Elver’s arguments, insofar as an the one hand, 
she is very pessimistic about a future in which secular parties ban expression of religious beliefs, 
while emphasising how AKP and Islamist political parties are fighting against inequality and 
discrimination against women. Yet, on the other hand, she presents statistical data showing that 
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the participation of women in economic, political and social life has been at its lowest level during 
the reign of AKP.172 In order to justify the poor performance of the AKP in their efforts to promote 
women in government, the present author would suggest that this low percentage of women in the 
public sector may be partly due to cultural factors and the failure of the previous secular 
governments. Despite of optimistic expectations of the AKP party, however, Turkey continues to 
score lowly when assessed for markers of human development in compare with other ECHR 
member states.173   
To conclude the assessment of Elver’s book it should be emphasised that she provides a 
useful summary of various attitudes and policies of different countries with respect to secularism 
and headscarf.  Elver uses in her analysis logical and legal arguments which render her claims and 
assertion quite convincing. However, similar to a number of other researchers working in this field, 
she fails to define and clarify terms such as secularism, discrimination, extremism, 
fundamentalism, intolerance and court’s neutrality which she and others employ in the discussion 
regarding the legality of banning the wearing of a headscarf. This lack of clarity in employing 
terms which are not properly defined is what this dissertation aims to avoid in discussing its main 
subject.  
The review of Elver’s book demonstrates that despite the author’s attempt to critically 
evaluate the ECtHR’s decision with respect to the wearing of headscarf,  the book fails to clearly 
state, by  using sound and strong arguments, its opposition towards the way in which the Court 
justified its decision. She rightly criticises the decisions of the court to restrict religious 
manifestation in the name of secular values and prevention of fundamentalism and intolerance, all 
of which are broad and controversial. Elver however, like previous researchers, avoids illuminating 
the concepts of fundamentalism and tolerance to prove that the use of these terms in the cases 
related to the wearing of the headscarf is logically and legally wrong. When analysing Court’s 
decisions regarding cases from Turkey, Elver rightfully looks closer at the concept of secularism 
within the historical context of the Turkish society. Using the historical theme to analyse concepts 
such as secularism, provides a more comprehensive understanding of the concept and also enables 
the researcher to evaluate the Court’s decisions’ compatibility with the socio-historical 
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development of the term. It is therefore apparent that one of the main strengths of Elver’s research 
is positioning the concept of secularism into its historical context. By doing so, Elver presents the 
reader with valuable insight into the development of secularism as a concept in Turkey, and 
partially in France, which the researcher can utilise when discussing in the present study secularism 
and the evolution in the understanding of this term in the last few decades.   
One other female researcher, Susanna Mancini, in her article174 focuses on comparing the 
use of the headscarf or hijab by Muslims against the wearing of a crucifix in Italian schools. The 
court case surrounding this latter issue considered the crucifix to be a cultural symbol, and that the 
wearing of a cross does not interfere with human rights or democracy. Therefore, the image of the 
crucifix is secularised, a view which the Catholic Church rejects due to the importance of the 
crucifix as a religious, rather than a national or socio-cultural, symbol.175 
Nonetheless, in the decision of the court, a crucifix has a more transcendent meaning among both 
Christians and non-Christians, meaning it is permitted to be hung in classrooms and halls at schools 
without causing offence to any student or adult. This is argued from the stance that the cross has a 
religious interpretation for Christians and a national and cultural meaning for non-Christians.176 
Mancini argues against this decision, stating that this symbolisation serves only to perpetual the 
colonial and homogeneous image of European society in opposition to the emergence of multi-
cultural states and nations across the continent. As commented by Evans, to position a religious 
symbol as holding national and cultural meaning for all minorities, regardless of whether it is a 
majority position, has severe consequences for religious freedoms and human rights.177 For 
instance, the ECtHR in the case Dahlab stated that it is ‘scarcely conceivable’ that teachers were 
allowed to wear religious items but the school itself was banned from displaying crucifixes. In this 
case, teachers were able to wear 'small pieces of jewellery' without any particular fuss, without 
consideration of the fact that additional discussion would have demonstrated that these pieces of 
jewellery were very often crucifixes, which are considered to have a different place discretely worn 
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around a teacher's neck than placed on a wall and held to demonstrate the school's values.178 
Mancini added that the judges do not argue against the concept of secularism, but interpret it in a 
manner that is suitable with the permissions given to Christianity, alongside the example of other 
cases of countries including, Italy, Germany and Switzerland which are permitted to display 
crosses within schools.179  
Mancini examines this decision of the ECtHR in regards to the cross alongside the 
discussions related to the use of headscarves by Muslim women. In contrast with the symbolism 
of the crucifix, headscarves have been viewed as a cultural symbol too, but also a political one, 
which in both senses opposes the values of democracy, human rights, and 'European' society.180 
Furthermore, Mancini argues that this approach to secularism may compromise the success of 
diversity and pluralism across Europe, and so threatens the staples of peace and stability.  
Importantly, she adds that the concept of secularism by the state in terms of addressing religious 
affairs is important across all treatments of religions; it is illogical for the state to at once permit 
the wearing of a crucifix but to simultaneously oppose the use of a headscarf. It is not only an 
offence against state neutrality, but is also an opposition to freedom of religion.181 
In her article, Mancini disagrees with the French Stasi Commission in its conceptualisation of 
headscarves as symbols of inequality, discrimination and intolerance. For a state to uphold its 
requirements to respect human rights, it is necessary for them to commit to the protection of 
religious freedoms, rather than banning religious symbols. This can be discerned in a paragraph of 
the report led by the Stasi Commission, which links gender equality to the image of a woman as a 
sexual object, such as the stereotypical image of a man forcing a woman or girl to wear Muslim 
dress and head coverings, and to not look at or talk to other men, in order to avoid being considered 
a whore. The report uses double standards to deal with the right of women to choose their clothing; 
on the one hand, the state is concerned that some girls might be forced to adorn the headscarf, 
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while on the other, the state assumes that it is better for a women to be bare headed than for her to 
cover her head.182 
Therefore, Mancini considers that preventing citizens from wearing religious clothing or 
symbols should not and cannot be linked to any objective characteristic of the religious symbol 
itself. A student or teacher who wears the hijab may by their actions violate the right and freedom 
of others, but it is such infringement that should be punished, not the fact of wearing of religious 
symbol. To assert that the symbol of the headscarf opposes gender equality is an assertion based 
on assumptions rather than clear evidence. If a student or teacher is to wear a religious symbol 
such as a hijab or headscarf, they should be punished from infringing another person's right; rather 
than for wearing that particular item of clothing.183 This is true for cases where manifestations of 
a religious nature affect the ability to do their job. For example, a school may implement a rule by 
which teachers may not preach or indoctrinate students towards a certain religion. 
Although the author presents a strong argument in terms of the case study of the crucifix 
in comparison with the Muslim headscarf, her argument is weaker in her comparison of this within 
the cases of Otto-Preminger-Institute v Austria184, Wingrove v. United Kingdom185, and Handyside 
v United Kingdom.186 In three last cases what is restricted is not religious expression of the 
applicants, but the freedom of expression. In contrast to the wearing of the headscarf or crucifix 
which are religious symbols, what were the forbidden in the aforementioned cases were 
dissemination of the film which may offend the belief of the believer but does not threaten religious 
freedom.187 
It has been additionally argued by Mancini that the ECtHR is unable to validate claims that 
Islamic principles are at a conflict with human rights. It is perhaps surprising that similar claims 
have been made by the author without providing proper explanation regarding other monotheistic 
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faiths with non-negotiable dogmas such as Christianity. These claims imply that the faiths are 
undemocratic, but no sufficient explanation is provided for the claims. 
 It has been stated by Mancini that if the wearing of the headscarf is one such practice that violates 
fundamental rights and freedoms, it should be restricted.188 Nonetheless, the idea of ‘fundamental 
rights and freedom’ has not been clearly defined in a collective way that takes into account each 
specific socio-cultural context in which it is applied. After all, out of necessity the definition of 
fundamental rights and freedoms must vary somewhat and carry nuances in accordance to each 
individual place. 
The most important aspect of Mancini’s study is the comparison between the crucifix and 
headscarf as two religious symbols in order to support the notion that both equally constitute a 
form of religious manifestation that should be respected and not prosecuted by the state. The author 
goes even further when asserting that imposing secularisation upon women in terms of dictating 
what they can or cannot wear contradicts the contemporary understanding of the concept of 
secularism as being supportive of religious pluralism. Despite her strong arguments in some places, 
the author is less persuasive in discussing the apparent contradiction between religious freedom 
and secularism from a legal perspective. Moreover, Mancini seems to predominantly focus on the 
comparison between the wearing of a headscarf and crucifix whilst neglecting to some degree 
other legal case that are linked with the issue of religious freedom and the ECtHR’s approach to 
dealing with this issue.  Also, by pointing at cases related to the freedom of expression as a means 
of criticising the Court’s decision in cases involving some form of religious manifestation, the 
author is perhaps unduly mixing two distinctive issues. In the proceedings for the Lautsi case, it 
was argued that the crucifix was representative of harmony and tolerance, and went some way to 
preventing fundamentalist thought. When the headscarf was considered by the ECtHR189, another 
religious symbol, it was linked to the promotion of fundamentalist thought. The author has failed 
to demonstrate a philosophical and historical understanding of the concept of the fundamentalism, 
in order to critique the decisions of the court. It is relevant that the concept of fundamentalism was 
first observed in Christianity while using the crucifix as a symbol of their religion. Later on 
fundamentalism became a global phenomenon.  
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Based on the abovementioned strengths and potential weakness of Mancini’s study, the 
researcher has decided to critically evaluate the obvious clash between secularism and 
manifestation of one’s religious beliefs in the context of the ECtHR’s decision and also to compare 
these decisions with decisions of other international and national judicial bodies with respect to 
the public display of religious symbols. This allows the researcher to compare the legal 
perspectives of various legal bodies regarding the pertinent issue whilst also the assisting 
researcher in identifying possible factors and substructures influencing the differences in these 
perspectives, particularly in the context of decisions regarding the wearing of religious symbols. 
Thus, the researcher can present a more precise in-depth analysis of the Court’s decisions in 
pertinent cases.  
Another author whose work should be reviewed is Carolyn Evans, a professor that is well 
known regarding her research on women and religion. In her article190 , she explores and analyses 
the case studies of Leyla Şahin v Turkey191 and Dahlab v Switzerland192, paying specific attention 
to the decisions taken by the ECtHR on the matter. Within her introduction, she firstly highlights 
how the conversation surrounding the wearing of the headscarf is deeply entrenched in both 
political and legal debate. She then subsequently analyses the donning of the scarf from within a 
religious right paradigm. From this, she draws the conclusion that the wearing of the ‘headscarf’ 
very much falls under the category of the right to ‘practice’ religious freedom. Therefore, similarly 
to the HRC it is necessary that the European institutions protect the religious rights of the 
individuals involved, thereby ensuring that they are able to wear religious garments of their choice 
without any interference from another party.193   
  More specifically, in the case of Dahlab v. Swiss194, the Swiss court supported the 
prohibition of a primary school teacher regarding the wearing of her headscarf, claiming that the 
scarf was a ‘powerful external symbol’ that would influence the children. As a result, the teacher 
involved was expelled from the school even though there were no existing laws within the legal 
system that supported these claims and gave authority for the action that was subsequently taken. 
Following this logic of the court the researcher argues that the court’s decision is implicitly 
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incompatible with the important principle of ‘No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence 
on account or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national law at the time 
when it was committed.195   
  The author asserts that if the ECtHR allows the wearing a crucifix which is seemingly just 
a piece of jewellery, then it is clear that the court has a tendency to consider and value beliefs of 
the Christian majority to a higher degree than is the case with Muslims or other religious 
minorities. This, according to Evans, is tantamount to a form of discrimination and preference of 
one religion over others.196  
Following this, the author examines the main reasons behind the court’s support of the 
decision to expel the teacher and student from the school.197 One of such reasons is prevention of 
proselytization. In this context, she highlights the fact that there is no clear direct or indirect 
evidence that could justify the court’s reasoning that this expulsion was a means of preventing 
proselytization in educational institutions. To put simply, it was not explained by the court how 
wearing a headscarf constitutes proselytising. To support her claim, the author refers to Dahlab’s 
reply to students asking her about the reason for wearing the headscarf in which she stated that she 
just wants to keep her ears warm, thus avoiding any notion of religion.198 
Another contested point mentioned by Evans revolves around the court’s argument that banning 
the wearing of a headscarf is a way to prevent inequality and discrimination. To counter this 
argument, the author points at the fact that both Dahlab and Leyla are experienced teachers with a 
high level of integrity who addressed the court to reject what they consider as injustice being done 
on them. Moreover, she duly emphasised that in countries where both women reside, no benefits, 
either social or economic, are provided based on the fact whether a woman is wearing a 
headscarf.199 
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 In the spirit of Gandhi’s quote that ‘intolerance is itself a form of violence and an obstacle 
to the growth of a true democratic spirit200, the author argues that the court failed to provide 
evidence that both women were in any way, shape or form intolerant towards others.   
Finally, Evans rejects the other argument presented by the court, maintaining that protection of 
secularism, used as a basis for the court’s last argument supporting the ban, has not served to 
guarantee equality between different theistic and non-theistic believes followed by the country’s 
citizens, but rather, it was exploited to prefer one specific modern religion (she deems secularism 
as religion) over all the others.201 In this context, it is worth considering Heimbach’s assertion that 
public authorities normally interpret the principle of secularism in a way that guarantees and 
protects the interests of the states rather than of human rights.202   
The court has argued that a religious wearing of the headscarf should be limited due to the 
link between the headscarf and extremist ideology. With this in mind, and like the previous 
scholars, the author makes her arguments based on purely legal reasons without profoundly 
examining the concepts which the court uses as justification to restrict religious manifestation. In 
order to establish whether or not a connection exists between the headscarf and fundamentalism, 
there must be an examination of the context behind both to ascertain whether it is a relevant claim. 
Although Evan has provided numerous clear logical and legal arguments undermining the 
correctness of the court’s decision concerning the two pertinent cases, the author failed to introduce 
comprehensive yet usable definitions of the terms employed very extensively in her work in 
general and in her arguments in particular. Among these terms are words such as proselytise, 
discrimination, intolerance and legal understanding and implications of the concept of secularism. 
For instance, the term proselytise is addressed by Evan in both Dalhab’s and Kokkinakis’s case 
and comparison is made between these two cases. However, it should be noted that whilst Dalhab 
was a teacher at a primary school where children are much more susceptible to teacher’s influence 
in terms of creating their value system, Kokkinakis worked with adults who have a much greater 
degree of autonomy to filter information whilst their belief system is much more stable.203 
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Notwithstanding the fairly extensive provision of legal evidence employed by the author 
as a means of supporting the wearing of the headscarf, Evan’s research does not offer a deep 
enough insight into the way the Court justifies banning the wearing of headscarf from a socio-
historical perspective. Similarly, in the author’s attempt to use a comparative approach, there is an 
evident over-dependence on comparing between the crucifix and headscarf. This leads to the 
author neglecting the precedents set by the ECtHR together with a host of other international and 
national legal bodies with respect to forms of religious manifestation. Ignoring these precedents 
then undermines the author’s attempt to evaluate the Court’s decisions in the context of the 
international human rights standards.  
Using the above-mentioned findings with the intention of avoiding related shortcomings, 
the researcher’s inquiry goes beyond the provision of sound evidence and focuses primarily on 
analysing and critically evaluating the Court’s decision and concepts that influenced them.  
Karen Armstrong’s seminal work ‘The Battle for God’ addresses extremism, in particular religious 
fundamentalist thought and behaviour, across its ten key sections.204 Unlike her contemporaries, 
Armstrong maintains a strong focus on traditional conceptions of fundamentalist thought and the 
way interpretations have changed over time. The nature of this work aids those interested in the 
subject to cultivate an understanding of the concept and the variety of approaches towards it. It is 
also true that Armstrong’s previous experience and academic background, as well as her style of 
analysis, has contributed greatly to the corpus of academic work on the subject of fundamentalist 
activity. Armstrong, it has been argued, addresses those topics and approaches neglected in the 
existing literature, as her work is supported and strengthened by the attention it has garnered from 
other important academics.205  
In her examination of fundamentalism, Armstrong first outlines two important terms: ‘mythos’ and 
‘logos’. According to Armstrong, these are the two elements key to uncovering truth, as they offer 
a foundation for the way in which people understand their lives. Myths provide a means of 
interpretation and understanding, via faith, mysticism and bigger questions of human nature. These 
myths were not provable or supported by fact, but provided an answer to universal questions; 
myths allow human beings to consider their own lives in relativity to the divine or to the universe 
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through tradition, ritual and inherited memory.  It is the nature of myth that it cannot be approached 
with empiricism as it is not based on science or fact; instead, the myth imbues human life with a 
purpose, whether imagined or otherwise.  
The alternative to mythos, claims Armstrong, is logos, which refers to logical reality. Logos 
addresses the physical world and its patterns, with a scientific basis. While mythos relies on ancient 
beliefs and long-standing traditions, logos is forward-thinking, always attempting to find new 
perspectives. Using both mythos and logos, Armstrong compares modern and traditional 
approaches to understanding, with a strong religious focus. She maintains that human nature has 
changed very little in essence, with the notable exception of faith and spirituality. This is where 
the two concepts come into play, as myth and logos impact how people live, behave, think and 
express themselves. Mythos and logos are both utilised when pursuing truth, with each interacting 
with the other to establish human beliefs and human behaviour. Traditionally, myth has always 
been the dominant approach. Armstrong outlines the terms in the opening of ‘The Battle for God’ 
and suggests that fundamentalists base their worldview in myth rather than the fact- based 
approach of logos. 
After her examination of the key terms and concepts, Armstrong addresses the treatment 
of the Jewish population of Spain at the hands of King Ferdinand after the reclamation of 
Granada.206 Jewish communities were forced to embrace Christianity or face exile from their 
home; similar numbers chose to leave as chose to convert. Europe was in a state of upheaval during 
this time, as several national populations were rising up against conservative rule, action which 
was largely successful. This success, it has been argues, has brought about an era of industrial 
advancement and forward-thinking politics, based in reason and scientific fact. Much of the Jewish 
population forced into exile struggled to integrate themselves into new communities. As a result 
of this, many embraced a secular way of life. Those who did not attempt to integrate into life in 
the West considered this way of life an affront to faith, as they believed that capitalist ideology 
and the rise of technology would replace Judaism. Dogmatic belief became the refuge for these 
communities, the way in which their religious truths would be preserved. This included a denial 
of modern interpretations of the Torah, instead clinging on to traditional and direct interpretations 
of the text.   
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Armstrong goes on to address a comparable Muslim example of such rationale, centering 
on communities in Egypt, Iran and the former Ottoman Empire.207 The Ottoman Empire, claims 
Armstrong, made great efforts to create a contemporary society, and were largely fruitful in these 
attempts; the Ottoman Empire was considered forward-thinking when compared to other global 
empires. The author argues that state development in organizational terms and policy may not 
result in advancement in every area. As Armstrong asserts, a modern approach may not result in a 
forward-thinking society; in a number of Islamic nations, attempts to modernize governance have 
not translated to a change in general attitude. When it comes to Western states, modernization has 
come from changes in government practice and national ethos, and has trickled down to 
community and societal attitude; a big part of this has been the establishment of secular practice. 
On the other hand, in predominantly Muslim states, governments have essentially dictated changes 
in national ethos and forcibly implemented them.  For instance, the governments of Iran and Egypt 
have long bought arms from the West, which has strengthened their military influence on an 
internal scale. The dominance of Western and secular states, however, have caused dejection in 
Muslim states and the failure of somewhat imperial attempts by the West to introduce democracy 
and western law to these nations has led many to embrace fundamentalist Islam in response to a 
perceived attack. The Egyptian ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ is a prime example of this approach; this 
radical group uses violent means to spread Sharia law and make it the national standard. This has 
included assassinations (of Western thinking academics, politicians and journalists) and terror 
attacks (on cinemas, museums, and other sites of Western influence). Iran, on the other hand, has 
been taken over by religious groups after the fall of the ruling house of Pahlavi. From this 
movement, the cry of the people became “No East, No West, Islam is the Best”, and the literal 
interpretation of the Holy texts became the foundation of rule. Following this, the rights of women 
were virtually non-existent, with all females required to adorn full-body coverings and treated 
unequally in courts of law and in political matters. Women were unable to attain any positions of 
power, either vocationally or socially. Armstrong asserts that communities embraced a 
fundamentalist worldview as a direct result of the imperialist legacy of the West, the defeat of 
secular states and a perceived attack on Muslim values208. 
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The author then goes on to address Christian fundamentalism across the USA and large 
parts of Europe. This, she argues, is indicative of the effect of science and technology on traditional 
communities. It is pertinent to note that the term ‘fundamentalism’ and its associated concepts 
were first conceived in the West and spread from there.  For example, Armstrong notes the 
beginning of innovation of print and its impacts on culture, social and religious attitude; before the 
prevalence of the printed word, religion was restricted to small, isolated clergies, of which a few 
were able to access and, therefore, interpret Holy texts. It allowed those with access the ability to 
take their own meaning from the word of God for the first time. Individual readings of the text 
provided a release from dictated interpretation by the church and encouraged personal faith. This 
development, coupled with the rise of industry and technology, forced many to realise the 
inconsistency of literal readings with modern life experiences. Science, as we now know it, began 
in concurrence with religious teachings; as scientific method and empirical measures became more 
ubiquitous, however, the myths were rejected and rational thought was coveted. Descartes famous 
proposition ‘Cogito ergo sum’ or ‘I think, therefore I am’, is indicative of this school of thought. 
It is important to note that the influence of moderation on religion often has different 
outcomes depending on circumstance, due to the dividing nature of ideology. Wesley asserts, much 
like Kant, that religion should be considered entirely separate from fact, claiming that it resides 
not in the mind but in the heart, despite its basis in rules and code.209 
The author argues that the differentiation between approaches to fundamentalism is not 
restricted to Europe, as demonstrated by the Christian right in the US. It has been evidenced that a 
large portion of Americans turn to faith in times of crisis, and this has been the case for centuries.210 
In the 1700’s, Christianity was the dominant ideology, spread across different denominations 
(Baptists, Quakers, etc.), most notably the Protestant Church, which saw a resurgence during this 
period. Although these denominations differed in certain key aspects, there existed a common 
thread between the offshoots, who shunned the authority of the central church, while carefully 
selecting their own leaders. Personal crises and feelings of alienation led large numbers to 
organised religion; while religious leaders often equate the mythos and logos of religion, modern 
day fundamentalist faith has a tendency to reject logos entirely, and it has been argued that this is 
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true of both Christian and Muslim collectives. However, it seems that to apply the word ‘logos’ to 
Islam from academic perspective can be problematic, and it is necessary to first explore its 
contrasting basis in Christian fundamentalism. 
The summary provided by ‘The Battle for God’ presents Armstrong’s position as one which 
warns of the threat of fundamentalist activity on human freedom. She also describes 
fundamentalist thought as an affront to human rights, gender equality, and the subjugation of 
minority groups; this is illustrated by the discussion over the wearing of the headscarf. In 
Armstrong’s work, however, there exist some contradictions. She, in one instance, describes 
fundamentalist action as a part of late 20th century social movement. One Christian fundamentalist 
leader, Pat Robertson, who was prominent in the 1980s, once claimed that fundamentalists were 
the majority in America and so could elect a representative. This indicates that fundamentalism 
may coexist with peaceful processes, such as democracy, indicating a lack of motivation to 
suppress the freedoms of any sector of society. However, Armstrong also argues that violent 
fundamentalists of all religions exist, and frequently attempt to spread their ideology as the pure 
and right way of life. The outcomes of fundamentalist thought may be primarily influenced by the 
approach of the state in question towards personal and religious freedom. On a more thorough 
examination of her work, Armstrong frequently neglects to differentiate between violent 
fundamentalism and non-violent religious action, as she admonishes both in equal measure. 
Armstrong attempts to analyse the various approaches put forward by other academics as 
to the link between fundamentalism and Islam; she writes that Islamic fundamentalism has much 
in common with fundamentalist belief and behaviour within other religions, Christianity in 
particular. It is these similarities which allow us to brand certain facets of Islam ‘fundamentalism. 
It is also noted, on the other hand, that Western extremist religious thought manifests itself 
differently due to societal and cultural differences, and has differing results. The literature indicates 
that Western fundamentalism has less violent outcomes and is often in line with democracy, while 
Jewish and Muslim extremist communities tend to warrant the term ‘fundamentalist’ largely due 
to the violence of the methods employed to convert or spread ideology211.  
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Armstrong, to support her arguments, refers to the act of hostage-taking, which occurred 
during an Iranian raid on US diplomats; there is a confusion of theological and political incitement 
for this act. Taking hostages, the author asserts, is a fundamentalist act, though the afore-mentioned 
case had a political rather than faith-based justification212. If purely religious in motive, the 
incident would have been repeated due to the existence of the current political condition of Iran. 
It is clear, then, that Armstrong places fundamentalism within its traditional conceptions 
and its historical interpretation; herein lies the weight of this approach. This facilitates an 
understanding of how fundamentalist thought and behaviour emerges, particularly with regard to 
Monostich religions. The results of her work are of great use to academics wishing to analyse an 
aspect of fundamentalism, and relate closely societal debates surrounding the headscarf or hijab. 
It also allows one to assess legal decisions of the ECtHR in light of the social history of extremism 
and fundamentalist religious though; this provides a solid base on which to present an argument.   
While this approach links the hijab or headscarf with fundamentalism, it is important to 
make clear that by no means does wearing the headscarf necessarily indicate an extremist 
inclination. Evidence in favour of this can be found in a 2013 poll undertaken in Egypt and Tunisia 
by the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research, which found that over half of 
respondents support the wearing of headscarf by women.213  
 
2.3. Views of Academia in non-Islamic Countries relating to religious expression in Islamic 
practices 
   As a result of the events of September 11th, 2001, some European countries such as France, 
Turkey and Switzerland were embroiled in arguments over Muslim head coverings. The 
deliberations was further inflamed by a decision by the ECtHR on the question of when women 
could or could not wear a headscarf; the question had always been treated as a public issue, but 
the European Court made it a question of legality.  
One academic who wrote on the ECtHR decision was Paul M. Taylor. In 2005, he wrote a book 
entitled “Freedom of religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice214”, which 
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delves intimately and intelligently into what he perceives as often unjust treatment of religious 
freedoms by international courts of law. The text centres on three main ideas: freedom of choosing 
a specific religious belief (s), conscientious rights (or “forum internum”), and the right for outward 
expression of one’s beliefs (or “forum externum”), together with analysing how the manifestation 
of religious beliefs can be legally limited. The book goes on to cover the European Convention of 
Human Rights by the Council of Europe, specifically Article 9, and compare it to the ICCPR 
Article 18, as instituted by the United Nations. Taylor analyses both aspects of religious freedom 
to speak out against the prejudicial public outcry and legislation against Muslim citizens in 
America and Europe alike after the 9/11 tragedy215. He asserts that because of an overly-paranoid 
attitude toward religious fundamentalism, not to mention xenophobia and bigotry, national and 
international courts have unjustly imposed limitations upon the expression of Muslim beliefs.216 
   In chapters two and three of his book, Taylor goes into further detail about what 
circumstances may lead a country to limit its citizens' right to select, manifest and, if desired, to 
change their own religion in the way they see fit. Based on the analysis of the travaux preparatoires, 
the author specifically discuss the advocating against the “right to change religion” which resulted 
in the reconfiguring of the ICCPR'S article 18. Many opponents cited situations where people were 
forced into changing religions, such as through proselytization, missionary activities, and other 
forms of forceful imposition of religious beliefs. Although the international bodies such the ECtHE 
and the HRC have spoken extensively on the issue overall, the author duly criticises this discussion 
as not being so much on the grounds of forum internum. Many countries which oppose 
proselytizing do so because they view it as akin to political campaigning or merchandise hawking; 
perhaps not inherently harmful, but a pervasive method. However, other countries seek to preserve 
the dominant national religion or sect because of how important it is to the social fabric, and 
therefore limit proselytizing for other belief systems. Proselytizing is an aspect of religious 
freedom, but since some view it as an offence, its processes can be legally controlled. Taylor 
therefore encourages narrowing down the interpretation of what constitutes a  ‘rights and freedom 
of others ‘especially in case of proselytization, insofar as this can assist in protecting individuals 
against coercion that would deprive them of the freedom to choose their religion or religious belief.   
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   Chapter three covers Taylor's dissection of the HRC ' argument, which says that the rules 
on coercion are only applicable to affairs of state and when it comes to forum internum. Both the 
Special Rapporteur and the ECtHR, meanwhile, assert that coercion can also come from the 
general public or from privatised corporations. This coercion can be direct or indirect. This chapter 
goes on to reinforce the fact that every person should have the unalienable right to choose 
whichever religion they want, as well as to convert to another if they wish.     
  Forum internum is closely related to matters of religious expression and the usual restrictions that 
come with it. Taylor's fourth chapter examines the different kinds of religious expression that an 
individual may choose to take part in. This includes public or private worship, religious study, and 
the celebration of holidays with particular attention to the permissible limitations that may be 
imposed by governments.  
This book is an especially revealing discourse on the subject of religious expression 
because of how exhaustive its analysis is. It delves deeply into travaux preparatoires, or 
“preparatory works”; this allows the writer to understand the real meaning of a text behind all the 
religious and doctrinal jargon.217 The text also goes in-depth into the verdicts rendered by both the 
ECtHR and the HRC, not to mention extraneous comments from both sides. 
Taylor is also highly astute when it comes to dissecting the two international agencies by 
comparing and contrasting their statutes and limitations. Of all the matters on the legislative table, 
one of the more heated cases involved the right of Muslim women to dress modestly in non-Islamic 
majority countries. Both the HRC and the European Courts deliberated on the matter, and Taylor 
describes both of their processes, but he offers a fairly scanty amount of legal information given 
how extensive and inflammatory these types of cases were. When he describes the court cases 
Kalaç v Turkey218, Refah Party v Turkey219, and Yanasik v Turkey220, he does so almost in passing 
without attempting to provide an insight regarding whether religious manifestation is an individual 
or communal right. In short, he does not explicitly analyse the nature of this right. This is 
understandable, as Taylor's primary focus in this book is not whether or not religious expression 
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in those cases is just and lawful; instead, he focuses on the concept of pluralism and the 
responsibility of states to protect secularism.221 
When it comes to cases which pertain to fundamentalism, the author rightly points out that 
the court often fails to note the difference in context between civil cases and those related to 
military; he argues that fundamentalism is not a strong enough or well supported enough argument 
to justify restriction of religious expression. As an internal aspect of religion, fundamentalist 
thought cannot be identified and proven legally as there is an absence of evidence for religious 
thought. Any attempt to enforce individuals into stating their religious convictions constitutes a 
violation the individual’s liberties and human rights. 
In some situations within this book, Taylor neglects to adequately define many of the terms 
which he uses, or even to provide a context in which the term may be used in a helpfully efficacious 
sense. One instance is when he fails to qualify or define the term “democratic” which is 
problematic mainly due to the presence of this term in one of his sub-headings “…necessary in a 
democratic society”.222 Furthermore, when he uses the term ‘necessary’, there is no link made 
between this term and the concept of democracy which renders the pertinent sub-heading fairly 
confusing. Notwithstanding the problems with clearly defining employed terms, the majority of 
Taylor's argument holds up. 
  Despite the discussed ambiguity and insufficiency in author’s dealing with some aspects 
of religious freedom, particularly religious manifestation, it can be argued that Taylor’s book 
serves as a valuable point of reference for the postgraduate scholars and researchers in various 
pertinent subjects, namely ‘proselytizing in religion’ and ‘ coercion in religion’.  Another point 
that increases the book’s credibility is the incorporating of views of various well-known 
researchers in the field of the religious freedom such as Malcolm Evans, Carols Evans, Bahiyyih 
Tahzib and Natan Lerner.  
Furthermore, the author did not take into account the analyses which examine whether it is 
legitimate of the court to make restrictions regarding manifestation of religious beliefs. 
Nevertheless, the author refers to various documents related to international human rights agenda, 
as well as freedom of religion, which are accepted by the judicial authorities on the international 
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level and provide information that aid the understanding of terms such as ‘freedom of religion’, 
‘coercion in religion’ and ’proselytize’.  
A far more subjective exploration of Muslim freedom in the western world can be found 
in the book by Fetzer and Soper.223 In only six chapters, the two authors describe how Muslims in 
western European nations are largely confined because of the time-honoured tradition of merging 
church and state. As a result, non-Christian citizens, especially Muslims, are discriminated against. 
Structurally, the book consists of six chapters. In its first chapter, the book’s aim is presented as 
proving the assertion that the discussed trio of countries – Britain224, France225 and Germany226, to 
examine how they have treated their religious minorities’ especially Muslim populations as far as 
public policy is concerned.227 According to the authors, these countries treat Muslims with a 
markedly different attitude than their counterparts in the European Union, and they promise to 
explain how and why.  
The political treatment of Muslims' right to express their beliefs has been affected by 
various factors.  The first factor revolves around the kind of relationship between church and state 
and the interaction between them. The second set of factors are based on the type of ideology (the 
pre-existing opinions about state and purpose of the state, view on nationality and citizenship) and 
the manner in which political institutions shape the advancement of their interests and the ensuing 
polices. The final set of factors is informed by the manner in which all of the concepts mentioned 
above play an important role in how each country attempts to aid Muslims in expressing their faith 
in whatever way they wish (political opportunity or structure theory).228  
These ideas are detailed by Fetzer and Soper as a result of their assertion that Muslim 
citizens are afforded a great degree of freedom of expression upon examination of the state's 
allowance of Islamic education, the preservation of Muslim practices, the teaching of Islamic 
tenets in public schools (not to mention the establishment and financial support for singularly 
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Islamic schools), and the sheer number of mosques built in the West. The authors chose the degree 
of the accommodation of Muslim religious practice as the dependent variable. 
The rest of the book’s chapters delve into how Britain, France, Germany deal with their 
Muslim citizens on a case by case basis, drawing comparisons and contrasts along the way. In 
order to make the comparisons more accurate, each country's diplomatic attributes are outlined.229 
The first line of thought examined is the historical background of the Western governments’ 
dealing with their Muslim citizens, as well as how the Muslims settled in the country. The second 
parameter is an overview of the context of the situation, including how all of the countries have 
unique relationships with their churches of choice; Britain took the route of establishment, France 
engaged in radical disestablishment, and Germany went with multiple establishments. 
Furthermore, each of these methods grew a life of its own, resulting in different social constructs, 
alternate interpretations of what constitutes free speech and religious representation, and how 
successfully or not the country has managed to bring a semblance of separating church and state. 
  The writers go on to describe how effectively the Muslim community has historically been 
able to express its faith, especially when it comes to spiritual celebrations in government-funded 
schools, and for publicly raising money for Islamic schools and mosques.230 Numerous particular 
events are provided which clarify the experiences in each of the three nations. The authors are of 
the opinion that the United Kingdom is the best of the three in terms of allowing Muslims to 
express their faith; the UK allows religious dress in public venues and provides funding to build 
mosques among other things.231 They attribute this to the relationship between various established 
churches and state (establishment) being so strong that Britain is comfortable enough to support 
other religions in some sense, and also their status as extremely multicultural. In fact, the country 
has been actively inviting Muslims to expect greater accountability from the government in regard 
to their treatment. 
 France, meanwhile, is considered as worst of the three countries in question with respect to its 
treatment of the Muslim minority.232 This is mainly due to the strong ideals of secularism which 
constitute the foundation of the republic and which have had ‘disastrous’ impact on the position 
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of Muslims in France. Meanwhile, Germany is not as understanding of Muslim customs as the 
United Kingdom, but more so than France.  
The author's analysis of data across the continent shows some degree of correlation with 
many of the ECtHR cases involving Muslim defendants; many of the cases which pertained to 
public religious expression (pertaining to the veil and other garments, predominantly) were 
successful in the United Kingdom233 and in Germany234, but not so much in France.235 
 In chapter 5, the writers explore data gathered about how the European public perceives 
the treatment of Muslim citizens, courtesy of the Roper Europe Religion and State Surveys from 
2001 and 2002. In terms of education, it is found to be an element encouraging accommodation.236 
Thus education is a factor indicating strong support for Muslim, which the authors suggest that 
those favouring accommodation should support multicultural education. It is apparent from the 
results of the two surveys that those who practise religion themselves are more supportive of 
Muslim goals, whilst most secular respondents support public displays of Islamic faith, especially 
when these displays are organised with the state’s support. This appears paradoxical at first, but 
the authors hypothesize that “despite the philosophic similarities between practicing Christians 
and Muslims, Muslims might be better served to join political forces with the large number of pro-
multicultural secularists than with a small band of Orthodox Christians”.237  
Chapter 6 focuses on summarising the key findings, comparing the level of accommodation 
in the three countries that might be predicted by each of the theoretical models (resources, 
structures, ideology and church-state).  In general, the church-state model advanced by the authors 
is a better predictor of the actual situation than any of the theories considered on their own. They 
also highlight the limitations of the other theories whilst acknowledging the insights each of them 
provides. Although the authors only research the political challenges of accommodation and 
integration of religious claims of Muslims in Europe, raises issues that would be equally valid with 
regard to religious groups in other nations.238   
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While Fetzer and Soper present compelling evidence for their theories of how the church-
state relationship impacts treatment of non-Christian sections of that state, their ideas are not 
perfectly aligned. For example, they assert that if certain standards for secularism are met in one 
nation, any nation which meets those standards will invariably have the same level of religious 
freedom afforded to Muslims. This claim represents a form of unsubstantiated extrapolation, 
insofar as the authors’ findings are limited only to three European nations. This notion is also an 
unpleasant one for French activists; they seek to make their country a better climate for welcoming 
people of other religions, but Fetzer and Soper's argument implies that France's intersectional 
relations cannot improve without first improving the standards of secularism in the country which 
is certainly a gigantic and unpopular task. Furthermore, the evidence and historical consideration 
regarding the secularism in France show that structure of the church-state and the position of 
secularism together with its interpretation have been continuously evolving and changing. Of 
course, these alterations are very gradual, sometimes taking place over generations, but they are 
accelerated through a discourse regarding secularism that is led by academics and public officials. 
For example, the authors correctly point to the different perception of the wearing of the veil by 
the Conseil d’Etat in 1989 and the Commission of Statsi between 2003-2004.239 They also 
differentiate between hard and soft secularism, as some nations step away from explicit religious 
control more than others do.  
The truth of the matter is that wide arrays of countries have different laws about whether 
or not Muslim women can wear the veil, so alternate national courts have no uniform compass to 
adhere to. The United States of America, for instance historically has a more lenient opinion of 
religious display than France does.240 This difference cannot be only ascribed to church-state 
influence, but also to the individual mind sets of the judges assigned to these types of cases, and 
also the political and cultural climate of the nation at the time. For example, the United States' 
rulings from a political point of view became far less lenient after the 9/11 atrocities. Given this 
reality, the findings of the books cannot be generalised as the authors claim, and the church-state 
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relationship is not the only factor determining the states in question’s different treatment of their 
Muslim minority. The authors go into more details about the various cases which the ECtHR 
deliberated upon, particularly with respect to the court’s justification for limiting religious freedom 
under certain conditions. However, like numerous researchers before, the authors just mention the 
concepts that are used to justify the limitation of religious manifestation without legally and 
critically analysing these concepts. It seems that applying this method to assess the accommodation 
of Muslims in these countries can sometimes lead to contradictory results. 
The analysis of the court’s decision concerning the manifestation of religious beliefs was 
used by the author to assert that the situation in the ECtHR indicates discord and tension when it 
comes to secularism and manifestation of religious beliefs. The researcher believes the solution to 
this discord must start with explaining the term secularism, both in terms of philosophy and the 
basic meaning. To address this task, the researcher suggests that term should be analyzed from a 
historical point of view. Regardless of the restrictions that the methodology proposed by Fetzer & 
Soper has, the examination of secularism in the history of three different countries, particularly 
France, delivered constructive results relevant to the research and also promising for the future 
development and perception of secularism.  
The social liberties afforded to a population are heavily reliant on the ideology and political 
inclination of the state itself. However, this should not be used as a justification to restrict the legal 
rights of certain groups; while important, the separation of religion and secular statehood should 
not serve as a basis for limiting religious rights under the unsupported guise of the prevention of 
extremist ideology and the encouragement of tolerance.  
Westerfield discusses in her article ‘Behind the veil: An American Legal Perspective on 
the European Headscarf Debate’ how France deals with Muslim displays, but compares and 
contrasts the country against Turkey and the United States.241 The first section of her work 
discusses the historical and legal debate over wearing of the hijab in Europe.  The next part goes 
over how secularism has become peculiarly fundamentalist, and describes certain cases where this 
happened. In the Şahin case, for instance, Westerfield states that the result was strongly affected 
by the ECtHR's unjustified support of fundamentalist secularism in Turkey. 
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The third part examines how the United States Supreme Court heard a case about banning 
all religious garments in public schools, arguing that the clothes would compromise the schools' 
safety, but the court refused to place a ban until they could prove these claims.242 The final part 
two rationales under which the Sahin case might have been decided differently, drawing on the 
U.S. case law in Part III by way of comparison. The article summarizes itself by stating that should 
a French case involving the wearing of the Islamic headscarf come before the ECtHR, the court 
should not merely follow its precedent in the Sahin case, and referring to France's probable 
argument that laicite or secularism requires a school ban on religious clothing. 
 The author discusses how some people see the veil as oppressive, intolerant and opposing 
democracy, whilst Muslims and their supporters champion the veil as part of their time-honoured 
religious tradition, and a kind of freedom in its own right. Such variety of views is even reflected 
in the decisions of the international judicial bodies. For instance, whereas the HRC upheld the right 
of wearing a headscarf, the ECtHR has supported some states’ decision to ban the wearing of the 
veil.  Even in the situation of France and Turkey, there is a question of whether or not France even 
had the right to ban religious garb in public schools; the author highlights that according to Conseil 
d'Etat, the ban was unnecessary.243  
Regarding the case Sahin v Turkey244, Westerfield has attempted to critically analyse the 
court’s justification of its decision. In terms of protection of secularism as justification to ban the 
wearing of the veil, Westerfield employed a historical analysis of the concept of secularism, 
concluding that secularism has embedded in itself strong support for religious expression.245 As 
an argument to support this claim, the author highlights the case of Ataturk’s wife who was 
wearing a headscarf even when the whole country was in the process of complex secularisation. 
Similarly to Elver, Westerfield divides secularism into two categories: liberal and 
fundamentalist secularism. He then uses the case of Sahin v Turkey  246 as an example of the latter, 
whereby the state assumes a position where it controls and even limits religious freedom. 
Furthermore, the author rejects the court’s argument that wearing a headscarf can have a negative 
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impact on students not wearing a headscarf as the court did not substantiated this claim 
sufficiently.247 The author also duly criticises the court’s justification regarding the notion that 
wearing a headscarf facilitates somehow the spread of fundamentalism in the country, as once 
again, the court’s claims are not supported by clear and sound evidence. In this regard, Gibson’s  
assertions can be used to support Westerfield’s criticisms, insofar as Gibson argues that in terms 
of fundamentalism, all ‘‘fundamentalist’’ Muslim women might wear headscarves, whereas not 
all Muslim women who wear headscarves are necessarily ‘‘fundamentalist’’.248 Finally, in her 
critique of the court’s argument that wearing a headscarf violates the principle of equality together 
with human rights, Westerfield underlines the comment made by the judge Tulkens that the court 
ignored in its decision-making processes the views of women as the key subject of the pertinent 
debate.249  
It can be concluded that whilst Westerfield does provide a compelling argument, she lacks 
an in-depth explanation of how secularism in the West has worked over the years. His criticism of 
fundamental secularism is well-founded, but when it comes to liberal secularism, she has very little 
to say and she fails to emphasise that this form of secularism has historically been a protector of 
religious freedom. Equally, Lovejoy in his discussion about the history of secularism states that 
secularism has been traditionally used to defend freedom of expression.250 This is in a stark contrast 
the current form of secularism in France that is according to Lovejoy restrictive with respect to 
religious freedom. Furthermore, her primary objection is that all arguments and justifications in 
support of banning religious expression are highly subjective and should not stand up in court, but 
she does little to explain the legal precedence to readers which labels such arguments subjective. 
Ironically, these are similar to the shortcomings that can be found in the court’s reasoning and 
justifications of its decisions. 
  The author nevertheless has important views to offer on the topic of religious freedom, 
which are on the whole well-reasoned. The outcome of fundamentalist secular as Human Rights 
Watch has predicted may come out with "zero-sum philosophy of despair" exemplified in the Sahin 
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case: the fear "that recognizing the rights of devout Muslims threatens the rights of others."251 The 
author duly points out that if states wish to promote democracy, they should do so by upholding 
the ideals of liberty, egalitarianism and dignity; governments should, therefore, make every effort 
to practice tolerance towards religious belief and expression, regardless of the state’s position on 
these beliefs. 
Presumably, the reason for the author’s criticism of the ECtHR’s reasoning in case of 
wearing headscarf is that it relates primarily to solid evidence, completely ignoring the context in 
which the decision was made. For example, the criticism of the court’s decision based on 
‘prevention of fundamentalism and intolerance’ or ‘protecting the rights and freedoms of others’ 
is rightfully criticised, as the court failed to provide any compelling reason supporting the claim 
against the applicants. Despite this, the current research will not rely on pure legal evidence and 
documentation. It will also examine the concepts of fundamentalism and tolerance from a 
historical and philosophical point of view in order to assess the legitimacy of their use in a legal 
context and whether these concepts are rightly used as the basis to restrict of religious expression. 
To address this task of understanding an issue surrounded by such controversy, it might be 
advisable to follow the Westerfieldian perception of secularism, particularly what is referred to as 
fundamentalist secularism252 which is emphasised in France, Switzerland and Turkey owing to 
fear of Islamic fundamentalist and intolerance. 
 
2.4 .The views of Islamic scholars on religious freedom in the context of Islam 
The ECtHR’s decision to prohibit the wearing of the veil has become a source of reflection 
for Muslim scholars. There are two possible causes for this period of reflection. The first reason is 
the ruling of the court that the headscarf is a symbol of misogyny and systematic oppression of 
women in Muslim society. The second is that the court overstepped its bounds by attempting to 
interpret the nature of Islam. According to the court, Islam is a doctrine that is incompatible with 
the very idea of human rights, democracy and tolerance. As a result of these facts, a group of 
Islamic scholars have challenged the court’s views from the legal perspective and also vis-à-vis 
the relationship between Islam, and human rights. Another group is, through analysis of Islam, 
making an effort to demonstrate that modern Islam is in accordance with human rights, especially 
                                                          
251 Supra no 242, 677.  
252 Paul F Campos, ‘Secular fundamentalism’ (1994) 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1814. 
85 
 
freedom of religion. To put it another way, this group is trying to discover an internal solution to 
the issue of human rights violations, and freedom of religion. 
 Among the most highly regarded of these scholars is Tahzib. He attempts in his article, 
“Applying a gender perspective in the area of the right to freedom of religion or belief,”253 to 
analyse the legal ramifications of the ECtHR’s decision regarding the headscarf. After he 
introduces the topic, he goes on to dedicate the second section to assessing the supposed violations 
of a woman’s rights to freedom of religion or creed. The thesis of the paper is that rights to religious 
freedom can be violated in both an external and an internal manner. The former means the violation 
of the right to manifest one’s beliefs externally whilst the latter constitutes the violation of the right 
to have, adopt and change one’s religious beliefs.  He claims that, in spite of the non-derogable 
nature of the right to change, have and adopt religion, this right is still violated in many different 
ways all over the world. He cites instances of women being abducted, and forcibly converted to 
another religion, or being coerced into adopting the religion of her husband, as an example. In 
regard to how women’s external or religious expression is violated which is the article’s primary 
subject, the author avers that any restriction of religious expression can only be examined in line 
with the three conditions that fall under the umbrella of the ICCPR and ECHR. These restrictions 
must be (1) prescribed by law, (2) in pursuance of one or more compelling state interests-namely 
public safety, order, health, morality, or the fundamental rights of others; and (3) necessary in 
order to safeguard one or more interests of the aforementioned state. Tahzib closely examines these 
three reasons for restriction of religious expression one by one. The first case applies to female 
genital mutilation; he correctly demonstrates that due to short term and eventual negative effects 
on the health of the victims, the state has proper grounds to ban FGM because it satisfies the three 
principles.254 
 Secondly, the author criticises the court’s justifications, on grounds of public order and 
morality, for banning the wearing of the veil by public employees. He claims that these principles, 
public order and morality, are ambiguous by nature, and differ between disparate eras, countries, 
and cultures. Therefore, the state is unable to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that wearing a 
headscarf disturbs a society’s public order or morality. Tahzib further claims that in regards to this 
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case of religious garb, the state faces extreme difficulty in proving that the second and third 
conditions of restriction have been properly met. In support of this claim, he cites the views of the 
Special Rapporteur, that attitudes towards religious garb must embrace flexibility and tolerance.255 
 Thirdly and lastly, Tahzib supports the idea that women should have the total freedom to 
dress in any way they choose to. In addition to criticising the decisions of the ECtHR, he condemns 
the restrictive actions of Sudan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other non-secular states, that force women 
to only dress in ways that cover them from head to toe. He asserts that in countries such as these, 
the public sphere is the sole possession of the state, and that women are not allowed to have a place 
within it256. 
 It is reasonable to state that the author’s criticisms of the court’s claims in regard to 
women’s religious expression constitute persuasive arguments. The state has legitimate reasons to 
forbid female genital mutilation, Tahzib says, because the negative effects of this practice have 
been proven by decades of rigorous scientific study. He contrasts this ban, on legal and logical 
grounds, with the ban on religious garments, as a criticism of the court’s justification of such on 
grounds of public order and morality. He avers that public order and morality are convoluted and 
ambiguous in nature, and therefore these restrictions on religious freedom put in place cannot be 
adequately justified under the three principles as required by law. By condemning the measures 
taken by the states to pass religiously motivated laws restricting the women’s freedom of choice 
of clothing, the author shows inclination towards secularism. Author in his methodology uses the 
texts of article 18 of the ICCPR and the article 9 of the ECHR for logical and, in legal terms, 
acceptable criticism of the court’s conclusion regarding the headscarves (pure legal), In general, 
the outcome of this research constitutes a solid base for evaluating the decisions of the ECtHR in 
the light of the international human rights criteria. This thesis will attempt to criticise the European 
court’s decision not only on legal grounds, but it will further evaluate the concepts of intolerance 
and fundamentalism from a historical perspective  in order to demonstrate that the Court’s decision 
is not in line with, or supportive of, the right to religious expression for Muslim women.  
  Professor Javid is another highly regarded Muslim scholar. An article he wrote, entitled 
“The Sharia, Freedom of religion and European Human Rights law,257” is split into three different 
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sections. He begins by pointing to the myriad ways in which religious freedom has been violated 
in Europe throughout history, and the measures taken within Europe to correct this matter. These 
struggles began as early as the 13th century, but remain contentious to this day. He correctly argues 
that the history of Europe is teeming with instances of religion being used as an instrument of 
oppression, and as a means to restrict the rights of religious minorities such as Jews and Muslims. 
The author then cites Islamic history in order to demonstrate that the Muslim world has been more 
tolerant of other religions than Europe. Lastly, he cites the ECtHR’s decisions in the cases of the 
Refah Party, Leyla Şahin, and Dahlab as examples of its longstanding bias against Muslims.  
 One could reasonably expect, judging by the article’s title, that the author would go into 
detail about Sharia, freedom of religion, and European jurisprudence, but the author does not give 
the reader a proper grounding in the legal problems. The author accuses the ECtHR of allowing 
anti-Islamic bias to influence its verdict, but at the same time offered an idealised image of Islamic 
history. Even if one accepts that Islamic society was progressive for its day and age, it does not 
necessarily follow that said system is copacetic with modern views on human rights. For example, 
conditional religious freedom was only extended to followers of Judaism and Christianity (ahl al 
ketab). Additionally, although the author avers that the Court’s views on Islam and women’s rights 
are grounded in prejudice; his own views also seem to be derived from Islamic bigotry258 when he 
cites the history of Islam in order to condemn the state of modern human rights. He claims that the 
government of the UK has taken an adversarial and prejudiced stance toward its Muslim minorities 
in every arena.259 He cites the example of the stated positions of former Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher towards Muslims, that Muslims did not condemn the terrorist attacks on London strongly 
enough.260 He also mentions statistics regarding unemployment of Muslim citizens, and the case 
of Shabana Begum, in which the court supported the school’s view that all students can only wear 
the school’s uniform.261   
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In the article, Javid clarifies the development which led to establishment of the religious 
freedom in the international human rights documents.262 The most significant difference between 
Javid’s perspective and that of most Muslims is that whilst they believe wearing religious clothes 
to be obligatory, he considers it to be an aspect of women’s freedom of expression. According to 
the ECtHR, both Islam and Sharia are dogmatic beliefs and are thus incompatible with human 
rights, democracy and tolerance.263 To appropriately react to this notion, rather than suggesting 
new solution to the discord between human rights and Islam, he pointed out the historical context 
when Islamic rulers, particularly those of the Ottoman Empire, granted certain privileges and 
freedom to people of other religions. Even though granting certain religious freedom might seem 
a progressive step in that era, such analogy cannot be applied nowadays, as it is incompatible with 
the criteria presented by international human rights such as equality between men and women and 
non-discrimination. In spite of the fact that the author fails to provide a solution to the discord 
between Islam and human rights, emphasis on the privileges that the Ottoman Empire provided to 
religious minorities permits an interpretation of Islam as a religion that is capable of addressing 
the human rights criteria. Moreover, this view can be used as a reason to critique the decisions of 
the ECtHR regarding the Islam. The general overview of Islam should not be decided solely by 
the ECtHR, as in such state it is incompatible even with some of Islam’s teachings. 
 Although contemporary interpretations of Islamic law in Muslim countries has led to the 
violation of human rights, many Islamic scholars, unlike the ECtHR, are in concordance that there 
is no inherent incompatibility between Islam and human rights. Essentially, Islam is able to 
incorporate modern laws of human rights. Bardin and Arifan assert that human rights are not 
simply derived from Western and Christian thought, but have their conception in the ideas of 
philosophers and politicians who witnessed the suffering caused by the World Wars. In his 
article,264 Badrin quotes the views of famed Islamic scholar Abdullahi, who claimed that values 
such as democracy, human rights, and pluralism are universal, and that Islamic countries must 
embrace them. He also argues that violations of human rights cannot simply be waved away or 
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justified by dint of cultural relativism.265 Through internal debate, and contemporary interpretation 
of Sharia, true integration of Islam and human rights is possible. He asserts that Islamic law can 
be reformed by reinterpreting Sharia through a modern lens, which would be more effective than 
a secular approach at advancing the cause of human rights.266  He writes that the assumed 
incompatibility between secularism and Islam has its roots in confusion of definitions and 
terminology, which must be deconstructed. In order to dismantle this definition of secularism, he 
claims that the accepted view of secularism that totally discards or diminishes the public role of 
religion is a problematic one. He also condemns the assumption that secularism is limited to 
Western European and North American Christian nations, and shows that secularism “has come 
to Africa and Asia in the suspect company of colonialism”. According to Badrin, secularism should 
be defined as a dialogue between the state and religion, instead of the specific ways in which that 
relationship has developed in certain countries. After deconstructing this definition of secularism, 
he then calls for Muslim states to re-embrace secularism, and argues that the most important reason 
for an Islamic version of secularism is the necessity of pluralistic nations to protect freedom of 
religion for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. In other words, freedom of religion is more likely to 
be restricted in a state that actively promotes any particular religious dogma, as opposed to one 
that remains truly secular.267 He also adds that Islamic jurists of the seventh century managed to 
fit Islam to their particular circumstances, so contemporary Muslim jurists have a duty to interpret 
scripture in a way that adapts religious practice to modern circumstances. 
 In contrast to Badrin, who favours modern interpretations of Islam, Arifan references 
Islamic sources that demonstrate that human rights and tolerance have already been extant within 
Islam. According to Arifan, violations of religious freedom stems from meddling by society, and 
the state in particular. He also claims that freedom of religion falls under the umbrella of civil and 
political rights. By this definition, the state should stay out of any question as to how an individual 
exercises his or her right to religion.268 Therefore, according to this analysis, forcing a woman to 
wear or remove her headscarf constitutes a violation of the right to religious freedom. Arifan bases 
his views of the interactions of society with religious freedom on the theories of Professor Fatima. 
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Fatima asserts that there are two disparate groups of interpretation. The first are Muslim societies 
which believe that its religion is exclusive, meaning that believers must reject other religions, and 
that Islam is the only true religion, and therefore must become the only religion. In these societies 
tolerance and religious freedom are unable to co-exist. The other group takes an inclusive attitude 
towards religion. They assert that although Islam is the true religion, other religions do and should 
exist that can allow a human being to achieve salvation.269 
To support the notion of Islam’s compatibility with the concept of human rights, Arifan 
makes references to various historical documents and events in the context of Islamic history. For 
instance, he references the Prophet’s speech during his last pilgrimage in which he emphasizes the 
importance of protecting one’s property, dignity and honour. Furthermore, the author highlights 
one of the objectives of Islamic law (maqasid al deen) being protection of the religion itself which 
can only be achieved if people have the opportunity to manifest their beliefs and exercise their 
religious rights freely. Another point of reference is an order of Omar, the second caliph, banning 
the ruler of Egypt from unjustified punishing of his subjects. In total, the author employs three 
different sources on which he builds his argument that there is a high degree of compatibility 
between Islam and the concept of human rights.270 
To formulate a final assessment of Arifan’s work, it can be said that his legal analysis of 
the concept of religious freedom implies that the author himself believes strongly in the freedom 
of religion, whereby he perceives this freedom as a part of essential human rights. Moreover, he 
argues that both state and non-state actors should avoid trying to impose their own version of a 
particular religious belief271. Yet, it should be noted that such ‘modern’ understanding of Islamic 
traditions is not shared by the majority of Muslim scholars. Nonetheless, Arifan’s views and 
arguments constitute a platform on which different views of Islam and its need for self-reflection 
can be discussed. In addition, although the author succeeded in critically evaluating the absence of 
a proper legal framework allowing the ban of wearing a headscarf, pointing out the articles 18 and 
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9 in ICCPR and ECHR respectively, he nonetheless failed to assess in more depth the court’s 
justifications.  
Generally speaking, Bardin and Arifan appear to have problems with interpreting Islam 
with its internal mechanisms as a religion compatible with human rights. In order to achieve this, 
the authors approach secularism, as well as human rights, as achievements of the whole of 
humanity rather than Christianity related achievements. Moreover, they comprehend the Islamic 
society together with the position Islam has in it, and they work with resources of primarily Islamic 
origin as the basis of a Muslim human rights agenda. From this perspective, Arifan successfully 
uses the hadith and Prophet’s speeches, as well as various examples from the history of Islam. At 
the same time, the modern approach demonstrates the fact that many Islamic scholars perceive 
wearing religious clothing, such as veils, as a rather personal matter and not a mandatory condition. 
It even indicates that, as opposed to the view presented by the ECtHR, Islam as a religion is capable 
of addressing the human rights question. There is no doubt that such perspectives offer substantial 
knowledge with respect to the subject of the research if they continue to perform a critical 
evaluation of the Court’s approach to Islam. 
Before identifying the  knowledge gap, it should be noted that both the John Stuart Mill 
and John Lock books have been influential on the research, but the researcher has avoided 
reviewing their works as part of the literature review due to their lack of relevance to the ECtHR 
cases relating to  wearing of headscarves.  
2.5. Knowledge Gap in the context of Article 9 and the Islamic headscarf 
Based on the review of various relevant works, it is apparent that there is not a lack of 
literature dealing with issues of religious freedom, or more specifically with the right to manifest 
outwardly one’s religious beliefs. A considerable number of sources have focused on analysing 
the case the Refah Party v. Turkey272  and cases involving the ban of wearing a headscarf in 
countries like Turkey, France and Switzerland. The majority of scholars have criticised relevant 
decisions of the ECtHR as constituting a clear case of discrimination against women and those 
exhibiting their right of religious freedom. And yet, having reviewed a considerable number of 
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relevant sources, it can be argued that there is absence of works basing their assertions on 
compelling legal arguments. 
In this context, the aim of this thesis is to formulate and support an argument that the 
decisions of the ECtHR in cases involving Muslims and their right to religious expression represent 
a serious legal problem. First and foremost, the researcher’s goal is to provide evidence that 
protection of the principle of secularism as result of fear of fundamentalists as a justification for 
banning the wearing of a headscarf is highly problematic and as such, it has proved to be difficult 
to justify through the existing legal principles. This is particularly due to existence of a plethora of 
definitions and understandings of the term secularism whilst its application differs substantially 
among European states. Reviewing previously conducted studies has revealed that the court’s use 
of the ‘protection of secularism’ as a core of their rationale has been heavily criticised, for the 
exact nature of what should be ‘protected’ remains unclear. In this regard, the author of this thesis 
argues that analysing the principle of secularism from a logical and legal standpoint requires 
evaluation of the philosophical and historical context from which this term originates. More 
specifically, it is essential to clarify whether secularism’s fundamental aim is separation of state 
from religion, including or excluding individuals. Also, does allowing the wearing of religious 
clothes affects the state’s neutrality towards all religions, and can a person wearing such clothes 
be prohibited from to perform public services?  
In the case of Leyla v. Turkey, the court expressed implicitly that there is a correlation 
between wearing a headscarf and increasing religious fundamentalism in the country. This 
justification has been duly criticised as not being sound, insofar as no clear evidence was presented 
implying that Leyla belonged to a specific religious group, let alone that she was a fundamentalist.  
In this context, there have been numerous studies conducted recently that tried to clarify the term 
fundamentalism; in this regard, it has been suggested that most world’s religions are more or less 
fundamentalist.273 To put simply, the majority of believers following some form of theism maintain 
the exclusivity of their particular religion with respect to eternal salvation. Building on this 
argument, it is becoming apparent that restriction of one’s manifestation of religious beliefs based 
purely on the fear of fundamentalism might be unjustifiable. It seems only obvious that any court 
should base its decision on the existing legal framework in a given country rather than on poorly 
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defined concepts such as fundamentalism. Furthermore, during the court hearing, individuals were 
asked to reveal their religious belief, which constitutes breaking of the rule established by the 
ECtHR after a precedent in the case Folgerø v. Norway, 274 whereby the court acknowledged that 
trying to compel a person to reveal their beliefs contradicts basic human rights. Besides the legal 
flaws in the arguments of the court in Turkey, there are also gaps in elementary logic. If one 
assumes that wearing a headscarf can facilitate spread of extremism within society, then there 
should be a documented high number of female terrorists actively perpetrating terrorist acts. By 
the same logic, since reportedly, the majority of individuals involved in terrorist attacks are male 
with long beards, the state should regulate the amount of facial hair on its male population’s 
faces.275  Despite the evident illogicality of such suggestion, a similar logic was used in Turkish 
courts’ decisions justifying the ban of wearing a headscarf.  
With respect to wearing a headscarf, the ECtHR maintains that there is a degree of 
incompatibility between the idea of tolerance and open manifestation of one’s religious beliefs.  
Yet, the Treatment Committee in Holland countered by stating that the openness towards all beliefs 
that is required from a teacher is not affected by wearing a headscarf.276 The only case in which a 
headscarf would be a contributing factor is a situation when a person wearing a headscarf 
committed an act of open hostility or intolerance towards a specific religion or belief.  It is evident 
from the aforementioned that it is crucial to define terms, such as religious tolerance or religious 
freedom, which are often employed in arguments regarding the pertinent cases. 
This position of the court has been rightly criticised from various angles, but mainly by 
focusing on the court’s failure to consider views of women themselves. For instance, it would be 
beneficial if the court analysed views of women who converted to Islam in Western countries and 
who wear a headscarf without being forced to do so. The rulings of the court which rely on the 
argument for the preservation of secular society have been widely challenged by scholars; these 
scholars propose that secularism is the avenue to pluralism and the acceptance of difference. The 
argument against this has cited the position of France and Turkey towards religious manifestation, 
which has been termed ‘fundamentalist secularism’. This form of secularism, it has been argued, 
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infringes on the liberties of women. It has also been put forward by reviewed authors that the 
presentation of a Christian symbol, such as a cross, has been allowed in schools, while the 
headscarf has been prohibited. This constitutes a disregard for human rights, as this amount to 
unequal treatment between religions. They argue that the ECtHR should uphold the principle of 
objectivity in their rulings, and that when the court prohibits the headscarf on the grounds that the 
court must preserve the rights and freedoms of others, the ECtHR should be required to present 
legal reasons that the headscarf impinges on these rights and freedoms. These arguments and 
reasons must be legally compelling and should avoid conjecture and possibility. Other reasons 
presented as justification for the prohibition of the headscarf include the concept of public order 
and morality, despite the ambiguity of this ill-defined and divisive term. The ECtHR has failed to 
provide any real and compelling line of reasoning which indicates that the headscarf is intrinsically 
threatening to the social cohesion or public morals and order.  
On the other hand, some, including Islamic critics, have challenged the rulings of the court 
as pertain to the headscarf by arguing that the justifications are nothing more than prejudice against 
Muslims and their faith, a symptom of the post-9/11 Islamophobia in the West. Using an Islamic 
context, both through an examination of past treatment of Muslims and a reading of the Qur’an, 
these critics attempt to understand modern day human freedoms through the lens of Islam which 
is compatible with secularism and democracy. They rally against the claims of the court that the 
headscarf signifies female oppression and marginalization; rather, they assert that in cases such as 
these, the testimony and voice of the women in question often goes unheard and there should be 
more attention paid to the experiences of hijabi women. The headscarf is often considered as a 
personal choice under the category of civil and political rights. It should be noted that the nature 
of political and civil rights is passive; in other words, in order to be implemented, states are 
required to avoid interfering in these rights. 
As well as supplementing and reinforcing that outlined above, this work aims to address a 
key area that was previously neglected in the literature: an analysis of fundamentalism and 
tolerance as justifications for prohibiting the headscarf by the ECtHR. To this end, the researcher 
will address the terms ‘tolerance’ and ‘fundamentalism’ in a historical and ideological context, 
including an analysis of their etymologies and varied interpretations. Following an examination of 
the findings of this analysis, the researcher will then apply this argument to the decisions of the 
ECtHR to determine how questionable these decisions have been. For instance, ‘intolerance’ and 
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‘fundamentalism’ may involve forcing others to adopt a belief, but those who have been the subject 
of the court decisions have not been in a position of power in order to indoctrinate or impose ideas, 
as they were merely attempting to practice their personal faith. It can be argued that the court, then, 
has based a number of its rulings on conjecture. For example, the recent shifts in the policy 
regarding the headscarf in Turkey, in which the headscarf has been accepted and supported 
complicate the issue further, and raises a real question about political and legal context of the 
debate regarding the wearing of the headscarf.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Freedom of religion under the international legal framework for 
human rights 
3.1. Development of human rights after World War II 
It would be an incomplete task to examine the question of freedom of religious 
manifestation under the ECHR without also examining the overall international legal context, 
which is what this chapter aims to do. Following WWII, the growth in advocacy for human rights 
has been substantial; a wide array of international conventions and declarations regarding the 
improvement of human rights both worldwide and regionally has been established. States have 
also ratified many of these documents. Cultural, economic, civil, social, and political rights, along 
with the rights of children277, the disabled278, migrant workers279, minorities280, and women281 have 
been included. Specialist treaties have centered on disability, torture282, and also racial 
discrimination.283 In addition, the idea of human rights and its definition have been interrogated 
and analysed repeatedly during the past several decades. Within academic literature about human 
rights, contrary to the time prior to the Second World War, individual rights have received 
considerable awareness. Despite utilising organisations and treaties, international society has been 
encountering difficulties with creating and maintaining an efficient way to oversee human rights 
outside of their own national borders. Previously, states had absolute jurisdiction in regard to their 
citizens, whereas today states legally must operate according to human rights standards imposed 
under international human rights law, and the shield wall of the absolute principle of sovereignty 
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has crumbled.284 Moreover, in the second half of the 20th century, additional rights have been 
included, an example being collective rights285, which were not previously incorporated in 
international law. Since then there has been growth in international human rights law which 
become the main development in that period. Although overall the circumstances regarding human 
rights have improved, citizens still have their rights breached, especially when considering 
religious freedom and in particular freedom of religious expression such as the wearing of the 
headscarf. Thus, religious freedom and tolerance is a key in the struggle for human rights.  
This means that the right to religious expression must be examined; this is what this 
research aims to achieve. This has been undertaken through an examination of this right according 
to the UN and under three relevant legal frameworks. In order to better understand the complexity 
of this right and its related terms, these terms have been tackled individually and related to the 
current discussion. This is aided by legal documents, case studies and the academic commentary 
which followed many of the cases cited. Further, there will be an argument made regarding the use 
of terms including public order, health, morality and right and freedom to others to justify 
restriction. This allows the researcher to better understand and, therefore, better assess the 
usefulness of these terms in a legal setting, as relates to religious freedom. In sum, the above 
outlined plan will allow the researcher to find out whether provisions within article 9 of ECHR 
have been applied in a legal and logical way to restrict religious manifestation. 
 
3.1.1. The United Nations Charter and human rights 
During WWII, the systematic and appalling abuse of human rights was pervasive. The 
League of Nations did not have an extensive policy regarding human rights, and neither managed 
to defend those rights nor avert the ensuing international crisis.286 For instance, in the 1919 peace 
treaties, the “Minority Treaties,” and in President Wilson’s “Fourteen Points,” nations’ and 
minority groups’ rights were mentioned. However, this did not prevent a failure on the side of the 
League of Nations regarding protection of European Jews. Moreover, many states had a tendency 
to disregard the notion of an individual citizen and his human rights being under the protection of 
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international law.  The treatment of their citizens was according to a number of countries, 
exclusively an internal matter of the state.287 Having witnessed the dire consequences of the 
absence of the League of Nations’ real power to implement satisfactory protection of human rights 
and peace, the world community decided to found the United Nation Organization in 1945.  
In the preparatory sessions on drafting the United Nations’ charter, positions about human 
rights differed. During the Dumbarton Oaks conference, the first conference to discuss the charter, 
human rights received limited consideration, with the main focus being on structuring the 
organization and quality of the dynamics between smaller and larger countries. Generally, during 
the charter’s drafting, two main perspectives emerged. One perspective was supported by the 
United States, multiple Latin American states288, NGOs, and civil society and human rights 
advocacy groups, which was a perspective that stressed the placement of human rights in the 
charter, advocating for the Bill of Rights to be included as well. The Soviet Union and Britain 
supported the second perspective, which was not as focused on human rights. The Soviet Union 
thought that including human rights would allow other countries to interfere with its domestic 
affairs, whilst Britain was concerned that their inclusion would make Britain’s dynamics with its 
colonies troublesome. 
Ultimately the charter included human rights in the preamble and eight of the articles, with 
Article 3 relaying that one of the central aims of the United Nations is “… encouraging respect 
for human rights and for the fundamental freedoms for all…” Whilst human rights were 
highlighted in the charter as one of its main purposes, the drafters purposely refrained from adding 
legal and binding language such as obligation to fulfill, obligation to protect and obligation to 
respect in regard to countries having obligations concerning human rights. 289 Instead, words such 
as “promotion,” “encourage,” “recommend,” and so on were utilized. These terms are arguably 
not legally binding, and the violation of these terms may be considered more a political issue than 
a legal one. Schwarzenberger, as commentator, held that “in the Charter clear distinction is drawn 
between the promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights, and the actual protection 
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of human rights”. 290 It seems that the utilization of these generalized terms indicates that the point 
of the charter was simply to relay hopes, not undertakings, not even programmes. Moreover, 
provisions within and the background of articles, 3, 62, and 76 show that a majority of the formulas 
focus on the goals and functions of the United Nations and its main organs instead of member 
requirements.291 Another instance of this is in Article 13, which states that the General Assembly 
shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:  
 “..Promoting international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health 
fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”  
Instead of national requirements, the power of assembly is addressed in this article, and 
recommendations put forth by the General Assembly lack binding power.292 The Chief of the 
United States’ delegation at San Francisco, Mr. Edward, said, “because the UN is an organization 
of sovereign states, the General Assembly does not have legislative power. It can recommend, but 
it cannot impose its recommendations upon the member states.” Essentially, whilst General 
Assembly members have equal rights, they do not have equal influence on decision-making. As a 
result, when the General Assembly deliberates about certain cases, there will also unavoidably be 
political deliberation regarding matters and actions. This will not foster the “neutral principle,” 
which is often relevant and should be appropriately utilized;293 instead, if this reasoning is used, 
then it is arguable that in an attempt to encourage “respect for and observance of human rights,” 
no significant part of the U.N. has been given legislative and executive power.294   
Articles 55 and 56 of the charter vary from the above-mentioned articles concerning this 
matter. These articles are more focused on the activities of U.N. members when they are not 
working within the framework of the U.N. and allow the matter of human rights to remain a 
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concern of individual countries. 295 Legally, the protection of rights drawn from the charter would 
only be enforced within the context of the national laws of that citizen’s country, and human rights 
would be still regarded as an internal subject. 
Another aspect to consider is that “human rights,” and “fundamental freedom” as terms are 
difficult to negotiate, since they are both contentious and broad. Whilst these terms are mentioned 
in Articles 1(3), 55, 62 (2), and 76, there is no scholarly consensus on their precise meaning. 296 
Still, pulling together abstract and workable definitions of these terms is accomplishable; the more 
challenging task is to negotiate, agree and ratify a document with particular human rights listed 
and have such a document enforceable by the courts. 297  
Overall, these contentions have resulted in a multitude of viewpoints on what is considered a 
human right and/or a fundamental freedom, with one society believing one definition, and another 
society believing another. This division seems fitting with the charter’s thinly developed stance 
regarding human rights. In this regard, Ernst Hass said that the U.N.’s attempts to enforce human 
rights standards “do not work.” 298 
 
3.1.2. Religious freedom under the provisions of the United Nations Charter 
During the period between WWI and WWII, advances were made concerning the right to 
religious freedom for religious minorities. The oft-but-unjustly criticized Minority Treaties in 1919 
provided a plan to protect ethnic, cultural, national, and/or religious minorities, with multiple 
provisions included. However, when the League of Nations collapsed, so did these treaties. It is 
impossible to determine how these treaties would have fared had WWII not occurred. After the 
war, the U.N. was formed as a consequence of the systematic abuse of human rights, as well as the 
government-sanctioned oppression and execution of 6 million Jewish people by the Nazi regime. 
International communities and NGOs, before the drafting of the charter, anticipated that the U.N.’s 
focus would be on protecting human rights with an emphasis on religious freedom. The 1942 
Conference and the Moscow Declaration of 1943 proclaimed human rights and protection of 
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religious freedom;299 however, upsetting assumptions, the U.N.’s charter did not clearly include 
freedom of religion in the 1945 San Francisco draft. This was despite the appeals from 
representatives of Chile, Cuba, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, and 42 NGOS to include 
comprehensive language regarding the freedom of religion into the draft. However, this did not 
work, partly because of inadequate support, and partly because of inadequate time.300 In the new 
system, the U.N. Charter stressed individual rights and freedoms whilst practically excluding 
group rights. The members of the U.N. who supported this position believed that laws about non-
discrimination and the protection of individual rights would satisfactorily protect those whose 
rights were threatened or breached due to a group trait such as race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, 
culture, or language. Essentially, the U.N.’s charter barely offered provisions for the freedom of 
religion. 301  
Whilst there are insufficient provisions for the freedom of religion and human rights, the U.N. 
is still the organization that plays the main role in the promotion and protection of human rights. 
The UN through its organs, particularly the Economic and Social Council (hereinafter ECOSOC) 
and its specialized agencies, has taken significant steps to standardize and set norms of human 
rights and religious freedom. There are three important documents promulgated by the UN which 
refer to religious freedom. These are: the 1948 the universal “Declaration of Human Rights,” the 
1966 “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” and the 1981 the “Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Belief and Religion”, which 
more clearly outlined the right to religious freedom. Arguably, the U.N.’s original charter supplied 
a basis for the later development of provisions for human rights, particularly the freedom of 
religion and religious expression. 302 
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3.2 .The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and how it has influenced the right to 
religious freedom 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on 10th December 1948, was the first initiative to express human rights as inherent and 
fundamental for all human beings. Before the adoption of the UDHR, no declaration existed that 
so strongly advocated the recognition of human rights and freedoms, and which supported such 
rights to be recognized across the whole world.303 Therefore, the Universal Declaration, under 
Resolution UNGA 217A (III), has been widely considered to be the most fundamental resolution 
to have ever been declared by both the UN and by any intergovernmental organization.304 It was 
introduced in 1948 by Eleanor Roosevelt, President and Chair of the Commission on Human 
Rights, at the end of the Second World War and as a reaction to the experience of wartime and 
post-war abuse of human rights. The UN ECOSOC therefore sought to develop a commission that 
examined human rights, which began working on a draft declaration in 1946. The draft was 
finalized in 1948. Since then, the UDHR has shown itself to have evolved in relevance and 
importance as a “living document” over the last sixty years.305 For instance, a key principle of the 
Declaration is that it protects the inherent dignity, and the equal and inalienable rights, of all 
members of the human family which is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace.  
Acknowledging this as a birth right which cannot be questioned or violated under any 
circumstances, any violation would constitute an affront to equality, freedom and harmony. 
Freedom and dignity are, clearly, intrinsically linked but nowadays, for millions of people from 
different religions and beliefs, freedom from violence, torture and the freedom to express their 
religious beliefs are far from reality.   
 
3.2.1. Background to the Drafting of the UDHR 
The Commission on Human Rights was authorized by the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) to organize an “international bill of rights”.306 The initial commission consisted of 
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eighteen members, which has expanded since then. Within these original eighteen seats, five seats 
were provided for the main world powers (the United Kingdom, the United States, China, France, 
and the Soviet Union), and thirteen seats were accordingly designated across other revolving 
countries.307 The initial step in creating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the 
formation of a board of eight members, who assembled the drafted declaration. The initial meeting 
for this board was organized to take place in June 1947, following four months of preparation by 
John Peters Humphrey(Director of the UN Division of Human Rights) and his team in assembling 
a draft, collecting suggestions given to the UN, and examining the existing  national constitutions 
and charters across the world.308 The committee then assembled 48 articles, based on almost 200 
years of effort that preceded the field of human rights around the world, to establish a succinct 
compilation of fundamental and universal human rights. 
  The draft of the UHDR took into account a range of issues over the history of human rights. 
Firstly, it begins with the 'first generation' or 'blue rights' of liberty and freedom in the political 
sphere, examining the civil rights discussed in American and French 18th century revolutionary 
constitutions. It also looked at the 'second generation' or 'red rights' of economic and social human 
rights, sourced from 19th and early 20th century national constitutions such as the rights observed 
in the Constitution of Norway (1814), which demanded officials recognize the rights of all citizens 
to be able to earn a living through their work.  Several other constitutions were examined in the 
course of drafting the UDHR. These included the General Law Code for the Prussian States, which 
held the State accountable for offering food and welfare to those who could not earn a living to 
fully support themselves, as well as the inspiration behind the Mexican Revolution’s examples of 
Christian socialism in governance309, and several constitutions across Latin America which 
provide basic resources for those in need.310 
One of the most important questions examined by the committee was how to present the 
document. It was widely debated within the committee and the UN, as well as by other nation 
states, whether it should be a list of recommended rights, a manifesto for nations and individuals 
to aspire to, or a legal document. According to Humphrey, it was Chang from China who 
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considered the document as being threefold, and that it stood at once as a declaration, a plan of 
implementation, and a treaty.311 
 The issue was debated across the committee and states. For example, President Roosevelt 
advised the US to consider it as an “international bill of rights”. The US supported the concept of 
a universal declaration, but also questioned the nature of its legality, advocating it to be a 
declaration only as opposed to a legal constitution. Many were opposed to the legalization of 
human rights entirely, with members of Roosevelt's cabinet, such as Cordell Hull (Secretary of 
State), preferring to view the idea of human rights as a rhetoric of war time.312 Additionally, 
although France at first backed the universality of human rights, the final draft of the UDHR led it 
to admit concerns for how it would affect the French empire in North Africa and further afield.313 
Due to international concerns on the binding force and legality of a human rights document, the 
concept of a non-binding declaration was seen as more attractive, with its implementation popular 
worldwide. From the drafters’ perspectives, the creation of a statement of human rights norms 
seemed to be a natural prerequisite for the establishment of mechanism such as an international 
court of human rights. Although the commission hoped its Bill of human rights would eventually 
contain both a declaration of rights and a binding convention, it also acknowledged the necessity 
of allowing states to gradually accede to the convention. Therefore, the UDHR was compiled as a 
Resolution, and given approval by the United Nations General Assembly.314  
 
3.2.2. Key Provisions of the UDHR 
The UDHR contains an introduction followed by thirty articles that attempt to consolidate 
the fundamental and universal human rights. The declaration has been often compared to the 
structure of a Greek temple's portico, and encompasses a foundation, facade, steps, columns, and 
a pediment (gable). The foundation is composed of liberty, equality, dignity and fraternity, as 
mentioned in the first two articles. The facade is composed of four columns, which are compared 
to the following four categories of rights: the rights of the individual, including the right to life 
(articles 3-11); the rights of an individual in the political and physical sphere (articles 12-17); the 
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right to spiritual, religious, and public freedoms (articles 18-21); and the economic, cultural and 
social rights (articles 22-27). The pediment, which completes the structure and makes it stable, is 
made of the three final articles 28-30, which examine how an individual and wider society function 
together, and the duties of the citizen to its nation or society.315 These human rights, as laid out in 
the UDHR, were intended to be a complete and heterarchical set of rights, where no single pillar 
is to be seen as more important than any other.316 
 
3.2.3. Religious freedom in the UDHR 
Whilst compiling the UDHR, the issue of religious freedom was considered to be one of 
the most sensitive and contentious topics. Religion is often one of the most important spiritual, 
political and cultural issues for a range of countries and individuals, with religious liberty often 
considered as the very first freedom.317 As the committee responsible for formulating the Universal 
Declaration was very aware of the religious discrimination of World War 2, and with up to 170 
million people killed due to ethnic cleansing through the duration of the 20th century as a result of 
religious persecution and fundamentalism, there were a range of problems to consider in 
developing the declaration.318 
Johan D. van der Vyver comments that the abuse of the right to religious freedom “almost 
invariably” leads to the abuse of other rights, such as the following: 
“the right to life, liberty and security of the person; the right to freedom from torture or 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; the right to freedom from discrimination; 
the right to fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal; the right to freedom 
of movement and residence; the right to freedom of opinion and expression; freedom of assembly 
and association; and the right to privacy.”319 
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Therefore, the right to religion is embedded in the body of human rights, and is as important 
as other rights in the Universal Declaration.320 The committee responsible for formulating the 
declaration had at first wanted to proceed with a draft that only mentioned belief sparingly, but 
Roosevelt commented that any text wanting to uphold religious freedom should use the term 
'religion'. Therefore, Article 18 does not only uphold religious freedom; it also recognizes the right 
to expression of religious beliefs by both individuals and in a wider community with others.321 
Even in 1948, when the committee first examined the draft of the declaration, an edit was 
submitted to delete the phrase “freedom to change his religion”. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, 
Afghanistan and Egypt argued against the repletion of this wording, with Saudi Arabia 
commenting that the edit was to stop missionaries from exploiting the right for political reasons, 
and that a change like this would destabilize their nation and its cultural structure. 
Although Egypt at first doubted the amendment, it eventually voted for the change to be 
made, with the only contention being that: “By proclaiming man’s freedom to change his religion 
or belief, the Declaration would be encouraging, even though it might not be intentional, the 
machinations of certain missions well known in the Orient”.322 
In terms of concerns by countries on its citizens converting to other religions, it is important 
to note that countries have many different viewpoints on the necessity of regulating or playing any 
role in affecting religious individual choices. In certain countries, changes in beliefs could have a 
wide-scale effect, whereas others may see very little impact on the social structure and only 
experience a private impact. Therefore, the practices of a country will generally mirror the choices 
and judgments of its overall society, and will attempt to support the societal structure and its 
foundations. Whether or not the country's rights allow for individuals to change their beliefs 
demonstrates in what way a country or state can be considered open to change in terms of religious 
structure and in terms of allowing a range of different religions.323 For example, in some Arab 
countries such as Saudi Arabia and Sudan, it is difficult for Muslims to convert to another religion 
due to pressures by society, and in certain countries such as Sudan and Iran, religious conversion 
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from Islam is legally prohibited.324 Therefore, it is difficult for states with a settled religious 
context to allow enough religious freedoms for their citizens to convert to another religion; this is 
the reason for their opposition to Article 18. 
Furthermore, many Islamic states opposed the right to change religion advocated by Article 
18 of the Universal Declaration because in some countries, leaving Islam for another religion can 
lead to severe consequences, including the death penalty. Western countries retorted, saying that 
it was necessary to refer explicitly to the right to change religion in order to prevent incorrect and 
religiously motivated interpretations. Although many Muslim states, such as Pakistan and Egypt, 
opposed the UDHR rights that dealt with marriage, family, and the right to alter religion, it was 
only Saudi Arabia in the end that opposed the right to religious freedom, and it was the only 
Muslim nation to abstain from voting for the declaration. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights was adopted with 48 votes, 8 abstained votes, and no opposition.325 
Although the UHDR is not a legal binding instruments, it has had a significant social, 
political and legal impact throughout the world. It has had a great effect on post-war human rights 
legislation in many countries. Every United Nations human rights resolution from there on, along 
with more localized human rights declarations in Europe and America as well as the African 
Charter, has been influenced by the UHDR. Practically all international instruments on human 
rights, both by the UN and outside, make reference to the declaration.326 The Universal Declaration 
attempts to safeguard all people and their religious beliefs, and has since been the framework for 
further instruments that support religious freedom, such as the “Declaration on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination based on Religion or Belief” and “the UN 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”. Although there is more work to be done before religious 
freedom can become possible for all citizens and in all states, these three documents have helped 
to support the legalization of religious freedom as well as the right to free belief internationally.327 
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3.3. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Religious Freedom328 
The development of human rights in the context of the modern history is closely related to 
the UN Charter. As mentioned before, this Charter is perceived by many as a constitution without 
a bill of rights and with only a mention of human rights' whilst highlighting that one of the key 
UN’s objectives is to promote and encourage ‘respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion'. However, when considered in its 
totality, the Charter does not refer to human rights in a systematic and comprehensive way with a 
large majority of these references being rather ‘promotional and programmatic’ in their nature.329 
Therefore, the absence of more specific focus on the issue of human rights spurred a concentrated 
effort to deal with the above-mentioned problem. One of the first implications of this effort was 
issuing the UDHR in 1948 by the General Assembly. This Declaration encompassed a wide array 
of references to a broad spectrum of human rights including those of a social, economic, cultural, 
civil and political character. Subsequently, this document became a platform on which two major 
international human rights agreements were based: the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESC) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) with both being signed in 1966 and coming into force in 1976.330 It is worth noting at 
this point that having two treaties tackling two categories of rights was in line with the general 
division of human rights into two classes: the so called ‘first generation rights’ including civil and 
political rights, and the ‘second generation rights’ encompassing economic, social and cultural 
rights. And yet, it needs to be emphasized that such categorization to some extent neglects the 
complexity of the interconnectedness of rights from both classes. 
Hence, to distinguish between ICESC and ICCPR it can be said that regarding the former, 
the obligation of states to implement human rights is progressive (step by step) and based on the 
states’ resources. For example, the expectations with respect to the developed states like UK to 
provide jobs and health services are higher than concerning developing countries such as Somalia. 
Furthermore, due to this complicated nature of these rights, it is usually difficult to measure 
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objectively implementation of the broad range of rights that are promoted in ICESC.331  In contrast 
to ICESC, ICCPR places an obligation on member states to implement the convention promptly. 
The rights incorporated in this convention usually do not require resources for their 
implementation.332 For example, guarantee and protection of the right to have and adopt a religion 
does not necessitate considerable resources. In other words, the lack of the resources is not an 
acceptable justification to ignore implementation of the rights incorporated in the Covenant.    
  Given the focus of this thesis, it is important to highlight that article 18 of ICCPR deals 
specifically with the right to religious freedom. This right is perceived as belonging to the category 
of civil rights. In their essence, civil rights’ objective is protection of an individual against any 
harm to their integrity, both physical and mental. In addition, civil rights are implemented to 
ascertain that no individual is exposed to any kind of discrimination and is treated fairly by other 
individuals and the state. To retain their effectiveness, civil rights have a tendency to act as a buffer 
against the power of the state in cases where this power can encroach on an individual’s liberty.333 
The next section examines in more details the process of implementing the ICCPR. 
 
3.3.1. The implementation mechanisms of the ICCPR 
The ICCPR as a legally binding instrument and is one of the main sources of international 
law which envisaged two primary mechanisms for implementation which are reporting procedures 
and interstate complaints procedures. The treaty’s article 40 stipulates that states are required to 
provide reports for the Human Rights Committee of the manner in which they have implemented 
various ‘measures and policies in order to give effect to the rights recognized in the covenant and 
on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights'. The HRC has a very important role in 
assessing these reports and providing states with relevant comments in order to enable each state 
to improve the implementation of human rights in the state’s specific context. Although the 
importance of monitoring and assessing countries’ progress in terms of abiding by the ICCPR is 
considerably higher with respect to countries that have a history of abusing human rights, even the 
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most developed states can benefit from a continuous evaluation of their policies and practices in 
the context of upholding and promoting human rights.334  
  At the same time, a considerable number of voices from the academic community have 
raised an issue with the quality and value of these reports and related monitoring. Their objections 
revolve around several points. Firstly, since the reports are administered by the state officials, the 
objectivity of the information provided is likely to be compromised. This was observed in the case 
of countries from the former Soviet Bloc which claimed to be upholding human rights, although 
there was enough evidence rendering this claim at least questionable if not completely lacking in 
merit. Additionally, there were states that did not fulfill their reporting duties adequately or were 
significantly late with the submission of their reports. For example, the HRC’s 1996 report noted 
that at that time 86 states were in arrears on their reports. Some state reports are more than twelve 
years overdue.335  
In its Article 41, ICCPR stipulates conditions for utilizing mechanisms and procedures 
regarding complaints and objections raised by one state against another. One of the key conditions 
is that both parties to the dispute have to acknowledge the HRC’s jurisdiction with respect to 
interstate communications.  ICCPR, through its Optional Protocol that was enacted in 1976, also 
enables individuals to raise objection and complain against a specific state in front of the HRC if 
they believe their rights, as stipulated by the Covenant, were not upheld appropriately or if these 
individuals were even denied some of these rights. However, it is common for non-democratic 
states to prevent their citizens from suing their governments for violation of their human rights. 336     
Furthermore, it should be noted that whatever decision the HRC takes, this decision will not have 
the binding force equal in authority to a ruling made by a court of law.337 It is possible to assert 
that the implementing and supervising functions that are present in the Covenant have yet to prove 
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their effectiveness. This is particularly due to their inability to initiate proceedings whilst being 
dependent on data provided by governments, NGOs and individuals who present petitions to a 
court. Being a party to human rights treaties for some states can be a symbolic act rather than 
emblematic of their unshakable determination to uphold human rights.338 It is apparent that 
international human rights bodies should be more assertive in preventing states from violating 
human rights. Moreover, they should be tirelessly urging all countries to commit themselves to the 
protection of human rights. One possible way of being more direct in terms of guarding the 
respecting of human rights is through the role of the Special Rapporteur who can personally 
evaluate cases of violations of human rights in countries that have signed treaties dealing with 
human rights issues.339 
Regardless of the aforementioned shortcomings considering the way in which ICCPR can 
be implemented, it is generally acknowledged that there are several benefits of enacting ICCPR. 
The first benefit is the clear formulation of international standards with respect to human rights 
that each state should strive to uphold, if not surpass. Secondly, monitoring and providing 
subsequent feedback can help states to improve their policies regarding human rights whilst 
enabling identification of states with a record of violating human rights and ill-treatment of ethnic, 
religious or cultural minorities.340 In other words, it is assumed that adopting ICCPR should have 
a considerably positive effect on a given state’s approach towards human rights. This is particularly 
because states that have signed ICCPR are from that moment under significant international 
scrutiny. Hence, there is a degree of pressure put on these states by the international community 
to improve their standing in the context of upholding human rights.341 
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3.3.2. Freedom of religion in the ICCPR 
Given the focus of this thesis, it is vital to discuss in more detail the article 18 of the ICCPR, 
insofar as it represents a legal framework for dealing with the right of the religious freedom. In its 
essence, this article follows the fundamental principles of the UDHR, albeit it does so without 
mentioning directly one’s right to change to another religious belief. This is particularly the result 
of pressure from several Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt and 
Afghanistan that objected in 1948 the explicit notion of one’s right to change their religion.342 The 
objection from Muslim countries was based on the notion that Islam forbids believers to change 
their religion – that is to leave the fold of Islam. Saudi Arabia particularly continued to argue the 
seemingly total incompatibility of the wording of Article 18 with the Islamic law as understood 
and practiced in this country during conferences discussing ICCPR that took place in 1954 and 
1960.343    
It should be highlighted that the core of Saudi Arabia’s opposition towards the explicit 
notion of one’s right of religious freedom was firmly rooted in the prevailing interpretation of 
Islam’s key tenets according to which leaving Islam is paramount to a major sin. Consequently, a 
person committing such sin deserves to be punished by ‘worldly’ authorities and face a severe 
penalty.344 This has been in a stark contrast to the position of Western countries that insisted on an 
explicit notion of the right of religious freedom as a guarantee that would limit the possibility of 
biased or vague interpretations. Another point in the original version of article 18 that the Saudi 
delegation contested revolved around the Saudi government’s fear that allowing religious freedom 
would open ways to missionary activities in the Kingdom, spreading either other major religion’s 
beliefs or promulgating anti-religious ideas. As a result, the Saudi representative formally asked 
for an amendment to the text of article 18, whereby the words “to maintain or to change his 
religion or belief, and freedom” were to be deleted. However, this amendment was later dropped, 
since Saudi Arabia decided to support a similar amendment requested by Brazil and the Philippines 
that suggested changing the words from “to maintain or to change his religion or belief” to “to 
have a religion or belief of his choice”.  In practice, such wording enabled some states to avoid 
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full recognition of one’s right to become a member of another religion and by doing so, these states 
are able to limit the extent of their citizens’ religious freedom.  
Subsequently, some Western countries raised strong objections against the proposed 
amendment as being static and preventive rather than being protective of religious freedom. A 
delegate from the UK therefore suggested a compromise, whereby a clause “or to adopt” would 
be incorporated in the text of the already mentioned proposal from the Brazilian and the Philippine 
delegation. The Afghani delegation asked for a separate vote on the amendment suggested by 
Britain. The result was that the amendment was retained with 54 votes to non-with 15 abstention. 
Subsequently, article 18345 with all discussed amendments was voted for as a whole by 70 votes to 
none with two abstentions on the 18th of November 1960 as below.  
‘1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall 
include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either 
individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief 
in worship, observance, practice and teaching’ 
2. ‘No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or adopt a religion 
or belief of his choice’ 
3.’Freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief may be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or moral or the 
fundamental rights and freedom of others.’ 
4. ‘The states parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents 
and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their 
children in conformity with their own conviction.’ 
 In 1966, the General Assembly adopted ICCPR through unanimous consent in its entirety. 
In terms of its dealing with the notion and practical issues related to religious freedom, article 18 
of ICCPR comprises of two essential parts. In the first part, the focus is on the right of an individual 
to have or to adopt any religion or a set of beliefs (forum internum), whereas the second part deals 
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with the right of every individual for the manifestation of their religion or a set of beliefs. The 
following section discusses in more detail the first part of article 18.346  
 
3.3.3. Forum internum in relation to religious freedom on the ICCPR 
The way religion is perceived can constitute an important factor with respect to various 
legal aspects of an individual’s life. In this regard, Article 18 of ICCPR in its first paragraph deals 
with the concept of freedom of thought, one’s religious beliefs and conscience. The fundamental 
point of this first paragraph is the guarantee of every individual’s right to “have, to adopt, a religion 
or belief of his choice”. Such right is all so more important if one considers the far-reaching impact 
of following certain religious beliefs on one’s way of life. By the same token, rather than 
representing just a formalised list of practises and dogmas, religion has come to constitute a key 
cornerstone of people’s life philosophy.347 In this context, the inclusion of the term ‘belief’ 
together with religion in the above-mentioned quote is of paramount importance, insofar as this 
part of article 18, and most importantly its objective, encompasses theistic, non-theistic and 
atheistic world views at the same. In addition, such wording acknowledges a right of an individual 
not to formally follow any specific religion or a set of beliefs. Finally, both ‘religion’ and ‘belief’ 
as terms are to be interpreted in their broadest sense in order to be inclusive not only towards the 
major religion and beliefs as they are professed currently around the world. Another rationale for 
such interpretation is to ensure the ‘timelessness’ of article 18, whereby the terms ‘religion’ and 
‘belief’ are sufficiently inclusive to allow currently forming, or as of now formally non-recognised 
religions and beliefs to be protected in the same way as traditional religions and beliefs are. The 
foregoing is further supported by General Comment No.22 in which it is stated that recognising a 
particular religion as an official state’s religion does not in any way justify non-acceptance or let 
alone repression of other religions and beliefs professed within a given state or of those who do 
not wish to follow this particular religion.348 
Regardless of the afore-mentioned effort to formulate article 18 in the way that is as 
inclusive as possible, there is one issue that remains a concern for human rights activists. This 
problem revolves around the vagueness that surrounds the definition of what constitutes religion 
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in its most common understanding.349 Existing and in some places even dominant schism within 
religions further compounds this problem, insofar as various sects and denominations often usurp 
the right to determine what defines their religion and who is and who cannot be considered as 
being a member of a particular religion. A very contemporary example of the foregoing can be 
found in the Middle East with various Sunni and Shia groups fighting each other both on a 
theological and political level. Evans very accurately summarizes the problem ensuing from the 
absence of a widely recognized definition of the term ‘religion’ by asserting that there is always a 
chance that those who call for religious freedom will in their effort include only those religions 
and beliefs that they are familiar with whilst ignoring religions or beliefs that they oppose or 
consider as alien to their beliefs.350  
On the other hand, Sulivan argues that the very fact that there is no one fundamental 
definition of religion is beneficial to the application and enforcement of the right to religious 
freedom.351 He supports his argument in multiple ways. Firstly, he underlines the difficulty 
anybody encounters if attempts to come up with a definition of religion or beliefs for that matter 
that would be broad enough to accommodate all the different religions or beliefs that are currently 
being professed in the world. Secondly, even if such definition was created, it is very likely that 
some states would be able to find a loophole in this definition big enough not to include into their 
legal framework administering the right for religious freedom a specific belief or religion professed 
in their territory that they do not agree with.352 
Given the scale and significance of the issues discussed above, there have been various 
attempts to find a practical solution. One of the possible ways of how to circumvent the problem 
ensuing from the absence of the definition of religion is to develop case laws regarding religious 
freedom at national, regional and international level. 
 
3.3.4. Right to religious freedom as Non-derogable rights  
In the context of the framework in which states administer policies regarding human rights, 
including the right to religious freedom, it is important to pay particular attention to the issue of 
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derogability of some of these rights under specific conditions and circumstances. This issue is 
covered by article 4 of ICCPR. It stipulates that in case of emergency the government, if it is in 
the public interest and under the condition that no obligations stipulated in international law will 
be avoided, can temporarily cease its adherence to the Covenant whilst having to ascertain that no 
portion of the population is discriminated against based on their race, colour, sex, religion, culture, 
ethnicity or socio-economic background. However, in the same article there are specific rights 
with respect to laws that cannot be derogated. These laws are listed in article 4 (2) and include the 
right for religious freedom. This limitation is in line with the Minimum Standards of Human Rights 
Norms, a document issued by the International Law Association in 1984 which stipulates that those 
rights that are listed as non-derogable in article 4 of ICCPR (including right to religious freedom), 
article 15 of ECHR and article 27 of American Convention on Human Rights cannot be suspended 
under any circumstances.353 Furthermore, from the HRC’s perspective any state that decides to 
derogate any human right has to do so under a fundamental condition that its actions will be 
consistent with its obligation as stipulated by international human rights law, international 
humanitarian law and international criminal law.354 
Having discussed non-derogable rights, it is vital to clarify the distinction between these 
rights and rights that are considered absolute. Essentially, the difference between these two types 
of rights – non-derogable and absolute – is that absolute rights have been considered so important 
that they cannot be limited or suspended under any circumstances. Some examples of such rights 
are the right to be free from torture, prohibition of slavery and the right to fair trial355. In other 
words, all absolute rights are non-derogable rights, whereas, non-derogable rights can be absolute 
or non-absolute. The non-absolute non-derogable rights, although prohibited from being 
suspended, can to a certain degree be limited in terms of their day-to-day application. For instance, 
the right to religious freedom is specified as being non-derogable, as it is listed as such in article 4 
of the ICCPR; yet simultaneously, article 18(3) includes a provision through which this right can 
be limited. Article 6 of the ICCPR, which protects the right to life is another example of a non-
derogable right. This right, however, is expressed in part as freedom from ‘arbitrary’ deprivation 
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of life. The use of the term ‘arbitrary’ indicates that circumstances may justify taking of life, where 
reasonable and necessary and if done in a manner proportionate to the given circumstances. In 
addition to the basic distinction between non-derogable and absolute rights, it should also be 
highlighted that absolute rights are formulated in absolute legal language. This can be illustrated 
by the example of article 7 of the ICCPR that stipulates “No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”, whereby the use of ‘no one’ clearly 
indicates that there are no exceptions in this regard.356 
In addition to the afore-mentioned, there are specific rights within customary international law that 
were determined by the HRC as non-derogable. Among these rights is the right of an individual to 
belong to a certain minority, which includes a religious minority as well (in the line with article 
27). Moreover, article 20 of ICCPR stipulates that any form of inciting of national, racial or 
religious hatred or supporting of war propaganda is prohibited. In the commentary to article 27, 
the HRC has made it clear that states are obliged to ascertain that the right to be a member of a 
religious minority is fully defended and protected.357   
The HRC, in recognizing the importance of religious freedoms, has stated in General 
Comment No.24 the reservations which would conflict with the ICCPR's objects and are therefore 
not possible to legally enforce. These reservations include the restriction of the freedom of religion, 
as well as restrictions against discrimination in terms of religion or sex. Any reservations made on 
this basis are impermissible and unable to stand alongside the purposes and objects of the 
ICCPR.358 
This protection of religious freedoms by the International Human Rights Committee 
demonstrates that the right to freely express and follow religious beliefs is regarded as highly 
important to the issue of human rights, in order to protect individual rights and to promote peaceful 
interactions between religions and societies across the world. 
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3.3.5. Coercion as regards the right to religious freedoms under article 18 (2) 
The role of coercion within religion, which has had a long history, can be viewed as the 
direct opposition to religious freedom. Within article 18 (2) of the ICCPR, coercion is prohibited: 
“No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion 
or belief of his choice”. As a result, if an individual is forced or compelled by a state, community 
or individual to practice a certain religion or follow certain beliefs, then it is considered coercion. 
In other words, that person is not acting of his own volition and he cannot be considered to be truly 
free359. 
   The right to freedom of religion and belief without coercion, as outlined in article 18(2), 
has some influence from the advocacy of Muslim countries towards maintaining and controlling 
an individual's religious beliefs, for the same reasons as were given for resisting an express right 
to change religion. Its roots come from an amendment requested by Egypt in 1952 at the eighth 
session of the commission which compromises of two parts: the first is to support the right of the 
‘freedom to maintain or to change his religion or belief’, and the second that ‘no one shall be 
subject to any form of coercion which would impair his freedom to maintain or to change his 
religion or belief’. The amendment was considered by the sponsors to be “mainly psychological”, 
and stemming from the imbalance of the current drafting, which only made reference to individuals 
having the freedom to change religion, and not mentioning any freedom to maintain religion (in 
other words, an individual had the freedom to alter their religious beliefs, but there was no set 
wording to allow them to continue their existing beliefs). It was hoped that the Egyptian 
amendment might allay doubts expressed by representatives of various Islamic countries during 
the third session of the General Assembly which had resulted in Saudi Arabia completely 
abstaining from voting on the declaration. Saudi Arabia had argued in the third committee that to 
single out a right to change religious belief might be interpreted as giving missionaries and 
proselytizers free rein. The suggestion for the amendment was partially influenced by the then 
articles 12, 13 and 16 within the Egyptian constitution, which allowed citizens to convert from 
Islam if they had had three discussions with a minister on their conversion360. 
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 The amendment to article 18(2) was widely supported, but only if it were interpreted in 
one way: that the amendment was making something explicit that was already existing within the 
original text, and that it was not encouraging any further restrictions or limitations. In other words, 
it could in no way be limiting a person from changing their belief or religion as they wished, neither 
could it endanger or limit the freedoms of religious practice, teaching, or worship. In line with this, 
the delegate from Australia requested that the term 'coercion' would not involve any persuasions 
or suggestions made to an individual's conscience. The delegate from Lebanon only gave support 
to the amendment if it would allow for the right of individuals to preach to others or to influence 
them in a way that may lead them to maintain their current religion or to change it accordingly. 
The UK delegate also rejected any interpretations that would limit any religious debate or 
discussion. In using the word coercion, this latter point was addressed sufficiently, and also 
addressed the other delegates' points in that appeals to the conscience or that preaching in order to 
influence the person either maintain or change a religion were not considered as coercive. 
Following this discussion between delegates, the two-part amendment suggested by Egypt was 
adopted into the covenant, meaning that coercion to maintain or change a religion as debated had 
been prohibited.361   
Part of the issue surrounding the ambiguous nature of coercion is that there are many 
different definitions of the term in existing literature. For example, Adhar considers religious 
coercion being the use of, or the threat of, force by the coercer or by government in order to 
persuade the coerced into involving themselves within (or not involving themselves in) a certain 
religious practice, belief, or ritual.362 The author here focuses on the types of coercion, rather than 
what exactly coercion is.  
In his opinion, coercion as relevant to this discussion comes in two different forms. The 
first form, which will be considered at length and with the use of an example, is the form of 
coercion which is both “direct”, and “legal”. This type of coercion involves an explicit and obvious 
pressure by the state or coercer in order to pressure individuals and citizens to either involve 
themselves in certain religious practices or not (as is appropriate). It is a “legal” coercion as failure 
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to comply with these expected religious duties is seen as a breach of the state's law, and involves 
a penalty or a fine against the individual for not complying. 
  Coercion is “direct” when the state or coercer is actively and intentionally involved with 
presenting an individual with the religious activities to which they are expected to comply, and 
with enforcing penalties for individuals not adhering to these. In this instance, the two parties in 
this relationship are the coercer and the coerced. 
 One example of this situation in practice is the case of Kang v Republic of Korea.363 Here, 
the HRC addressed the “ideology conversion system” of the State, which the Republic of Korea 
was unable to demonstrate was necessary for any of the reasons as outlined in articles 18 and 19. 
The HRC therefore ruled that, through the guise of political stance the coercer was restricting 
religious freedoms through limiting the freedom of expression. As a result, the Republic of Korea 
was found to be in violation of article 18 (1) and article 19 (1), together with Article 26.  
 One of the shortcomings of Adhar’s analysis is that not all direct coercions are considered. 
In other words, the author did not examine in full the direct but illegal coercion which may take 
place between a group and an individual, or between two individuals. Therefore, although states 
are considered as being direct coercers, less wide-ranging forms of coercion between individuals 
and small groups are not examined in detail. 
 The second form of coercion, according to Ahdar, is “indirect” religious coercion.364 Here, 
a state or country involves a third party in order to coerce an individual or community into 
maintaining particular religious practices, or into changing their beliefs. In this case, more subtle 
forms of coercion are used which have a psychological effect on the coerced, particular between 
private groups and individuals. In this form, and due to the nature of it, no legal penalties are 
enforced on the non-complying individual. Additionally, the involvement and compliance of an 
individual to these religious practices is, although encouraged, voluntary.365 This version of 
coercion is a much more subtle and vague form which affects individuals through a range of social 
and psychological pressures, rather than pressures which are legally binding or direct.  
Nonetheless, a person who is dominated by such pressures may feel that they are expected to take 
on these beliefs and practices, or to change their beliefs accordingly.366 An example of this is a 
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case was brought before a Canadian Court367, where reading the Lord's prayers and any other 
hymns in public schools is a form of coercion and therefore a violation of the freedom of religion. 
Additionally, reading the Bible within schools can be considered a way of imposing Christian 
practices and observances onto other religions. In combining article 18(2) and 17 (privacy), it can 
be argued that the declaration additionally agrees that individuals are not required to reveal their 
beliefs.368 Therefore, a school does not have the right to force students into discussing their religion 
or their individual beliefs, and a student cannot be penalised for declining to read the Bible or from 
being absent at a time of reading it.369 
From Adhar’s analysis it can be perceived that although the author provides a thorough 
examination of forms of coercion, he is more focused on the involvement of the state and the 
individual rather than groups and organizations in coercing an individual. This is problematic in 
many examples, not least the recent example of Jews leaving France in vast numbers due to the 
influence of Islamic groups and organizations, none of which are state governed or permitted by 
the state to act in such a way.370 
Gunn considers more thoroughly the direct coercion of individuals, without examining 
them as being legal or illegal.371 Firstly, he looks at coercion that interferes with religion. Examples 
of these can be the disruption of religious ceremonies, damage done to buildings or shrines that 
have religious worth, or disruptions that may involve a danger or loss of life. These actions may 
take place for a range of reasons, including hatred and discrimination, or targeting a community 
directly. One example of this most recently is the involvement of ISIS in destroying the religious 
buildings and places of worship of the Kurdish Yezidian and of Christians, forcing them to 
abandon their communities and livelihoods.372 
The second form of religious coercion he considers is conformity to religious rules within 
a given group or community. This situation can be seen in the example of a state or a smaller 
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community attempting to force citizens to follow particular religious rules, or cultural rules which 
are affected by religion. Such coercion ranges in its extremities, from a parent punishing a child 
for not conforming, to an individual being executed or tortured. In religious communities, women 
are often targeted as objects of conformity more often than men.373 For instance, in Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, women are expected to dress exactly according to their perception of Islamic criteria, 
(which are arguably more confining and conforming than the dress code for men), as well as fulfill 
certain roles and sacrifice certain freedoms.374  
 Although Gunn's analysis was particularly detailed in terms of clarifying religious coercion 
and its different forms, there are some criticisms that can be made of this model. For example, his 
analysis appears to suggest that coercion is solely a direct process, meaning he does not adequately 
address the indirect and more subtle forms of coercion that occur within society between the roles 
of state, community and individual. This defies general consensus on the power of indirect 
coercion as explored in Lee v. Weisman, where the Supreme Court of US were in agreement that 
public pressure, as well as peer pressure, . . . though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt 
compulsion.375 
 In contrast to this, the HRC takes a much more general view of coercion within article 
18(2). Coercion, in views of the HRC, is not only any attempt to restrict the maintenance of a set 
of existing beliefs or current religion, or any attempt to prevent the adoption of a religion or a set 
of beliefs, but also an attempt to pressurize the maintenance or suggest the adoption of any religion 
or belief. This coercion can be performed through a range of different forms, including the use or 
the threat of physical force or physical violence, the use or threat of legal restrictions in order to 
criminalize any unauthorized religious activities or beliefs, and the use of policies or practices 
which restrict any freedoms or rights of an individual, including their rights to vote (article 25) and 
to education or medical care.376 The HRC particularly focuses on the involvement of state actors 
in this coercion, especially in terms of “restricting access to education, medical care and 
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employment”, as such policies are under the authority of the state. However, the prohibition of 
religious coercion also applies to groups and individuals within the said state. 
The HRC is also clear that coercion may come under a range of guises, and may not be 
only “blatant” or direct, which involves a range of sanctions, threats or penalties for failing to 
adhere, but also indirect.377 
Notwithstanding the effort of the authors to define the term ‘coercion’ and regardless of 
the interpretation of this term by the HRC, one can observe that the understanding of this term 
does not encompass religious duress. Within their interpretation of the pertinent term, the HRC 
emphasizes that the victim is often threatened by physical threat or other kind of penalty by virtue 
of resisting to accept certain religious beliefs.  However, duress is defined as a situation when the 
victim has to endure being threatened by immediate death or serious personal violence to the extent 
where it is not humanly possible to endure.378 Therefore, it is apparent that the term duress implies 
higher intensity of forced conversion than coercion. For instance, since 2014, a considerable 
number of Kurdish Yezidis in Iraq have been forced to change their religion whilst many Yezidi 
women have been forcefully married to members of the terrorist group Isis; in case of resisting the 
conversion or marriage, they were threatened with a death penalty. One of the suggestions how to 
address the problem with the absence of emphasis on the element of duress in the convention is to 
adopt a broader interpretation of the term ‘coercion’ that would encompass religious duress. In this 
regard, Gilbert underlines the fact that the terms ‘duress’ and ‘coercion’ are often employed in 
legal texts interchangeably379.   
Overall, there is an awareness that coercion may be conducted by state institutions in a 
direct manner, that this coercion may be done via a third party or through more subtle means, or 
that it may not be conducted by states but by a range of individuals or organizations. Nonetheless, 
whether the coercion is by the state or not, it still remains the duty of the state to monitor and 
prevent all instances of coercion by individuals and organizations.  
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3.3.6. External aspect of the religious freedom: the manifestation of religion and its 
limitations 
The Right to religious freedom is complete when a person can freely practice the religion 
of their choice and are able to freely express their religious beliefs. Under the ICCPR, the right to 
freedom of religion is protected. As expressed by article 18 of the convention the freedom to 
manifest religion or belief may be exercised 'either individually or in community with others and 
in public or private'. 
This freedom to express one's religion or beliefs covers a range of different acts. For 
example, individuals and communities are free to worship through rituals, rites, traditions and 
other ceremonial acts. They are also able to express their religious beliefs in other ways, such as 
building churches, mosques and other buildings for religious activities, using symbols or objects 
considered to have a religious meaning, and observing days of rest or holidays. Other religious 
practices and customs include following certain dietary practices, wearing particular clothing 
styles or head coverings, participating in with rituals and customs on a regular basis, praying at 
certain times and in certain areas, and using ritualistic language which is an integral part of 
religious worship. Furthermore, individuals and communities are free to engage in other activities 
to support their religion, including being free to choose a religious leader of their choice, joining 
groups or schools of their religion or belief, and distributing pamphlets, texts and promotional 
materials pertaining to their religion.380  
 The external aspect of religion may be subject to limitations that are prescribed by law and 
are necessary to protect public safety, order, health morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of others. When Interpreting the scope of permissible limitations clauses, states parties should 
proceed from the need to protect the rights guaranteed under the covenant, including the right to 
equality and non-discrimination on all grounds specified in articles 2, 3 and 26381. These 
limitations should be enforced only by the relevant bodies of law and order, and not through any 
means or by any parties that would violate those rights as mentioned in article 18 of ICCPR. The 
HRC confirms this, stating that article 18(3) should be firmly adhered to, and that the “freedom to 
manifest religion or belief in worship [and the] observance, practice and teaching encompass a 
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broad range of acts that must be protected”.382 Any restrictions to religious freedoms that are not 
mentioned as a type of exception are not permitted, even if they would be allowed as restrictions 
to other rights protected in the covenant such as national security. There must also be no 
restrictions based on discrimination, or restrictions which are made for discriminatory reasons.383  
The following sub-sections examine the reasons why limitations to religious freedoms may be 
made, in accordance to article 18(3). It begins by examining the conditions which must be satisfied 
before such limitations can be considered legitimate. 
 
3.3.6.1. Limitations must be prescribed by law  
One main condition in terms of restricting religious freedoms and beliefs is that any 
limitations must be prescribed by law. This means that restrictions and limitations cannot be 
performed in an arbitrary way, neither can they be done in a way that violates article 18(1) of the 
ICCPR, as well as those stated under article 18 (3) which says that limitations must be connected 
to the purpose of the limitations and done so proportionately. However, the notion of non-arbitrary 
on its own cannot protect human rights in general and religious freedom in particular. For example, 
during the Nuremberg trials, which had a large impact on the development of the international 
human rights and international criminal law, prosecuted war criminals referred to the existence of 
specific laws of the time period as being justifications for their crimes. However, these domestic 
laws were disregarded by the court in favour of natural and universal human rights law, as the 
court did not recognise the laws of the Nazis as a legitimate form of legal system.384 A second 
example is the laws under the Iran Constitution, where only Shia Muslims may run as candidates 
for leader and presidency in Iran.385 As the acts of perpetrators in Nazi Germany were based on 
the existing laws in Germany at that time, they may be perceived as being technically lawful. The 
same logic can be then applied to the laws depriving non-Shia candidates from running for a 
position of a leader or a president. However both these law are incompatible with the covenants’ 
principles of non-discrimination and equality. The HRC have therefore had to further develop the 
term of 'arbitrary' and 'non-arbitrary' in order to clarify the provisions of article. The HRC considers 
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that 'arbitrariness' should not specifically be equated to 'against the law', but must be understood 
as meaning an 'unjust' method which is considered inappropriate, unfair and unpredictable.386 
These criteria are further developed in the General Comment No 35.387 The meaning of 'injustice', 
as described by the HRC, seems to refer to the principles of natural law and its importance in the 
creation of human rights law. Adding to this, the HRC made further adjustments following the 
case Jeong-Eune Lee v Republic of Korea: 
“The Committee observes that, in accordance with article 22, paragraph 2, any restriction 
on the right to freedom of association to be valid must cumulatively meet the following conditions: 
(a) it must be provided by law; (b) it may only be imposed for one of the purposes set out in 
paragraph 2; and (c) it must be “necessary in a democratic society” for achieving one of these 
purposes.”388  
The HRC therefore supports a range of associations, including those which peacefully promote 
ideas which are not supported by the majority of the population, and counts these as part of the 
fabric of a democratic society.  
 The HRC also mentions elsewhere, in Toonen v. Australia389, that following the General 
Comment 16 on article 17, the usage of the term 'arbitrariness' demonstrates that a law or 
government cannot involve itself with the restriction of religious freedoms except in very specific 
circumstances: "The introduction of the concept of arbitrariness is intended to guarantee that even 
interference provided for by the law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and 
objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the circumstances”.390 
Arbitrariness is defined further by the European Commission in a range of cases, including Sunday 
Times v United Kingdom.391 From the results of this case, two requirements were found for 
something to be considered 'non-arbitrary'. Firstly, accessibility is important, meaning that the law 
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should be able to be accessed readily in order for the citizen to understand whether or not their 
rights are restricted by the law. Therefore, it is necessary that an individual is able to obtain 
information on the legalities, and whether or not they are breaking them. Secondly, foreseeability 
is required, meaning that the law is to be formulated so that an individual can monitor their own 
behaviour, and foresee whether or not the consequences of their actions may be impinged by any 
legality.392 
Additionally, to this, being prescribed by law is a necessary condition for limitation of 
religious freedom and it must be followed at all times even in particular context of derogations that 
may happen based on article 4 of the ICCPR.393   
As a result, any law that accepts restrictions to religious expression must consider a range 
of factors, such as justice and proportionality, before implementing such a change. 
 
3.3.6.2. Protection of Public order as a justification for restrictions to religious freedoms 
The protection of public order is a consideration which may account for restrictions to a 
number of rights and freedoms. Public order, however, is a vague legal concept which has no 
common definition and particular pattern across all societies.394 The HRC has taken a generally 
restrictive approach to the application of this ground of limitations. As a result, the HRC must 
consider limitations to freedoms carefully when made for reasons to protect public order, in order 
to ensure the limitations are both required and that they are proportional to the possibility of harm 
or danger in a given situation. Although the definition of 'public order' is varied and must be 
interpreted differently depending on what right or freedom is being restricted, there are two key 
features which are common to the idea of public order: 1) A set of principles which maintains the 
peaceful running of a society; 2) A respect for the rights and freedoms of those individuals and 
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communities.395 The case Gauthier v. Canad396 demonstrates the first point, where a reporter 
appealed that the House of Parliament denied him access to the building. Although the limitations 
made on the right to free expression were indeed found to be out of proportion, the HRC concurred 
that protecting Parliament could be viewed as an acceptable aim of public order.The second point 
was demonstrated with a contentious case, Wackenheim v. France, which examined a range of 
questions regarding when a practice is to be considered discriminatory or not, and what are the 
restrictions to one's occupation and private life.  Wackenheim, who had dwarfism, appealed against 
a law which banned dwarf tossing, considering this from stopping him from working and therefore 
contravening his human rights. The HRC agreed with France that the prohibition was important in 
order to maintain public order and in respecting the human rights of all individuals with dwarfism. 
The HRC considered that “human dignity is a part of public order” even if it may affect local areas 
and if the individual's consent was not found.397  
 The relevance of public order in terms of religious freedoms is most often that the state 
may attempt to protect public order in relation to a range of threats and social situations.  At the 
same time, any state involvement in the restriction of religious freedoms must be done with some 
awareness and respect of the faith's stance on a given issue.398 The function of the public authority 
is to preserve public order and not to pass judgments on the religion in question. Even when actions 
leading to disorder are caused by religion, the duty of the state is to protect public order and not to 
expose the perceived falsity of the given religious belief.  For example, in Islam, Muslim men are 
able to practice polygamy and take up to four wives. However, in France as well as many other 
countries, this is illegal, and it is contrary to public order.399 In this regard the function of the public 
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authority is not to make a value judgment but to prohibit the practice of polygamy as an unlawful 
action.  
With reference to the case of Şahin v Turkey and Dahlab v Switzerland, the preservation of 
public order was cited as the reason for a restriction on the wearing of the headscarf. Despite this, 
there was no argument made as to how, exactly, the headscarf disrupts public order. As outlined 
above, public ‘order’ is an ill-defined concept and so nations which do not impose a rigid definition 
can use this term flexibly to undermine the rights of minorities. For instance, there have been a 
few cases in France in which the headscarf was restricted or prohibited, particularly in schools (for 
example, three girls were dismissed for refusing to remove their hijabs in Creil in 1989)400. At the 
time of the case, the Minister of Education took this case through to the highest level to bring the 
headscarf debate to public attention. The ruling was that the headscarf was permitted as long as 
these students did not actively threaten the ‘public order’. Therefore, the headscarf ceased to be a 
legal matter until 2004401, the year in which the French government imposed a ban on religious 
manifestation in places of education. Public order, then, can be used with some flexibility and has 
been used to question the religious rights of certain communities. This raises the question as to 
why headscarves suddenly became a threat to public order in 2004; due to the fluid nature of the 
concept of public order402, the use of this term as a justification for prohibiting the headscarf should 
be employed with high degree of objectivity. For instance, if we use this justification, the forcible 
adornment of the hijab or niqab in certain states, the KSA for example, must also be accepted on 
the grounds that is protects public order. The researcher argues, then, that religious garments 
should not be restricted if there is no legally and logically sound reason to do so. As a result, one 
can see that the justifications for public order may attempt to validate restrictions to religious 
freedoms, and that, in a conflict between religious freedoms and public order, public order is 
normally favoured. However, due to the ambiguous and imprecise nature of this concept, it must 
be monitored with some care by public authorities, in order to respect as much as possible the 
freedoms of individuals and their religious views. 
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3.3.6..3. Public health and public safety as a justification for restricting religious freedoms 
 Public health and public safety are both considered in Article 18 (3) of the ICCPR as being 
two legal justifications for restricting religious freedoms. 'Public health' and 'public safety', in 
terms of their overall purpose, are normally considered as interlinked concepts. However, their 
precise meanings differ. Public safety concerns the protection of persons from threats to their life, 
physical integrity and property, and assists this by upholding law and order. Public health relates 
more precisely to ensuring that peoples stay healthy, and explores ways of improving the physical 
and mental health of citizens. 
  The protection of public safety is therefore often raised to justify to use and employment of 
criminal convictions which may have an impact on the rights enjoyed under the ICCPR. Public 
safety must not only assist in governing the actions that have or may have a physical effect on 
citizens, but also those that may have a psychological effect. For instance, on the Ashura (a day 
commemorating the martyrdom of the grandson of the prophet Mohammad, Husayn ibn Ali), Shia 
Muslims cut the foreheads of their children, which have some a significantly adverse impact on 
children both physically and psychologically.403  
 The protection of public health is also considered an issue which restricts religious 
freedoms. Health is considered a widely important issue, to the extent that an administrator of 
WHO Jonathan Mann maintained that people were unable to fully enjoy their rights if they were 
unhealthy.404 However, the existing terminology related to health is not entirely clear, with much 
debate both on its practical and theoretical application. As defined by The Institute of Medicine, 
reporting on the Future of Public Health, it considers public health as being “what we, as a society, 
do collectively to assure the conditions for people to be healthy”.405 This definition considers the 
collective and societal means of improving public health as being more important that the role of 
an individual or particular organisation. The World Health Organization is considered to have the 
generally accepted definition, considering “public health as widely an ideal state of physical and 
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mental health to a more concrete listing of public health practices”.406 This definition considers a 
range of means to improve public health, which includes individual and collective measures. In 
other words, this definition is not confined to any particular approach or measure. In terms of 
legalities surrounding public health, it is narrow in its scope; it is only invoked as a legal issue or 
a limitation in order to allow a state to confront a serious issue threatening health of the population 
or individual members of the population. These measures must be directed to preventing illness or 
injury, or in providing services for those who are injured or ill.407 
 Many countries have implemented both public health and public safety laws in order to 
prohibit certain religious practices from taking place that may in some way endanger individuals 
or populations. For instance, female genital mutilation (FGM), which is performed for religious 
and traditional reasons, has been banned in a wide range of countries as it has been considered a 
significant endangerment to the health of women and girls.408 The HRC often considers public 
safety and public health to prevail in importance over religious rights. For example, in the case 
Malakhovsky and Pikul v. Belarus409, the HRC confirmed that it was important for both health and 
safety for a religious association's registration to be approved only if conforming to fire and health 
standards. The HRC ruled also, in Karnel Singh Bhinder v Canada410 regarding the use of Sikh 
headwear in a construction industry, that if the requirement of a hard hat contravened article 18's 
reference to religious freedom, that it was justified by article 18(3) and its reference to public 
health and safety. The HRC did not consider it a valid reason, as given by the victim, that the safety 
risks he would experience by not wearing a hard hat would be personal to him alone. 
Characterizing public health as a utilitarian sacrifice of fundamental personal interests is as unfair 
as characterizing liberalism as a sacrifice of vital communal interests. 
 There is therefore some opposition between the state's liberal attempt to provide the 
maximum amount of individual freedom, and the system of public health which examines the 
interests of a wide collective. This does not necessarily contribute towards attaining the public 
health objectives, as a utilitarian sacrifice of fundamental individual interests would be unfair if 
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one considers liberalism a sacrifice of collective and community interests.411 Public authorities are 
better seen as an enforcement of accepted laws and a regulator of individuals and collectives in 
order to ensure they are not undertaking risks that may impact upon health and safety.  It can 
therefore be argued that public health and public safety is more about ensuring the collective health 
and wellbeing the population as whole and to a lesser extent about the health of individuals- and 
that this goal is reached by a generally high level of safety and health throughout society. The logic 
here is that through maintaining the health of collectives, the health of individuals can be 
maintained too. Therefore, limitations regarding religious freedom are permitted when such 
limitations are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these 
rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.412 Public 
health and safety must therefore be shown by the government to demonstrate a link between the 
objective – providing overall welfare to citizens – and the methods leading to these results, such 
as systematic procedures, approaches, approved benchmarks, and requirements regarding 
confinement.413 As a result, within this overall system providing maximum health and safety for 
the widest population, certain religious freedoms are bypassed for the integrity of the system and 
for providing healthcare to all individuals. In Canada, for example, a Jehovah's Witness couple 
tried to stop blood transfusions for their one-year-old daughter who was critically ill. Although the 
court recognized the religious freedoms of the parents and their freedoms as parents to determine 
their child's interests, the baby was nonetheless ordered by the court to be given blood transfusions 
under ward of the state. The court accepted this was a limitation of religious freedoms, but that it 
was justifiable.414 
 As a result, it can be seen that the state, in upholding commitments to public health and 
public safety, are able to accordingly restrict religious freedoms if they feel that such freedoms in 
any way contravene the health and safety of citizens. Therefore, certain practices such as female 
genital mutilation and the refusal of blood transfusions for minors, or the wearing of a turban when 
                                                          
411.  Supra no 394, 126. 
412. Lawrence O Gostin ‘Public Health, Ethics, and Human Rights: A Tribute to the Late Jonathan Mann’ 
(2001)29(2) The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 121, 127. 
413.  Laura Davidson, ‘Human Rights v Protection English Mental Health Law in Crisis’ (2002) 25.05 International 
Journal of Law and Psychiatry 492, 506. 
414.  B. v Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto (1995) Case No.23298. 
133 
 
a hard hat is required, may be seen as endangerments to public health and public safety and can 
therefore be restricted accordingly. 
When tackling the issue of the headscarf, it is important to examine two relevant cases 
concerning Christian religious expression in the workplace. These cases concerned a British 
Airways (BA) employee from London and a nurse from Exeter, respectively, and both were asked 
to cover or remove their cross necklaces. After bringing cases against their employers, both lost 
their cases in Britain after being refused the right to wear a cross as a symbol of faith under their 
employers’ uniform policy. In these cases, Article 9 of the ECHR, in which religious freedom is 
addressed, was applicable and Article 14, which protects against discrimination based on, among 
other things, faith. These applicants argued that prohibiting the cross in the workplace while 
allowing other religious symbols, such as the headscarf in Islam, was discriminatory. It is 
important to acknowledge that, in these cases, the ECtHR rightly assessed the context surrounding 
the wearing of the cross. In the former case, the ECtHR stated that the cross worn by the individual 
was small and unassuming, and did not appear unprofessional. Nor did the cross, or other forms 
of religious manifestation, affect the reputation of BA detrimentally. The court states that  
“Ms Eweida’s cross was discreet and cannot have detracted from her professional 
appearance. There was no evidence that the wearing of other, previously authorised, items of 
religious clothing, such as turbans and hijabs, by other employees, had any negative impact on 
British Airways’ brand or image…”415 The court therefore ruled that the applicant in this case 
could wear the cross necklace. 
In the latter case, involving the nurse, the ECtHR had a different view, asserting that the 
cross had to be removed for health and safety reasons in a hospital environment, which had a 
bigger impact on professionalism than in the former case. Further, they argued that hospital 
managers were in a better position to know the impact of this behaviour on everyday safety than 
the members of the Court, particularly a court in possession of very little relevant information or 
evidence.416 
In the latter case, in response to the charge of discrimination, a spokesman for Berkshire 
Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust responded that the headscarf is a garment necessary to practice 
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ones faith and does not pose a risk to staff or patients. A Christian employee, on the other hand, is 
not required to wear a cross to fully practice their faith, and so this becomes a matter of health and 
safety rather than restriction of religious practice.417 
From these cases, it can be deduced that banning the headscarf on the basis of preserving the public 
health and safety would be legally unsupportable.  
 
3.3.6.4. Public morality as a justification for restriction of religious freedoms 
 The term morality, which comes from the Latin word moralitas, refers to the 
differentiation of good behaviour, values and decisions from those that are considered bad or 
wrong. Morality is governed by a range of customs, traditions, and cultural contexts which may 
shape what is considered good and what is considered bad. 
Public morality therefore refers to the ethics, morals, and values which are upheld by a 
given society or state. This may be framed by existing traditions and customs and which, overall, 
defends a society's shared values and visions, demonstrates its ethos, and regulates the enforcement 
of these values and ethics by both the individual and the collective.418 This is often to some extent 
entwined with, supported by, or contrasted with religious morality, where individuals and 
communities follow a religious framework of morality and its own coded system of ethics and 
values, such as those given by the Ten Commandments.419 Furthermore, both public morality and 
law do regulate the relationship between individual and between individuals and the community 
or the state. Public morality therefore defines the way in which an individual should behave within 
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society, and the regulations to which they should adhere.420 Just the same as the legal system being 
different in each country, public morality may differ across societies. One example of this is how 
polygamy is both legally and morally considered inappropriate within the United States.421 
However, in Kurdistan, although it is against the law to practice polygamy, this does not reflect 
the current traditional and religious morality within Kurdistan. Despite the prohibition of 
polygamy on legal grounds, it is still practiced by Kurdish citizens who view the practice as 
morally and religiously acceptable.422 
In General Comment No. 22, “The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion”, the HRC 
said: 
“the concept of morals derives from many social, philosophical and religious traditions; 
consequently, limitations... for the purpose of protecting morals must be based on principles not 
deriving exclusively from a single tradition”. 
These limitations, as said by the HRC, must therefore be considered in terms of overall 
principles, without discriminating against particular tradition or religion.423 A state therefore has 
the discretion to define its moral code based on the underlying traditions and customs. For 
example, in the case Hertzberg et al v Finland424 which examined the censorship of homosexuality 
in TV and radio, the HRC made the following comment: 
The HRC feels, however, that the information before it is sufficient to formulate its view on the 
communication. It has to be noted, first, that public morals differ widely. There is no universally 
applicable common standard. Consequently, in this respect, a certain margin of discretion must be 
accorded to the responsible national authorities.425 
This therefore demonstrates that the HRC, as well as states in general, recognise the 
different existence of moral codes throughout the world, how these too can be interpreted 
differently by the individual, and the inability to recognise any code as a universal standard. 
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Therefore, allowing states the right to limit the freedoms of a citizen due to the desire to uphold 
public morality may impose some limits on their human rights.426 In this above case, Torkel in his 
individual opinion considered that the state should not be permitted to merely refer to Article 19 
(3) of ICCPR in order to justify the limitations of freedoms, as violating this article and its terms 
on public morality should only be deemed acceptable if seen as absolutely necessary.427 As a result, 
the opposition commented that a state which uses the example of public morality in order to limit 
human rights and freedoms should be able to show that these restrictions are fully necessary in 
order to support the essential values and customs of a community.428    
In comparison to this, in the case Toonen v Australia429 where Toonen opposed Tasmanian 
law which criminalised sex between two adult males, the HRC took a somewhat different stance. 
In examining whether the state has the right to restrict rights in order to uphold public morality, 
the HRC noted that it could not accept that moral issues were only a matter relevant to the domestic 
state, as this would prevent the HRC from being able to examine a large number of cases related 
to the role of human rights.430  From the point of view of the HRC, although states are able to limit 
the religious freedoms of citizens for the good of public morality, this authority cannot be 
considered absolute, and the HRC must be allowed some measure of involvement in examining 
the ways states restrict the freedoms of their citizens. Although public morality is considered one 
way for states to restrict the freedoms as declared in the ICCPR, they cannot be restricted for 
reasons of discrimination or for arbitrary, whimsical reasons.  
It has been common for the ECtHR431 to support the interference regarding religious rights 
in the name of preserving “public morals”. This is a difficult term to define, as morals change 
across time and geography, as well as between communities. The ECtHR holds the view that state 
apparatus is better equipped to decide their own morality cases, as they best understand the 
complexity of their society. Similarly, the UNHRC asserts that there is no universal conception of 
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‘morality’.432 On the other hand, the state does not have absolute dominion of the governance of 
morals, as moral restriction must meet the necessity and proportionality standards. In relation to 
the headscarf, public morality has not yet been claimed as justification. It is, however, true that 
‘public morals’ is a flexible phrase and it may be applied in future to ban the headscarf under these 
terms. For example, Belgian members of parliament stated ‘morality’ alongside national security 
as justification for banning the burqa.433 Governments must therefore be careful to manage both 
the freedoms and human rights of their citizens as well as maintain their system of public morality. 
 
3.3.6.5. The rights and freedoms of others as a justifying restrictions to religious freedoms 
In maintaining the balance between person's rights and the rights of another, it is important 
for states to recognize that a citizen's membership in a society means not only that person is entitled 
to their own rights, but that said citizen must recognize the rights of others and respect and exercise 
responsibility towards them. The preamble of the ICCPR recognizes this, in that every person has 
responsibilities to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs (realizing that the 
individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under 
responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present 
covenant).434 As mentioned in earlier sections, religious freedoms and rights are protected, but are 
not completely unrestricted. In the limitation of rights described in article 18(3) of the ICCPR, the 
exercise of the right to freedom of religion and belief carries with it particular duties and 
responsibilities. 
  This is a matter which has been subject to much consideration before the HRC in the 
context of wearing of the veil. Although the HRC435 recognizes the rights to wear this headwear, 
there have been notable instances where the use of headwear has been prohibited, including in 
France and Turkey. In the case of Bikramjit Singh v. France436 the HRC recognized that restricting 
religious dress in this case “serve[d] purposes related to protecting the rights and freedoms of 
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others, public order and safety”, as it was aimed at assisting the prevention of tensions and 
incidents in regards to religious harassment within schools. In this case, however, the HRC 
considered the state as not having fully demonstrated that the religious dress in this instance had 
demonstrated a threat to rights and freedoms of others or to public order at the school, nor did it 
consider Singh’s permanent expulsion as being proportionate and necessary.  
This case helps to demonstrate the extent to which the manifestation of religious freedoms 
may violate the freedoms of other persons, and the power of the state in restricting or allowing 
these freedoms accordingly. The scope of the rights and freedom of others that may act as a 
limitation upon rights in the covenant extends beyond the rights and freedoms recognized in the 
covenant. If a conflict arises between a right which is recognised and protected within the 
covenant, and a right which is not, it must be first established that the covenant attempts foremost 
to protect the fundamental human rights of individuals. Therefore, with this assumption, 
importance must be given to those rights which are not subject to restrictions within the 
Covenant.437 In cases of limitations and restrictions, states must give strong justification for the 
reasons behind limiting religious freedoms in order to protect the rights of others. This justification 
must suggest the restriction as being “necessary” and being proportionally linked to the needs and 
situation identified438.  
Overall the ICCPR is the legal and fundamental document which has a universal bearing 
on religious freedoms and rights. Despite addressing a range of human rights and not just religious 
rights, it serves to provide a universal clarification of the rights to religious freedoms. Although 
there is only one article in the document which relates to religious freedom, the HRC has provided 
additional resources and guidance through their General Comments and through the use of this 
article in a range of communications, to which reference has already been made in this analysis 
through the use of illustrative examples. The document is therefore a useful tool in providing 
universal protections of religious rights and freedom. However, there are still some difficulties in 
elaborating and clarifying the religious rights of individuals alongside concepts and situations such 
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as public health and public safety, public order, and the rights and freedoms of others. It is hoped 
that, given time, the range of judicial cases and the HRC's role within them will be able to clarify 
religious freedoms and rights in regards to these concepts. 
3.4. Declaration Drafting on Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief (25 November 1981) 
3.4.1. Background of the Declaration and its content 
The maximum protection of religious freedom is necessary in order to maintain stability 
and peace internationally. Accordingly, efforts to ensure this protection have been persisting, and 
have resulted in the inclusion of the right to religious freedom in multiple documents regarding 
human rights. Nevertheless, these human rights documents typically cover human rights in 
general; they are not solely devoted to the matter of religious freedom. In fact, one perspective 
posits that the Declaration on Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based 
on Religion or Belief 1981 is the singular document wholly devoted to the right to religious 
freedom, and may be one of the most significant religious freedom documents internationally. This 
significance is determined not by its enforceability or its quality, but by its comprehensiveness 
regarding religious freedom rights, and how it is utilised to define the right to religious freedom 
by many nations.439 In 1981, after twenty years of work subsequent to the U.N.’s December 7, 
1962 mandate, the General Assembly enacted the Declaration.440 The multiple setbacks to reaching 
an agreement about the document are indicative of the underlying political power play dynamics 
within the U.N., as well as the controversy regarding the very topic. Eight articles comprised this 
document, which incorporated the following main principles: 
1) Descriptions of religious rights for both individuals and institutions.   
2) Language regarding religious intolerance, discrimination, or abuse  
3) Provisions specifically regarding parents’ and children’s religious rights and, 
 4) Clear implementation principles441.  
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Essential components concerning religious freedom emphasised in the Declaration are the 
right to assemble, the right to establish and preserve places to worship, the right to write, publish, 
and disseminate religious texts, the right to teach about religion or beliefs, and the right to practice 
days of rest or holy days.442  
 
3.4.2. The Debate on the content of the Declaration 
Throughout the preparation stage, the creators of the 1981 Declaration confronted multiple 
contentious matters. An example of this was when Eastern European and communist states raised 
the issue of the vagueness of religion as a term, contending that incorporating religion as a term 
meant that atheism and non-belief were not also protected, and they should be. They also believed 
that the use of religion as a term gave preferential treatment to belief versus non-belief. Westerners 
answered this concern by saying that the Declaration was designed to protect religion, and that 
atheism was not a religion; however, they also said that atheism would presumably discover a way 
to be protected within the language of the Declaration regardless.443 The two sides came to an 
agreement; “whatever” would precede instances of the word “belief” in the preamble and Article 
1 (1), for example article 1 (1) is drafted “… the right shall include freedom to have a religion or 
whatever belief of his choice..”444 It could be argued that when compared to the provisions of the 
UDHR and ICCPR, the agreement has proved to be clear and beneficial; there is an understanding 
from the text of article 1(1) that most beliefs, religious and non-religious, including agnosticism, 
atheism, and rationalism, are protected. Compared to the 1981 declaration which explicitly 
includes all belief, the capacity and scope of Article 18 (1) of the ICCPR is decided by the HRC 
by virtue of General Comment No. 22.445  
Another contentious matter addressed by Muslim representatives was whether a person’s 
right to convert from one religion to another religion ought to be protected, a matter that had 
previously raised problems throughout the drafting of the UDHR as well as the 1966 Covenant. 
As already discussed some argued against this, as typical Muslim law defines conversion from 
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Islam to another religion as apostasy. Due to this view, many Muslim governments have little 
patience for other religions’ missionaries, believing these missionaries’ and proselytises would 
tempt Muslims to be apostate by converting. These views, most notably expressed by Islamic 
delegates from Saudi Arabia, led to the elimination of language about the right to convert religions 
from the preamble and Article 1 of the 1981 Declaration. This was a move away from the explicit 
protection in the UDHR and to some extent even from Article 18 of the 1966 ICCPR, with the 
phrase “freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice”. As a result, the language 
of the 1981 Declaration became less powerful in its wording. In order to appease those who 
opposed the elimination of this phrase (right to change religion), Article 8 was added, which stated 
“nothing in the present Declaration shall be construed as restricting or derogating from any right 
defined in the UDHR and the International Covenants on Human Rights.”446 Since the UDHR and 
1981 declaration technically are not binding documents and therefore do not create legally binding, 
states that do not ratify’ Covenant are seem to suggest that the right to convert is not international 
law, despite its incorporation in the UDHR and the 1966 Covenant. Supporters of the right to 
convert were displeased with this interpretation, but argued that the right to convert was not 
completely downgraded in the document. One perspective even proposes that the revised Article 
8 maintains that the right to convert is a basic right. Scholar Benito analysed the unified impact of 
the UDHR, the 1966 Covenant, and the 1981 Declaration, and determined that whilst each 
document’s phrasing was a bit different, all had the same essential meaning; individuals have a 
right to convert religions. He believed that, no matter how it is displayed, this right is implied in 
the language that discusses the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief.447 Still 
Saudi Arabia’s abstention regarding the UDHR, the elimination of the phrase “change of religion” 
due to Muslim opposition, from the ICCPR, and the 1981 Declaration’s language, have made the 
status of the right to convert to ambiguous. This ambiguity may allow some Islamic countries to 
disregard the right to convert or manipulate how they will interpret and apply it; an instance of this 
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is in Iran and Mauritania, where one may convert to Islam, but one cannot convert from Islam to 
another religion.448 
Similar to the ICCPR, Article 1(3) of the 1981 Declaration discusses religious 
manifestation, which, according to the Declaration, is only allowed to be restricted when 
prescribed by law, or when it is essential for the protection of public safety, order, health, or morals. 
Also, it may be restricted when it endangers others’ fundamental rights or freedoms. 
 
3.4.3. Discrimination and Intolerance based on religious criteria in the 1981 Declaration  
Article 2 of the 1981 Declaration focuses on religious discrimination and intolerance. It 
says, “No one shall be subject to discrimination by any State, institution, group of persons, or 
person, on the ground of religion or belief.” When considering international law, this article has 
extensive implications. Whilst many commitments drawn from treaties and resolutions typically 
bind the State, Article 2(1) binds all people, groups, and institutions, which includes both religious 
groups and institutions.449  
If one reads paragraph 1 of Article 2 which prohibits discrimination by “any state, 
institution, group of persons, or person along with Article 3, which describes discrimination 
between human being as an abuse of human dignity, and together with paragraph 1 of Article 4, 
which discusses how states will prevent discrimination in all areas, such as civil, economic, and 
cultural areas, then one would conclude that the prohibition ought to be applied to both public and 
private actions. This interpretation reflects Article 2(1) of the UN Declaration on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, where discrimination by any “state, institution, group, or 
individual,” is banned. This means that discriminatory actions of “private” non-governmental 
institutions, governmental authorities, and (due to the inclusion of the word “person” in the 
singular) individuals are also subject to the provisions of Article 2. Article 3 of the 1981 declaration 
supports this position, with phrases denouncing discrimination “between human beings.” Also, 
Article 2(2) 1981 Declaration differs from the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)450 in that it omits the phrase that prohibits discrimination 
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in “political, economic, social, cultural, or any other field of public life.” Still, other language 
within the ICERD illustrates that its aim was to cover private action also.451  
As aforesaid, state, individual, and non-governmental organization discrimination may 
occur. However, in order to preserve public order and public safety, according to Article 4, states 
(not individuals) have a responsibility to intervene against religious discrimination.452 
Paragraph 1 of article 2 solely addresses discrimination, but paragraph 2 also includes 
intolerance, defining intolerance in a way that it becomes interchangeable with discrimination. 
However, in previous drafts of the 1981 Declaration, the two terms were employed separately, 
with discrimination put in later.453 Two perspectives have risen concerning the definition of 
“intolerance” and its importance within the Declaration. During the drafting stage, one perspective 
argued that “intolerance” does not have juridical meaning and indicates a mind-set or prejudice.454 
Afterwards, this has been highlighted regarding education provisions in order to promote the 1981 
Declaration.455 The other perspective argues that intolerance is defined as both actions that are the 
result of hatred or prejudice stemming from religion or beliefs, as well as a mind-set. It includes 
other human rights violations, like physical attacks.456 
The argument that intolerance includes emotional, psychological, philosophical, and 
religious views that may instigate discriminatory acts or the infringement upon religious freedom 
is a compelling one. Nevertheless, another argument contends that “discrimination” as a term is a 
legal one, and whilst not completely clear, it does supply an applicable and comprehensive formula 
for identifying discrimination457, whereas “intolerance” is currently a more ambiguous term, in 
that it merely indicates emotional, psychological, philosophical, and other viewpoints that may 
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Special Rapporteur Odio Benito). 
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Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief’ (1972) 12 The. Santa Clara Lawyer 403. 
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instigate discrimination, hatred, or persecution.458 Thus, the lack of a workable definition and 
precarious position of the term “intolerance” in international judicial cases are making it difficult 
to use as a term as proof that intolerance occurred in a legal context. Article 4(2) of 1981 
Declaration supports this perspective, where it refers to various ways in which states can manage 
discrimination and intolerance and highlights the difference between the two; it stipulates that 
legislative action ought to be taken against discrimination whereas states ought to take “all 
appropriate measures” against intolerance. Intolerance can instigate actions such as murder, 
property destruction, and more, which are infringements upon international human rights, and they 
typically also breach national law. If intolerance instigates the infringement of religious freedom, 
then this intolerance and resulting acts violate the rights protected under the 1981 Declaration.459 
 
3.4.4. Legal Nature of the Declaration 
The 1981 Declaration is the most significant document in regard to the right of religious 
freedom, nevertheless, the 1981 Declaration is not legally binding, and it has no power to create 
legal obligations. As a result, the Special Rapporteur for the Commission on Human Rights which 
it was replaced by the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) in 2006, as well as some 
states, such as the former Soviet Union and the Philippines suggested the creation of an open-
ended working group in the commission in order to prepare a convention. They argued that a 
convention and its mandatory provisions would place an obligation on states to fulfil duties like 
submitting reports about the implementation of such provisions. Completing duties such as these 
may inspire more respect for religious rights and religious freedom. Angelo Vidal d’Almeida 
Ribeiro460 and Abdelfattah Amor461, the Special Rapporteurs, claimed that the 1981 Declaration 
does not have adequate power to obligate states to fulfil these duties, and find continuing the status 
quo a fruitless effort. Since the Special Rapporteurs are important members in the implementation 
procedures, they are the ones who typically observe and report examples of noncompliance 
regarding the Declaration. As a result, they especially understand the necessity of more stringent 
enforcement of the 1981 Declaration and how noncompliance is higher than it should be. When 
                                                          
458 Ibid,  
459 Carolyn Evans, ‘Time for a Treaty-The Legal Sufficiency of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and Discrimination’ (2007) 3 BYU L. Rev. 617, 626. 
460 E/CN.4/1988/45 Report submitted by Mr Angelo Vidal d’ Almeida Ribeiro, Special Rapporteur appointed in 
accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1986/20 .para 55. 
461 E/CN.4/1996/95 Report submitted by Mr Abdelfatah Amor, Special Rapporteur appointed in accordance with 
Commission on Human Rights resolution.para69. See E/CN.4/1993/25. 
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analysing the Special Rapporteurs’ reports, one can observe these examples of noncompliance 
particularly regarding the right to have a religion, to worship unobstructed, to convert religions, 
and to observe religious holidays.462 
Several nations, however, did not agree with the formation of a convention, arguing that 
their national sovereignty and independence in the management of their own affairs would be 
threatened. They do agree that the 1981 Declaration is useful for guidance and for consistent 
implementation concerning religious freedom, which is why the Declaration is considered one of 
the most esteemed international human rights documents, to which standards for religious freedom 
are conformed. Scholar R.S. Clark stated that, in regard to the utilisation of the Declaration, it is 
best for supplying more explicit information to be included in the UDHR and the ICCPR.463 
Accordingly, it may be employed when States Reports are being reviewed in the context of the 
ICCPR, or when complaints are being analysed in the context of its Optional Protocol. Also, the 
1981 Declaration is applicable when accusations of the abuse of human rights were being 
investigated by the Commission on Human Rights464 with its “Confidential1503”465 procedure or 
its “Public 1235”466 procedure, as well as when the Secretary General is utilising his good offices 
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463  Cited in Derek H Davis, ‘the Evolution of Religious Freedom as a Universal Human Right: Examining the Role 
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to address human rights issues, or when he is acting in a manner comparable to the ombudsman-
like work of the proposed United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.467  
There is a view which contends that whilst the Declaration does not have adequate power 
to enforce its provisions, it may be utilised to aid the legally binding ICCPR by clarifying more 
obligations of the signatories’ party of treaty.468 In this manner it would be both helpful and 
authoritative for settling disputes concerning definitions of terms in the ICCPR. Essentially, the 
Declaration would not have legal force, but it would nonetheless have a legal influence.  
The 1981 Declaration can also be utilised with international customary law by employing 
terms that imply legal obligation rather than simple aspirations. Instances of this include utilising 
phrases like, “everyone shall have the right,” “no one shall be subject to discrimination,” and “all 
States shall take effective measures”.469 When these kinds of phrases are utilised, it demonstrates 
that nations should not have disagreements regarding the importance of the right to religious 
freedom. Also, the Declaration implores nations to employ actions to protect religious freedom. 
The 1981 Declaration also has a legal influence without carrying legal force because it was passed 
with the approval of many nations from diverse political systems, legal systems, and regions, with 
Islamic, Communist, and Western states participating in the drafting process.470 Sullivan wrote 
that the UN General Assembly aimed for the 1981 Declaration to be not only hortatory, but 
normative, which is highlighted in Articles 4 and 7.471 In Article 4, it says that states must “make 
all efforts to enact or rescind legislation” as well as to act against religious discrimination. Article 
7 is more definitive, stating that the rights and freedoms in the Declaration should be incorporated 
into national legislation so all citizens are able to exercise those rights and freedoms.472 
Eventually, the Declaration’s drafters discussed the idea of creating a convention regarding 
religious freedom and determined that “it was more difficult to legislate on religious intolerance 
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than on racial discrimination, since a convention on religious freedom impinged upon the most 
intimate emotions of human beings”.473 
In general, whilst it must be recognised that the Declaration is not a legally binding 
document in the context of international law, it is beneficial to have a comprehensive document 
on religious freedom. The accomplishment of completing this document is commendable, 
especially considering the difficult issues which arose throughout its creation. The document is 
significant and useful for interpreting more formal and binding international assurances regarding 
the freedom of religion, and is therefore relevant in even the most basic of religious freedom cases. 
As Bahiyyih Tahzib has commented, “States regard the 1981 Declaration, or at least some of its 
provisions, as normative in nature and part of customary international law”.474 
 
3.5. Conclusion  
The twentieth century saw significant growth in the recognition of religious rights and 
freedoms. The very first endeavour to establish a human rights document, which also encompasses 
religious rights, was the UDHR. Even in the face of ideological conflicts between countries and 
states, particularly communist and capitalist powers at the time of the UDHR, it was still possible 
to reach a consensus on the subject of human rights. Although the UDHR is not legally binding, it 
can be argued that it still a living document which is relevant to the issues of 21st century such as 
mass immigration and globalization that lead to more population interaction, cultural and religious 
diversity. For instance, articles 3 (right to life) article 12 (right to privacy) and article 18 (right to 
religious freedom) of the UDHR are all reproduced in the ECHR which the ECtHR has been 
justified its decisions based on these texts of articles. The UDHR is comprised of a wide range of 
rights, from economic, social and cultural rights to civil and political rights. Therefore, it is 
composed of and regulates both first-generation human rights and second-generation. In doing so, 
the declaration has established a clear position in terms of religious freedoms and rights. 
Additionally, unlike other international documents such as the ICCPR and the 1981 religion 
declaration which indicate the freedom to change religion implicitly, the UDHR referred to the 
right to change religion unambiguously. The declaration therefore is an explicit stance on human 
rights, which aims to protect religious rights and freedoms.  
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The absence of a completely legally enforceable document in regards to human rights has 
led to a range of treaties in order to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals. 18 years after 
the UDHR was formally accepted, the ICCPR was introduced as a covenant protecting the civil 
rights and political. It is used to monitor compliance with civil and political rights among the 
parties through annual reports.  However, as the reports from the ICCPR are obtained from states 
not from the Human Rights Committee, and the approval of the jurisdiction of the HRC is derived 
from the acceptance of the states, many consider that the system cannot force member governments 
to actualise civil and political rights within their nations. Nonetheless, the HRC, through providing 
a variety of General Comments and judicial stances, have made considerable progress in 
establishing human rights governance and monitoring.  
It is important to note that we are currently at a time in history where that mass influx of 
immigrants and refugees and population movements is leading to more cultural interaction and 
religious conflicts. As a result, the importance of respect for religious rights has become more 
fundamental than ever in avoiding conflict between countries and to enforce trust and respect 
between religious communities. The international community found it difficult to regulate these 
conflicts until 1981. When the General Assembly initiated a declaration, which opposed 
discrimination and intolerance based on individuals or community's religions or beliefs. This 
decision came after over twenty years discussing religious rights and freedoms. The three 
documents together play an important part in regulating and improving the importance of religious 
freedoms and rights across the international community, and are used to guide a range of legal 
processes, including within the ECHR and ECtHR. This chapter has examined in depth the 
freedoms and rights of religion and beliefs in the light of relevant international instruments such 
as the UDHR.  
In the next chapter, religious freedoms will be discussed in the context of the concept of 
fundamentalism and in the light of the decisions of the ECtHR in relation to wearing of Islamic 
headscarf.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Critical analysis of the concept of ‘fundamentalism’ which is used as 
a justification by the ECtHR to ban the wearing of the headscarf 
4.1. Introduction 
It appears that much can be revealed by a headscarf. Immediately after a Muslim woman 
wraps one around her head, her identity and her attributes become disclosed to a cross-section of 
society - from reporters, to politicians and scholars, etc. Regardless of the fact that a head covering 
has, in a variety of forms, been a regular part of Muslim and non-Muslim women’s clothing for 
hundreds of years, headscarves seem to attract significant attention in the world. Official reactions 
range from the changes in French regulations concerning the wearing of headscarves by schoolgirls 
were covered by the media, to controversy surrounding a case in Denmark, where women check-
out operators were dismissed from their jobs;475 a case in Britain, where a schoolgirl considered 
their school’s uniforms insufficiently strict from a Muslim perspective;476 another case in New 
Zealand, where a witnesses credibility was challenged on the basis of her wearing a headscarf 
when providing evidence in a trial concerning car theft477, or the case in Australia, where a referee 
refused to allow a soccer player to participate in the game as long as she wore a headscarf.478  
It is necessary to note that the discussion in this work revolves around issues related 
specifically to wearing the headscarf and not other types of Islamic attire such as burqa or niqab. 
This is mainly due to the fact that wearing the burqa and niqab is not common in the concerned 
states.479 Furthermore, it can be argued that from a legal and logical perspective, the banning of 
the niqab and burqa can be justified by the need to protect public order and achieve a higher level 
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of security.480 Similarly, both above-mentioned pieces of clothing are not accepted in educational 
environments where verbal communication, of which seeing someone’s face is an indispensable 
part, between the teacher and students is a crucial element in the process of learning.  Example of 
the foregoing is the case of Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council 481 where the 
Respondent’s Education Service observed that: 
“We believe the following principles are appropriate to our circumstances. Obscuring the 
face and mouth reduces the non-verbal signals required between adult and pupil, both in the 
classroom and other communal parts of the School. A pupil needs to see the adult’s full face in 
order to receive optimum communication. Schools are professional settings where communication 
is vital, both between adults and pupils and between adults. It follows that for teachers or support 
workers wearing a veil in the workplace will prevent full and effective communication being 
maintained. In our view the desire to express religious identity does not overcome the primary 
requirement for optimal communication between adults and children.”  
The legal and political discussion related to public display of religious clothing, especially 
in schools, universities, public service bureaus, and other institutions of similar kinds, eventually 
reached the ECtHR represented by two cases. In the first case, Dahlab v Switzerland482, 
administration of a primary school forbade one of its teachers to continue teaching because of her 
modest and traditional way of dressing which included a headscarf. In the second case, Şahin v 
Turkey483, a university student was not allowed to study because of her wish to wear a headscarf 
during lectures and exams. The Şahin case is especially important, since it was the first decision 
related to the matter of religious clothing that the Grand Chamber ever took. It is vital to emphasise 
that in the period after the Şahin’ case, almost 100 similar petitions were refused by the ECtHR.484 
Therefore, whilst Şahin is more important in legal terms, Dahlab can be considered a landmark 
case of any issue related to religious freedom in terms of the outcome for the applicant.    
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Refah Party v Turkey485 was another case that could be considered relevant to the issue of the 
relationship between the wearing of the headscarf and fundamentalism. Even though it concerned 
the dissolution of a Turkish political party, several sections of the Court’s decision referred to 
headscarves as a sign of fundamentalism prevalent in society and a threat to the secular setting of 
the country. 
In each of these cases, the Court offered several arguments to justify the ban on the wearing 
of headscarves in workplaces and educational institutions, but the limited extent of this thesis does 
not allow analysis and evaluation of each of these claims in suitable details. Therefore, after 
reviewing the Court’s arguments in favour of restricting religious manifestation, the researcher 
selected two controversial arguments - ‘prevention of fundamentalism’ and ‘intolerance’. This 
chapter aims to critically examine the argument – ‘prevention of fundamentalism’– which the 
ECtHR (cited in its decision to ban headscarves) to determine their legal verifiability and validity. 
In order to do so, the thesis analyses and assesses all of the above mentioned cases, as well as other 
similar cases adjudicated by the European Judicial bodies such as Kalaç v Turkey486 and Engel 
and others v The Netherlands.487 Moreover, from the researcher’s point of view, a logical 
evaluation and analysis of the Court’s decision requires illustrating and considering the arguments 
first in philosophical and historical terms, then in the legal context. 
 
4.2. Key Elements of the ECtHR Reasoning 
In reference to those instances whereby the headscarf was directly involved, court 
proceedings were handled with very little consideration as to the key concerns of the two parties, 
instead addressing the ability of the state to defend their decision to ban or restrict religious attire 
with reference to the criteria set out in article 9(2) of the ‘ECHR’. In the case of Ms Dahlab, the 
core argument to restrict religious expression was ‘protection of the rights and freedoms of others’ 
which is incorporated in article 9(2), with the court stating, with reference to the ECHR, that it 
should “…weigh the requirements of the protection of the rights and liberties of others against the 
conduct of which the applicant stood accused”.488  
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  This phrase has been objected to as being overused and formulated in a way that clearly 
favours those who have rights and liberties, whilst Ms Dahlab’s role is reduced to that of the 
accused one. This wording strips Ms Dahlab of her rights and liberties, painting her as a perpetrator 
of an offence towards the ‘others’.489 Due to this fact, it is worth quoting this important extract at 
length as it constituted the ground for the decision:  
“During the period in question there were no objections to the content or quality of the 
teaching provided by the applicant, who does not appear to have sought to gain any kind of 
advantage from the outward manifestation of her religious beliefs. The Court accepts that it is very 
difficult to assess the impact that a powerful external symbol such as wearing a headscarf may 
have on the freedom of conscience and religion of very young children. The applicant’s pupils 
were aged between four and eight, an age at which children wonder about many things and are 
also more easily influenced than older pupils. In those circumstances, it cannot be denied outright 
that the wearing of a headscarf might have some kind of proselytizing effect, seeing that it appears 
to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran and which, as the Federal 
Court noted, is hard to square with the principle of gender equality. It therefore appears difficult 
to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for others 
and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must 
convey to their pupils.”490 
With respect to the tolerance, according to the Court, there exists a clear correlation 
between a higher level of intolerance and the wearing of headscarf which is why “It therefore 
appears difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, 
respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic 
society must convey to their pupils”.491 
While Şahin is a Grand Chamber judgment, and did deal with the issues in a little more detail, the 
Grand Chamber relied in part on the decision in Dahlab with respect to gender equality and 
tolerance. 
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From paragraphs quoted above, one can identify certain assumptions made by the court: 
that the headscarf may, intentionally or otherwise, convert children (proselyte effects), that it is 
incompatible with gender equality, and that it represents an affront to integration and tolerance.492  
In the Şahin’s case the first assumption, that the headscarf may have a proselytizing effect, has 
very little weight in the final verdict, as far more emphasis was put on the other reasons such as 
gender equality, religious tolerance, combating fundamentalists group and protection of 
secularism.493 In terms of fundamentalism and groups subscribed to extremist ideology that seek 
to forced their ideas on society, the court states that 
“The Court does not lose sight of the fact that there are extremist political movements in 
Turkey which seek to impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and conception of a 
society founded on religious precepts ... It has previously said that each Contracting State may, in 
accordance with the Convention provisions, take a stance against such political movements, based 
on its historical experience (see Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others,). The regulations 
concerned have to be viewed in that context and constitute a measure intended to achieve the 
legitimate aims referred to above and thereby to preserve pluralism in the university”.  
The court added that: 
Imposing limitations on freedom in this sphere may, therefore, be regarded as meeting a pressing 
social need by seeking to achieve those two legitimate aims, especially since, as the Turkish 
courts stated ..., this religious symbol has taken on political significance in Turkey in recent 
years494. 
 While Şahin cites influence on students as a factor, it is not for fear of conversion, as the 
majority of the students are likely to be of the same religion as the teacher, even if they may have 
a different perception of its requirements. The main weight of the decision seems to be rooted, 
then, in the protection of the rights and liberties of others. The court in this regard comments that: 
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“… the Court is able to accept that the impugned interference primarily pursued the legitimate 
aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and of protecting public order, a point which 
is not in issue between the parties.”495 
The final case is related to the Refah Party v Turkey in which the adornment of the 
headscarf is equated to exerting pressure on females who did not follow that practice, which may 
lead to discrimination based on religion and belief.  There was also a concern amongst the court 
that covering with a headscarf, particularly the implementation of mandatory covering, threatens 
the freedoms of others, public order and public safety.496 It was noted by the court that the actions 
of certain universities were aimed to avert extremist beliefs and the groups which hold them in 
order to preserve religious or non-religious freedom, in line with article 9 of the ECHR.497  The 
court also stated that  
“In a country like Turkey, where the great majority of the population belong to a particular 
religion, measures taken in universities to prevent certain fundamentalist religious movements 
from exerting pressure on students who do not practise that religion or on those who belong to 
another religion may be justified under Article 9 § 2 of the Convention. In that context, secular 
universities may regulate manifestation of the rites and symbols of the said religion by imposing 
restrictions as to the place and manner of such manifestation with the aim of ensuring peaceful 
co-existence between students of various faiths and thus protecting public order and the beliefs of 
others”.498 
The following section will attempt to provide an understanding of the nature and main 
characteristics of fundamentalism, in order to determine its legitimacy as a reason for the 
restriction of religious garments and symbols. 
 
4.3. Prevention of Fundamentalism as a Tool for Restrict Religious Manifestation   
With the advent of the 21st century religious fundamentalism has become more and more 
prevalent on a global scale across religious groups; due to the extreme nature of the attacks on the 
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US in 2001499, Islamic extremism has received the most coverage in recent years. One should note 
that while the rise in extremist belief and activity has had a significant influence on the theological 
and political landscape of many nations, it has only recently entered the legal world as a 
justification for court decisions. While fundamentalism and extremism has been cited as a reason 
for rulings against religious attire, including in judgments by the ECtHR, the most high profile 
cases have been exclusively related to the head coverings of Muslim women.500 On examining the 
subject, it is clear that the term ‘fundamentalism’ is difficult to pin down, conceptually and 
definitively, particular in relation to Islam. Many have attempted the challenging task of creating 
a schema for the concept by which the historical context, national interpretation and individual 
ideology behind fundamentalism are taken into consideration. This research will aim to discover 
whether this is a concept common to a number of religions, and how the perception of the concept 
of ‘fundamentalism’ differs when applied to religions other than Islam. The way in which the 
ECHR legal system approaches fundamentalism and religious rights is the primary aim of this 
research; before this examination, however, an comprehension of several interpretations of 
‘fundamentalism’ must be achieved. Furthermore, an exploration of the historical and 
philosophical elements of the term will be undertaken, and the approach this research is to adopt 
elucidated. With this context established, an analysis of the court system in relation to 
fundamentalism can be undertaken.  
 
4.3. 1. The Roots of fundamentalism 
The word ‘fundamentalism’, in recent years, has come to be inextricably linked to Islam in 
the mind of the public; however, the term has its origin in the US in Protestant communities in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, where it was used to refer to more devout protestants, even by 
the group themselves.501 In 1920, this term was first publicly used by Curtis Lee Laws in 1920, as 
the ‘fundamentalist’ Protestants associated with the Niagara Falls Conference organised into a 
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group named the ‘World Christian Fundamentals Association’. Between 1910 and 1915, this group 
published the series “The Fundamentals of the Christian Religion”, in which the mandatory rules 
of Christianity were described in adherence with the teachings of early 20th century evangelical 
religious figures.502 
The terms ‘fundamentalist’ was not here taken to be derogative, but instead as referring to 
the ‘fundamentals’ of the faith; these were considered to be the laws dictated by the bible, a belief 
in miracles, and the acceptance of Christ as the giver of redemption. Those who did not live 
according to these fundamentals were deemed unchristian by the fundamentalist Protestants.503 
It is perhaps pertinent that fundamentalist communities, with their roots in the US, have 
not been a threat to a political system. The Christian right-wingers of the 1900s, for example, have 
their ideological roots in personal belief and religious bigotry. They did not target the state, but 
rather other communities, and it was not their aim to bring down the government and replace it 
with a government of their own. More recently, fundamentalism has become a more complicated 
term, as it now spans religions and cultures; there is now Islamic fundamentalism and Jewish 
fundamentalism. Fundamentalism has become politicised, particularly with regard to Islam, since 
the late 1970s with the Iranian revolution. Fundamentalism is no longer just a theological idea, as 
it is now being used as grounds to prohibit religious expression in legal cases. 
 
4.3. 2.  Definition of fundamentalism 
As with any conceptual research, the concept must first be defined; this is particularly 
difficult in the case of ‘fundamentalism’ due it’s prevalence in the media, politics, and in society, 
by whom it is used most commonly and widely to refer to extremist activity associated with certain 
segments of adherents to Islam. Due to this muddying of the terms by popular culture, there is no 
clear definition of the term for use by scholars which is recognized and accepted by all in the field, 
as it is interpreted differently between academics.504 Fundamentalism has been considered by 
academics to be, among other things, an ideological movement, a political stance, a purely 
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religious movement, or a socially created concept. It is a term which must be interpreted within 
the context by which it is used; fundamentalism must be considered as inseparable from 
modernity.505  
Marsden suggested considering fundamentalism as a very heterogeneous group of 
cobelligerents that are unified through their strong opposing views regarding the effort of 
modernists to render Christianity more compatible with the modern society.506 Alternatively, 
Martin Riesebrodt considers fundamentalism a 
 “radical patriarchalism… an urban movement directed primarily against the dissolution 
of personalistic, patriarchal notions of order and social relations and their replacement by 
depersonalized principles caused primarily by the dramatic reduction in chances of the 
traditionalist milieu to reproduce itself culturally under conditions of rapid urbanization, 
industrialization, and secularization”.507 It has been argued that this definition is not specific 
enough to provide uniformity in academia, as well as suggesting that fundamentalism aspires to 
preserve tradition; these traditions are assumed to be those dictating day to day life and behaviour. 
This assumption is largely incorrect, as these traditions and conducts are not, in and of themselves, 
merely religious in origin, instead acted upon by complex social and cultural factors.  According 
to the definition provided by Riesebrodt above, extreme behaviour by religious groups, such as the 
KKK and Al Qaeda, can be branded fundamentalism as easily as parents calling for tighter online 
security for their children in the classroom.  
Lionel Caplan has proposed a more narrowly defined and probably even more useful 
definition of fundamentalism by positioning it within a modern context; he asserts that 
fundamentalists are engaged in a very dynamic interaction with their environment and its social 
elements and are thereby accepting benefits ensuing from the emergence of new technologies and 
employing these benefits in the pursuit of their own interests.508 According to Caplan, then, 
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fundamentalism is impossible without modernity, a view supported by Bruce Lawrence, who 
stated that “fundamentalists are modern but not modernist”.509 
In 1989, Lawrence in his work foresaw the importance of religious fundamentalism in 
society, though asserting that it was ideological rather than theological in nature, at odds with 
modernist thought.510 This was revolutionary in sociological circles as fundamentalism was 
recognised as belonging to no culture in particular whilst having deep roots in the development of 
people and their societies.511 With these suggested definitions in mind, fundamentalism should be 
considered an ideology not unlike communism or nationalism: a belief system which should be 
allowed to exist and be expressed.   
It is important to note that a number of academics see fundamentalism as a political 
affiliation, the aim of which is to achieve power.512 The organisation ‘Women Against 
Fundamentalism’ has described fundamentalism as a political force which operates under the guise 
of religious motive to obtain social power. Fundamentalist groups also tend to position themselves 
against the government, and profess that the religious doctrine that they follow is the true way; this 
doctrine is then spread through political methods.513 
Fundamentalism has a symbiotic relationship with modernity, operating on an international 
scale. The most active type of fundamentalism nowadays is the Islamic fundamentalism. Based on 
the political perception of fundamentalism it can be argued that fundamentalism is a broader 
ideology which operates in opposition to the secular government, pushing instead for a theocracy 
and the abolition of the separation of religious and state bodies.514 This sort of system has been 
evidenced in the Iranian political system, by which the Supreme leader is chosen by the Assembly 
of Experts on the basis of political and religious power; this process is less than democratic, as the 
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Assembly is chosen by the Guardian Council officials chosen by the Supreme Leader of Iran, 
resulting in the indirect self-appointment of the leader.515  
   The explanations of the terms outlined above are, of course, broad and fundamentalist 
groups can, and have, risen to positions of authority in democratic ways, as has been observed in 
Egypt (Muslim Brotherhoods) and in Tunisia by the An-Nada movement.516  However, this process 
is often coupled with the use of violent force, as evidenced by the Taliban and Islamic State, by 
which democracy is bastardised and corrupted.517 The influence of fundamentalist groups in 
politics cannot be understated, though this is not always a tragic occurrence; fundamentalist 
political parties will not necessarily bring with them mandatory religious laws. In the US, 
fundamentalist churches have, in recent years, become incredibly popular, with just under a third 
of Americans showing support for fundamentalist political representatives.518 
It has been argued, conversely, that the link between fundamentalism and politics is unfounded, 
that it is a purely religious phenomenon separate from political movements. This brings more 
specificity to the term, which is useful for academic applications but risks oversimplifying the 
concept. 
There is an argument that considers fundamentalism to be a solely religious phenomenon 
that is in its essence a “religious way of being…a strategy by which beleaguered believers attempt 
to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or group in the face of modernity and 
secularization”.519 This stance takes a unique approach to the historical context of fundamentalism, 
in that the protestant fundamentalist group of the early 1900’s were not directly opposed to the 
government, but rather opposed to other, less devout protestant group who they deemed to be 
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unchristian, which included the large majority of protestants who were attempting to become more 
liberal and modern.520   
 Antoun, in his 2001 work521, considers fundamentalism a conflict between modernism 
and religion; one could describe fundamentalism, according to this theory, as a violent reaction 
against social change and growing secularism. Bruce, similarly, argues that "Fundamentalism is 
the rational response of traditionally religious peoples to social, political and economic changes 
that downgrade and constrain the role of religion in the public world”.522 Some equate 
“fundamentalism” with violent extremism. When fundamentalism is understood as a form of 
violent extremism, it is impossible to distinguish between militants, who may not necessarily 
employ violence, and terrorists who usually do. Furthermore, this association of fundamentalism 
with extremism and then with violence also renders the terms ‘fundamentalist’ and ‘terrorist’ 
synonymous.523 By the same token, Karen Armstrong524, a professor of religious studies at Oxford 
University, perceives fundamentalism as both ‘embattled forms of spirituality’ and ‘militant piety’. 
On the whole this way of looking at the question implies that the use of violence is understood as 
being a core part of fundamentalism. 
 From the above, nothing resembling a standard definition of fundamentalism exists in 
academia, though the prevailing opinion is that religion is used as a rationalisation of 
fundamentalist action. The multitude of interpretations of the term amongst scholars creates 
difficulty in discerning which definition applies within a legal scenario, particularly when making 
judicial rulings which may interfere with the religious freedoms of groups and individuals.   
  
4.3.3. Characteristics of fundamentalism 
The attempt to discern the definition of fundamentalism and its relationship (if any) with 
the wearing of the headscarf has been largely to provide a framework within which to approach 
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such a complex subject. A commonly agreed upon set of characteristics needs to be established in 
order to identify a concept and explore it with any success; without a framework, an complex 
phenomenon is impossible to assess due to the sheer scale of it. The complexity of the concept of 
fundamentalism is based on the fact that scholars have perceived it from a political, social, 
religious and ideological perspective. This logically renders any analysis of this concept in the 
legal context in which it was used as a justification of banning the wearing of headscarf particularly 
difficult. It is therefore necessary to establish a set of characteristics of fundamentalism that can 
then enable the researcher to assess more precisely the legality of ECtHR’s pertinent decisions. 
The review of the existing body of relevant literature has revealed the existence of several key 
characteristics of fundamentalisms. First, fundamentalism is perceived as a form of reaction to the 
trend of diminishing the role of religion in the society, whereby fundamentalists seek the 
preservation of a strong position of religion in this regard. Second, fundamentalists have a 
tendency to perceive the world as being divided between the good and the bad side where those 
on the bad side are condemned to eternal damnation. By the same token, to belong to the good side 
means, particularly in case of women, to comply with a set of strict rules of conduct accompanied 
by a specific dress code.525 Third, fundamentalists maintain infallibility of their holy texts which 
inform every aspects of believers’ life and have to be applied in their literal meaning.  Finally, 
fundamentalism is often marked by existing contradiction in their approach to modernists where 
they are being very selective in interpreting available information whilst, as mentioned above, they 
believe in the exactness of their religious texts. In addition, fundamentalists are often quite tech-
savvy people who do not shy away from using technology and more recently social media, for 
disseminating their beliefs.526  
The researcher hopes that the above-mentioned key characteristics of fundamentalism will 
help to provide a better and more accurate analysis of the ECtHR’s decisions regarding the cases 
involving the wearing of the headscarf. 
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4.3.3.1. The Reactionary nature of fundamentalism 
A common characteristic observed in fundamentalist groups and movements is its 
reactionary nature; in most cases, this is in response to secularization or an “actual or perceived” 
threat to religion and religious identity.527 Lawrence sees fundamentalisms as reactions to the 
effects of the Enlightenment, which expresses itself as modernism and modernist thinking.528 
Fundamentalists are in opposition to all those individuals or institutions that advocate 
Enlightenment values and wave the banner of secularism or modernism.529  
With this in mind, Marty puts forward the view that fundamentalist thought does not allow 
for deviation, as they constitute an absolutist answer to relative ethics and liberal society. 
Fundamentalism is thorough and focused on moral detail.530 In fundamentalist communities, 
attempting to act outside of the outlined standards is forbidden and warrants a strong punishment; 
in the case of ISIS, women must cover themselves completely, with any deviation from this 
resulting in a public beating.531    
4.3.3. 2. Sharp boundaries in the moral beliefs of fundamentalists 
Moral absolutism is another major feature of fundamentalist thought, by which their beliefs 
are right and moral, and differing thoughts are wrong and immoral, often unreligious. There is 
little room for deviation away from the rules and beliefs set out by the fundamentalist, and any 
behaviour which differs, however slightly, from the set system results in being considered no 
longer a person of faith in the eyes of the fundamentalist group.  Fundamentalist belief systems 
often promote an idea of a moralistic god who punishes and rewards human behaviour in 
accordance to scripture.532 
Fundamentalist thought, it should be noted, may remain as a private conviction, or may 
manifest itself in ways which have no effect on others. However, the binary oppositions put 
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forward by modern fundamentalist groups are exemplified most typically in the activity of the 
Taliban and Islamic State. Even in the case of Iran, which has been affected by fundamentalism in 
the past, religious freedom has been relatively present, with marginalised groups allowed to freely 
practice their religion.533 The promotion of moral and religious absolutism requires the creation of 
set rules and codes for behaviour; these often include restricted or compulsory dress, restricted 
speech, the criminalisation of certain sexual behaviours, restrictions on food and drink, bans on 
certain films and music, and many others.534   
Fundamentalist groups are, without exception, intolerant of homosexuality, deviations 
from gender norms, and non-normative heterosexuality, while also imposing virginal standards on 
women and dress code, proclaiming secular women to be unvirtuous and idolatrous, the product 
of a godless western culture.535  
The rules that are to govern an individual’s behaviour as outlined by fundamentalist groups 
tend to impose a powerful affective dimension, an imitative, conforming dimension, by which 
traditional gender, familial and social norms are forcibly upheld, as well as the regulation of 
literature and media. Fundamentalist groups which hold beliefs relating to religious apocalypse 
rapture, and similar theories of annihilation are also prevalent. Gender roles and norms are a large 
component of much fundamentalist belief, with an emphasis on motherhood, patriarchal rule, and 
strict parenting.536 
Another common characteristic of fundamentalism is a chosen congregation who are 
defined by their devotion to the scripture and to religious practice. Some fundamentalist groups 
are even more exclusive, with an innermost circle of followers surrounded by lesser ranking 
devotees. While these movements often encourage a cognitive separation of followers and 
unbelievers, this can sometimes go as far as the implementation of rules demanding the physical 
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isolation of the believers from the rest of society, claiming their own land through often violent 
means.537 Those fundamentalist groups who are opposed to other religious groups often seize 
control of the land of these communities in order to establish a dedicated state for themselves and 
assert their dominion over other religious groups; this has been evidenced in Israel538, as well as 
by Hindu communities in India. The conflict over territory tends to be in holy locations or areas 
of particular religious significance to the fundamentalist group, though sometimes manifesting 
itself as the destruction of places of worship sacred to other religious sects.539 For instance, this 
activity has been observed in the conflict between ISIL and the Christian and the Yezidi population 
present on the Kurdish lands540. As relates to religious dress, the ‘haredim’ of Israel consists of 
strictly orthodox Jewish women who advocate for the wearing of full body covering, comparable 
to the burqa; this belief has been spread through the education system in some areas of Israel.541  
 
4.3.3.3. Absolutism and inerrancy in relation to fundamentalism 
Fundamentalist thought tends to encompass the belief that the holy text is without fault, 
that it is the exact teaching of the divine, true and accurate in all particulars. Fundamentalist 
thought also tends to ignore, if not actively oppose, contemporary reading of the text or later 
revisions, refusing to acknowledge any interpretations developed by secularized philosophers. The 
word of the sacred text, then, is absolute and inerrable, with any attempt to modernise its words an 
affront to the text itself. Fundamentalist groups often claim to hold exclusive insight into the words 
and teaching found in the text, the standards to which they then hold society.542 In cases such as 
Hinduism, in which the sacred text is not clearly delineated, one scripture is chosen as the holy 
text and abided by.543 
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This devout religiosity extends to the government, state and military component, as these 
bodies, too, must follow the laws and codes of behaviour dictated by the holy text; this was 
illustrated most notably by the Taliban and their operations in Afghanistan. While not every 
fundamentalist group extends their beliefs to their militaries and state apparatus, it is clear that 
these groups consider religion and state operation to be one and the same, that the state should 
prioritise religion in its political aims-. Failing this unity between religion and state, fundamentalist 
groups will attempt to create their own system of religious governance separate from that of the 
state government.544  
While worshipping only the divine entity, or entities, of their religion, fundamentalist 
groups often center on an individual who represents the group, often a charismatic individual who 
can strengthen the number of the group through recruitment; this individual often claims to be 
divinely elected, with direct access to the divine. These organisations, then, can be said that have 
no bureaucracy in the sense of rational-legal division of power and competence.545 According to 
the work of Schlesinger, this strict adherence to the sacred text, without fail, results in violence 
and terror; if those who do not adhere to the text are considered heathens and against God, then 
those who believe themselves as acting according to God’s will may have little remorse when 
inflecting violence upon the ‘godless’ to further the perceived cause546. He goes on to argue that 
“fundamentalists of all faiths will continue to believe that they are serving God by mayhem and 
murder”.547 An example of this phenomenon can be found in the events in Mosul following the 
Islamic State occupation; the Christian population of the area were told to either pay a huge sum 
of money, convert, or die, and were so forced to flee, despite the historic presence of Christian 
communities in this area for thousands of years. It is also worth citing the words of David 
Saperstein, an Ambassador for the IRF (International Religious Freedom), “There is an absolute 
and unequivocal need to give voice to the religiously oppressed in every land afraid to speak of 
what they believe in; who face death and live in fear, who worship in underground churches, 
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mosques or temples, who feel so desperate that they flee their homes to avoid killing and 
persecution simply because they love God in their own way or question the existence of God”.548  
Fundamentalist thought dictates that there will be an end point to their worship and 
devotion, which will involve their reward and the punishment and suffering of non-believers; some 
groups have taken it upon themselves to enact the judgement of their religion.  
The leaders of these groups are almost exclusively male, who take the word of the holy 
texts as direct commands which govern the rules of society, including dress codes for men and 
women. Rather than focusing on the rights of the people, religious duty is the focus; for example, 
the leaders of the Iranian Revolution made the hijab mandatory following the removal of the 
Shah549. Khomeini implied that the state knows better the interests of women than the women 
themselves. The ECtHR, then, supports the national courts in deciding what it is best for Muslim 
women to wear, which some have argued is a violation of freedom of choice and constitutes the 
oppression of women. In both cases, including that of the Iranian regime and ECtHR, women are 
deprived of the decision as to how to manifest their religion. 
4.3.3. 4. Selectivity as an aspect of Fundamentalism 
Fundamentalist groups are often very particular about their codes of behaviour and 
worship. Despite considering the word of the holy text absolute, fundamentalists often put more 
emphasis on certain elements of the text than on others, usually more extreme selections from the 
sacred text, in order to remain distinct from the rest of religious society.550 Despite being vocally 
opposed to modern interpretation, fundamentalist groups, more often than not, adopt modern 
means of implementing and enforcing their religious views, such as the use of communication 
technology and high-tech weapons when involved in armed conflicts. Further, there is also a 
selection of behaviours exhibited by those they believe to be godless which fundamentalists take 
an extreme opposition towards, such as homosexuality or abortion.551 While denouncing many 
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forms of modernity, fundamentalist groups will adopt certain modern amenities if they aid in 
furthering the cause; in other words, fundamentalist thought is very accepting of modern goods 
and services, but strictly opposed to modern ideologies, values and cultures. 
It is clear that fundamentalist thought does not adhere strictly to archaic versions of 
religious practice, though it opposes almost all form of modernity except those which can be 
utilised in the name of the divine. Interpretations of the texts, then, select key causes and practices 
which are then taken on as staples of the fundamentalist movement, such as head coverings or the 
acquisition. In other words, fundamentalist are selective in relation to modernity, accepting most 
of its material features particularly those related to technology, media and institutions, but 
categorically rejecting its cultural relativism and religious pluralism and secular values in the 
society.552 Many have argued that the actions of fundamentalist groups tend to interpret the 
scripture to fit their own political, rather than religious, motives. The key to fundamentalist 
thought, then, can be found by observing the teachings and interpretations of the group leaders and 
those who brand themselves as being divine, instead of turning to the holy texts themselves. Some 
of the ideals held by fundamentalist groups are often unrelated to the scripture, as in the case of 
Buddhists in Sri Lanka where fundamentals of the movement were found to be from traditional 
poems and non-religious texts, rather than from any holy book.553 
 
4.4. Is fundamentalism applicable as a concept in other religions beside American 
Protestantism? 
The term fundamentalism can be often misleading. As already mentioned, it was originally 
employed in a discourse of American Protestants who sought to strengthen and protect the ' 
fundamentals' of their faith. This was essentially in response to liberal Protestants who were seen 
as non-conforming elements within the church that could threaten the purity of the faith.554 
However, fundamentalism as a term is often used outside of the above-mentioned historical 
context. More specifically, it has been employed regularly when referring to different strands 
within Judaism, Islam or other religions. As such, this term has been broadened to encompass 
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certain attitudes that persist more or less in all religions.555 Consequent to the wide-spread use of 
the term ‘fundamentalism’ with respect to an array of religious beliefs, there is an ongoing debate 
regarding the appropriateness of employing such a term in discourses focusing on contemporary 
issues within world’s major religions. 
When examining a very pertinent question ‘what is meant by fundamentalism in 
contemporary discourses?’ Karen Armstrong 556 in her probe into the history of religious 
fundamentalism offers a very useful starting point. According to her, this term is very closely 
related to a type of thinking that is considered reactionary and a hindrance to progress. However, 
the very essence of this term, based on its origins in North American Protestantism, revolves 
around the effort by adherence a religion to preserve the ‘purity’ of their religious teaching by 
interpreting religious texts literally.557 Although having its meaning significantly widened since 
its origins, the term ‘fundamentalism’ is still sourced to one specific religion – Christianity – which 
should logically limit its usage with respect to other religious traditions. Otherwise a literal 
translation of the term ‘fundamentalism’ without taking into consideration its contextual 
understanding can render quite dramatic changes in meaning. Among many reasons supporting 
this limitation, one factor stands out. The term ‘fundamentalism’, if understood outside its 
historical context (as going back to fundamentals of religion) and employed in non-Western 
settings and discourses, as for example in the context of Islam, can acquire a very strong positive 
connotation, representing a high level of obedience and compliance with religious teachings. Such 
understanding of fundamentalism then can paradoxically be synonymous for a large number of 
Muslims with piety. Moreover, acknowledging that obedience to traditions and core teachings 
constitutes a positive qualitative attribute - in other words being an obedient Muslim equals being 
a pious Muslim - means that any deviation within Islam that might challenge these traditions and 
teachings is inevitably perceived negatively.558 However, the main concern is the emergence of 
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intolerant behavior among religions, not trend towards piety and purity.  In this respect, Bhatt 
emphasises the necessity to distinguish between fundamentalism signifying ‘a return to 
fundamentals’ and deep-seated intolerance towards everything foreign or new. The author 
therefore employs the term ‘religious absolutism’ to refer to fundamentalism as a new religious 
movement seeking the absolute truth within their religious beliefs.559 
 It is apparent that the way in which the term ‘fundamentalism’ is being employed in 
academic discourses has led to an array of controversies. The potential issues related to using this 
term can be summarise into four key points. First, as was already discussed, the origins of this term 
are very specific and are bound to the context of North American Protestantism which might render 
the use of this term with respect to other religious beliefs highly problematic.560 To deal with the 
limitation related to its Christian origins, Wacker suggests that the use of the term 
‘fundamentalism’ outside this context does not necessarily have to pose a problem. Not only such 
usage has become more and more common both in public and academic discourses, but any issue 
concerning this matter can be avoided by employing the term ‘historic fundamentalism’, denoting 
the origins of fundamentalism both as a concept and a term.561 The foregoing might be a helpful 
means of differentiating between various strands within Christianity; yet, this does not answer the 
criticism aimed at the decisions adopted by the ECtHR562 with respect to wearing the headscarf. 
The reason for this is the fact that the Court has employed the concept of fundamentalism in 
general, thus not making a clear distinction in terms of the specific type or concept of 
fundamentalism involved. Second, the term has clear conceptual flaws given its ambiguity, 
vagueness and the tendency to be interpreted in a large number of ways, thus decreasing its value 
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in domain-specific academic discourses and judicial application in cases. It has been suggested 
that the conceptual flaws in the term ‘fundamentalism’ revolve around the phenomenon known as 
‘concept overstretching’. This is in simple terms a conflict between either defining a concept very 
narrowly, thus preventing the wider application of this term, or, to broaden the conceptual basis of 
the term whilst risking that the term becomes too vague to offer any value in a judicial context. In 
case of the term ‘fundamentalism’ both extremes are observed. However, it should be noted that 
this can be said for most concepts employed in social sciences including ‘democracy’, ‘religion’; 
hence, the alleged conceptual flaws should not prevent the use of the term ‘fundamentalism’ in 
academic and public discourses.563 The main concern is using these ambiguous concepts in the 
legal context, as it is clear judicial bodies have to make decisions based on the solid and precise 
evidence. 
  Third, as the term is predominantly based on religious narratives, its use in political 
discourses is substantially limited. The apparent lack of the term’s relevance in discussions 
regarding political questions can be countered by highlighting the primary focus of 
‘fundamentalists’. They, as opposed to traditionalist who are more concerned with preservation of 
their religious beliefs’ purity, focus predominantly on widening the role of religion in the public 
sphere whilst guarding their teachings and practices from being diluted through interaction of their 
communities with other elements of the public and political sphere564 - thus emphasizing the role 
of religion in public sphere. 
Fourth, the contemporary term ‘fundamentalism’ is connected with prejudices and biases 
towards religions particularly Islam.565 This phenomenon can be illustrated by the example of 
media’s largely negative coverage of anything related to the Islamic fundamentalism. 
It has been shown in this section that there is currently no consensus among scholars regarding the 
appropriateness of applying the term fundamentalism in contexts other than the one in which it 
historically originates. However, since this term has been commonly employed in the 
contemporary discourse regarding Islam and Islamic movements, it is vital to elaborate on the 
ongoing discussion of the usability of the term fundamentalism in the context of Islam. 
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4.4. 1. The Debate surrounding the use of the term fundamentalism in the Islamic context 
It seems that the most frequent target of statements regarding the term ‘fundamentalism’ 
of recent has been Islam and Muslim communities all around the world.  According to the available 
body of literature on this subject, the use of this term in relation to Islam was however almost non-
existent prior to the Iranian revolution in 1979.566 One of the few exceptions in this regard was a 
work of Hamilton Gibb that discussed Wahhabism and the Islamic movements that were a part of 
religious reawakening during the 18th and 19th century.567 In addition, Arnold Toynbee applied this 
term in 1931 to refer to ‘traditionalist’ Muslims.568 Among Islamic scholars, Aziz Ahmad,  one of 
the prominent academic figures in 1960s, employed the term ‘fundamentalism’ to denote the 
religious views of Shah Waliallah (1703-1762) living in India and Mohamad Ibn Abd al Wahhab 
(1703-1787) residing in Najd, a part of present day Saudi Arabia.569 In the aftermath of the Islamic 
revolution in Iran, the term fundamentalism began to be used both in reference to different cultures 
and religions (gradually extending from Protestantism to Islam and later to other religious 
traditions) and with a pejorative bias.570 One can go even further and argue that the popular use of 
this term in the West has over time focused exclusively on Islamic fundamentalism. Such a 
perception of the term has been encouraged by Western governments which have repeatedly 
highlighted Islamic fundamentalists as being the major post-Cold War security threat.571 
Moreover, this narrowly defined and understood concept of fundamentalism is strongly related to 
persisting and ever-growing Islamophobia in the West, whereby although having clear negative 
connotations, the term is still being applied indiscriminately to the majority of the Muslim 
population in Western countries.572 However, the foregoing is not only a rhetorical and academic 
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issue, but as seen in the example of the ECtHR’s decisions where the notion of Islamic 
fundamentalism has been used to endorse calls for restricting religious manifestation, particularly 
the wearing of the headscarf in the absence of any compelling evidence. The arbitrarily made 
correlation between Islam and fundamentalism can have considerably negative consequences for 
the Muslim minority.573 As already mentioned, the term fundamentalism and fundamentalist have 
acquired very negative connotations; hence its use to label large sections of population is 
particularly problematic. The foregoing arguments has served as an impetus to a considerable 
number of scholars within the Islamic world to promote the use of terms such as ‘Islamism' or 
'political Islam, integrism, neo- traditionalism, Islamic nativism, Jihadism, Militant Islam; 
although, none of these terms is completely free of criticism. 
For instance, ‘Islamism’ which has been promulgated by many scholars as an alternative 
term for ‘fundamentalism’ can be confusing given the fact that this term was once applied by 
scholars in France in 18th century as a word synonymous with Islam. Munson goes further and 
criticises the term ‘Islamism’ for being a form of unfortunate neologism.574 In addition, the term 
‘Islamism’ is arguably quite broadly defined, general and a vague term, whereby its widespread 
use might be dismissive towards the complexity of Islam and its array of various strands, schools 
and trends. 
 Similarly, the term ‘Political Islam’ often fails to acknowledge various dimensions of 
fundamentalism. More specifically, the reason why Political Islam cannot encompass the term 
fundamentalism in its essence is because the latter incorporates dimension of not only political, 
but also religious, social and ideological character. Moreover, the notion that all groups bearing 
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characteristics of political Islam are essentially fundamentalist is erroneous. For instance, besides 
fundamentalist parties, there are political groups employing rhetoric and means of a moderate 
version of political Islam, including calls for transformation of the society and the political system 
based on democratic principles. A good example in this regard is Tunisia, where the Ennahda party 
became the first Islamist movement to gain power in the aftermath of the Arab ‘spring’ in 2011. 
More importantly, this very party did not hesitate to acknowledge its defeat in the last elections 
and enabled a peaceful exchange of executive power within the country.575  
Another term proposed as an alternative to fundamentalism is Jihadism. This term has 
gained the tragic events of prominence particularly after 9/11. The key problem with Jihadism in 
this regard is its inevitable connection with violence and terrorism, whereas fundamentalism does 
not necessarily imply acts of violence or terror.576 To put it simply, although there exists a large 
group of devoted Muslims for whom Islam is the only way to eternal salvation, they do not intend 
to impose their views on others in a violent way or cause harm to others for not sharing these 
views.  
There is a consensus among scholars that in the Qur’an, the word Jihad is used to call upon 
believers to surrender their properties and themselves in the path of Allah to make it succeed. The 
principal purpose of this is to ‘establish prayer, give Zakat, command good and forbid evil’. It also 
enjoins believers to struggle against unbelievers to convert them to Islam. The first type, which 
entails peaceful means has been described as ‘jihad of tongue’ and ‘jihad of pen’ and are regarded 
as ‘the greater jihad’. The second type, involving struggle and aggression, is regarded as ‘the 
smaller jihad’. It is worth noting that the verses related to the ‘the greater jihad’ are primarily 
‘instructive’; regarding ‘the smaller jihad’ unlike the ‘instructive’ orientation of earlier verses, 
these verses are oriented to ‘motivating’ and ‘mobilising’ the believers to participate in jihad. 
Furthermore, there is deep disagreement among scholars whether the Qur’an allows fighting the 
unbelievers as a defence against aggression or under any circumstances.577   
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The leader of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, placed 
much emphasis on the grater jihad arguing that man’s worst enemy is his “lower self” and that this 
is the root cause of “human depravity.” To rally the masses further, Khomeini used early Muslims 
throughout history as examples of how they conquered the jihad within before waging jihad against 
nonbelievers. Thus, one sees that Islam’s historical eschatological elements have always held the 
belief that the oppressed would arise victorious against the oppressors.578 So the term of ‘Jihadism’ 
instead of ‘fundamentalism’ leads to different perception among people. Not all adherents of 
jihadism subscribe to the use of violence as part of religious practice.   
According to Lewis, it can be misleading to employ the term fundamentalism with respect 
to characterising Islamic movements. This is because changes in how Islam is practiced, and 
movements to modernise Islam, are shunned by fundamentalists, whose views do not represent all 
of Islam.579 Further, Esposito, who has been in a vocal opposition towards employing this term, 
claims that using this term portrays Islam as a regressive, stagnant, intolerant and violent religion. 
As an alternative, he proposed the term ‘Islamic revivalism’.580 
It has been argued by a number of scholars581 that another misleading aspect of using the 
term fundamentalism with reference to Islam and Muslims is its historical meaning and the link 
between this meaning and Protestants’ adherence to Bible as the unmediated word of God. In the 
context of Protestantism, fundamentalists were those believing in biblical inerrancy whilst more 
liberal Protestants opposed this idea. However, applying such distinction with respect to Islam is 
fallacious as all Muslims maintain that the Qur’an is the word of God which is thus flawless and 
irreproachable. Hence, in this respect, all Muslims could be marked as fundamentalists; this 
however would not only be erroneous but it would also prevent making a necessary distinction 
between militant Islamic groups whose ultimate goal is to Islamize the society and those Muslims 
who do not share such ambitions and are completely focused on building their relationship with 
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God through piety and devotion including engaging in religious practices and expression of their 
faith through the use of attire such as Muslim women wearing the headscarf.582  
 
4.5. An Exploration of the Relationship between Fundamentalism and Religious 
Manifestations in the Decisions of the ECtHR                                        
Though fundamentalist thought once separated itself from contemporary society, modern 
religious fundamentalists have begun to incorporate societal factors into their ideas and ideologies; 
no longer are their discourses insular processes, relating only to anomalous organisations, instead 
they wish to spread these ideas and promote them as the ideal. In efforts to spread these ideas, 
modern fundamentalist groups have increased their activities in the wider community. While these 
groups consider themselves to be primarily political in motive, there is almost always religious 
dogma at the heart of these movements. There has been much disagreement between academics as 
to the extent to which theological freedom of expression and the implementation of fundamentalist 
thought is a necessary part of belief and religious community. There is an academic question, as 
well as a highly debated judicial question, as to whether fundamentalist teachings should be 
censored outright, or whether each case of possible fundamentalist preaching should be taken 
individually, as it has been argued that not all individuals or groups attempting to spread 
fundamentalism are doing so at the detriment to the rights of others. Contextually, European legal 
institutions have not, historically, differentiated between different ‘fundamentalist’ communities 
and individual, often curtailing religious manifestation across the board without examining the 
details of how and why fundamentalism was being spread, and what exactly was being proclaimed.  
Moreover, with respect to fundamentalism, a distinction was not made by the ECtHR between an 
individual actively participating in the fundamentalist group engaged in illegal activities and an 
individual wearing the headscarf purely out of personal devotion.583 By the same token, both 
individuals got sacked from education institution and relieved of their military responsibility. 
It is important to highlight that given the way in which ‘religious manifestation’ and 
‘fundamentalism’ have been previously understood, the occurrence of legal issues revolves around 
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public expression of individual’s and group’s beliefs. Hence, a more precise analysis of the 
ECtHR’s decisions can be assisted by comprehensive elaboration of the terms in question. 
 
4.5.1. Relationship between Fundamentalism and Freedom of Religious Expression 
Religious freedom is widely acknowledged to be a basic right, and can be taken to mean 
the right to express one’s own religious or ideological set of beliefs without fear of persecution. 
There has, however, been much debate in academia and government as to how this relates to 
fundamentalist expression, as it has been argued that the spread of fundamentalist belief is at odds 
with, even a threat to, the freedom of other individuals and groups. Many have argued, however, 
that fundamentalist beliefs should hold the same right to be expressed as other religious beliefs on 
the condition that their expression does not infringe on the rights of others in society.584 
Consequently, fundamentalism must be considered from two different perspectives, from the 
interior and the exterior, where the former is a fundamental right and the latter can, in some 
instances, be restricted. Thus, in this section the main focus will be on the relationship between 
fundamentalism and religious manifestation in general without considering ECtHR cases. 
Fundamentalist belief, considered internally, is based on a purely literal understanding of 
religious text, whereby any deviation is dismissed;585 this aspect of fundamentalism is problematic 
in terms of human rights, as it can be argued that much of the Islamic doctrine seems to be at odds 
with much of the human rights legislation which must be adhered to globally. To provide an 
example, the Salafi movement is based on a word for word interpretation of Islamic texts, that, 
according to the Hadith which is one of the primary sources of sharia, “Every bid’ah (innovation) 
is a going astray and every going astray is in Hell-fire”; this ideology dismisses any attempt to 
advance human rights which does not adhere exactly to the text as ‘un-Islamic’, as any command 
in a religious text can be considered holy, and therefore higher than any command given by a 
human establishment.586 Further, fundamentalist groups use religious texts as justification to 
impose archaic ideas of societal order, rigid instructions on dress, steeped in patriarchy and strict 
moral judgement.  
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This form of fundamentalist expression, often termed ‘idealistic fundamentalism’, focuses 
on the involvement of religious bodies in  public activities, often based in morality and tradition 
informed by religion; these beliefs are often expressed by moralistic preacher and vocal religious 
figures.587 This imposition of fundamentalist ideas onto public life and law often extends to 
controlling how individuals interact, dress, and go about their daily lives; these regulations most 
commonly affect women588, as the ideal fundamentalist society tends to be informed by patriarchy, 
causing many feminists to fiercely oppose the expression of some fundamentalist beliefs.   
Such opposition has been expressed by journalist Polly Toynbee, who criticised Islam, 
alongside Christianity and Judaism, as upholding beliefs which explicitly express a hatred of the 
female body; she cites rituals of humiliation, churching (i.e. ritual after child birth), the regulation 
of reproductive rights, arranged marriages, a disparity in the marriage rights of men and women, 
purifying baths, and the ostracisation of ‘unclean’ women as just a few of the acts decreed by 
religious doctrine which oppress women. She argues that “all extreme fundamentalism plunges 
back into the dark ages by using the oppression of women (sometimes called ‘family values’) as 
its talisman”.589  
While some may argue that the testimony of a white, British journalist may hold little 
credibility in the context of Islamic fundamentalism, this view has been supported by the WAF 
(Women’s Action Forum), based in Pakistan, who have expressed their belief that “at the heart of 
the fundamentalists' agenda is the control of women's minds and bodies. [All] support the 
patriarchal family as a central agent of such control. They view women as embodying the morals 
and traditional values of the family and the whole community”.590  
Elsewhere in the Middle East, there have been similar assertions; two scholars at Birzeit 
University, Rema Hammami and Islah Jad, have written that “the commonality between 
movements profoundly lies in their obsessive focus on the rights, rules and behaviour of women as 
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pivotal to both their strategy of rule and as an aim in itself”.591 Similarly, Gita Saghal (writer, 
journalist, activist with Amnesty International) and Nira Yuval-Davis (Women rights activist and 
lecturer), in their work Refusing Holy Orders, Women and Fundamentalism in Britain,592 have 
explained that the way in which fundamentalism operates revolves around social order, which 
relies heavily on the religious subjugation of women. This order is established and maintained 
through categorising women, based on their actions and behaviours, into proper and improper 
women; in addition to this, women also hold a cultural burden, as it is their responsibility to teach 
the traditions of the society to the next generation. To ensure this process is effective, marriage 
guarantees that the offspring of ‘proper’ women exist within this collective, ensuring a biological 
and ideological ‘purity’. 
These beliefs have very real consequences, as demonstrated by an incident in 2001 which 
led to the death of 15 girls in Jeddah boarding school when a fire began in their sleeping quarters. 
These girls were enclosed in the dormitory by the religious police, who enforced them back into a 
blazing building because they were not adhered to the strict dress code of the religion. The eye 
witnesses said that religious police stopped men who tried to help girls escape from the building, 
saying, “It is sinful to approach them”.593 In response, the executive Director of the Middle East 
and North Africa division of Human Rights Watch, Hanny Megally, released a statement which 
said the following: “women and girls may have died unnecessarily because of extreme 
interpretations of the Islamic dress code. State authorities with direct and indirect responsibility 
for this tragedy must be held accountable”.’594 
On the other hand, fundamentalists often approach their preaching in a way which directly, 
sometimes aggressively, opposes other religious communities and personal faiths; this process 
often involves the acquisition of land through violent means, as observed in Israel.595 In another 
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example, an attack by fundamentalist Hindus on Christian’s in Orissa, India claimed 60 lives taken 
and 50, 000 Christian were driven away through persecution in 2008. The collection of eyewitness 
accounts includes numerous stories depicting the brutality of the attackers, whereby the victims 
faced threats and beatings through which they sustained serious injuries. Among these victims 
were also children, the elderly or even people with disabilities. The crowd’s violence was 
specifically aimed at those representing the Church, such as pastors, priests or nuns who became 
targets for torture, humiliation and killing.596 In addition, in Iraq and Syria, ISIL have been 
torturing and murdering those who did not follow the ‘true way’ or those, of whatever faith, or 
they have destroyed sacred landmarks or relics. There have also been numerous reports of sexual 
violence and hostage taking by ISIL against ethnic minorities in the area of Iraq and Syria which 
are under ISIL control. This strict perception of religious texts and subsequently intolerant 
behaviour towards other religions can be illustrated  by the Kurdish Yazidi girl of 17 kidnapped 
by ISIL, who reported being kept as slave, physically abused and raped on a daily basis, and forced 
them to follow their dress code along with around 40 other women, by the fighters; the ISIL 
members rationale for this abuse and ownership was to brand the women ‘non-Muslims’ due to 
their marginally differing beliefs, justifying them as property.597 
An additional complication in understanding how to deal with the right to religious freedom 
is recognising the legal rights of two religious groups whose ideas about what society should entail 
are so diametrically opposed, such as is the case with Hindu’s and Muslims in India, or Shia and 
Sunni Muslims in Iran, where the majority religion incites the persecution of minority religions.598 
Fundamentalist religious groups often regard their holy doctrine as the ‘one true way’, a clear set 
of truths and a guide to how to live; any deviation from this text is a deviation from the divine 
word and is, as such, considered by them to be anti-religious.599   
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Any attempt to disprove the word of the sacred text is to denounce the entire work, and, 
consequently, the entire ideology; this is deemed unacceptable, and so puts a limitation on the 
freedom of expression both by other religious groups and by a large number of individuals of the 
religion in question.  
The word of sacred texts often needs little explanation, as commands can often be taken 
literally and applied to daily life; the Salafi community, for example, adhere to the ideology laid 
out in the Qur’an and Sunna, taking the exact word as absolute holy truth in order to reject any 
human conceptions of morality.600 From the Salafist point of view there is only one legitimate 
interpretation; Islamic pluralism does not exist. 
This adoption of the exact word of the doctrine means that it cannot be adapted as society 
progresses; as an illustration of the foregoing, one can consider the printing press was first created 
in Europe in 1440, and was immediately banned by Muslim rulers in order to prevent works which 
stood in opposition to Islamic belief601, leading to a lack of knowledge surrounding culture, 
science, art and philosophy, which were all undergoing major changes in the West. Medical 
advancement in the Middle East also suffered because of this ban, as there were little to no up-to-
date medical works in Arabic and other languages of the region; the only physiological text which 
existed in the late 1700’s which had an Arabic translation related to cures for syphilis, written two 
centuries previously.602   
Both privately and externally, ideas surrounding the negative effect of fundamentalism on 
knowledge, scientific or otherwise, are based upon the assumption that debate is a necessary part 
of scientific or social progress. If we subscribe to this assumption, fundamentalism of any kind is 
thus detrimental to such progress, as it tends to reject any evidence based information which, 
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though useful, is at odds with the teachings of whichever ideology that the fundamentalism belongs 
to.603  
Fundamentalism, then, at its core, chooses to actively ignore the new, the modern and the 
progressive, instead attempting to preserve a way of life which existed at the time the holy texts 
were written; continuity, along lines of time and communities, is the fundamentalist bedrock, 
which is used, in part, to challenge their own ‘otherness’. This sameness is in relation to religious 
ritual across geographical lines (which God to worship and how to worship them) as well as 
sameness with regard to religious ritual along the timeline of that religion; this sameness is 
extremely important, with many martyring themselves for this cause. There is a link between the 
aforementioned and what Freud understood to ‘the narcissism (excessive in admiration itself) of 
minor differences.604 
For example, from the point of view of the Salafi community, culture is the antithesis to 
Islam; fundamentalist collectives such as these strive for what Olivier Roy termed “deculturation”, 
attempting to entirely remove Islamic doctrine from modern culture by decrying any tradition not 
explicitly called for in the holy text.605 
Some have argued that fundamentalism is simply a religion-led interpretation of 
totalitarianism, not dissimilar to the regime enforced during Stalinism in the Soviet Union.606 
Philosopher and social anthropologist Ernest Gellner has put forward that fundamentalism 
“repudiates the tolerant modernist claim that the faith in question means something much milder, 
far less exclusive, altogether less demanding, and much more accommodating; above all 
something quite compatible with all other faiths, even, or especially, with the lack of faith”. 607 
Examining fundamentalist collectives, it is clear that the members all feel connected through a 
common aim, common beliefs, and a shared sense of dedication to the cause; this gives its members 
a sense of actualisation in community.608 
There is another school of thought which does not differentiate between fundamentalist 
communities and other fascist or otherwise extreme-right political institutions, which they deem a 
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comparable threat to the quality of life and human rights.609 A pre-9/11 work by Armstrong 
interprets the term ‘fundamentalist’ as an organisation or person who rejects “democracy, 
pluralism, religious toleration, peacekeeping, free speech, [and] the separation of church and 
state”.610 
These interpretations of fundamentalism primarily concern the public elements of the 
movement, i.e. the ways in which it attempts to spread its religion as the true way. The sum of 
these perceptions of fundamentalism illustrates that to apply or even impose its ideas can constitute 
a threat to the universal and unalienable rights and freedoms of every member of a given society. 
The aforementioned leads to a discussion regarding whether expressing the ideals of 
fundamentalism should totally be prohibited and whether wearing headscarf can be, from a legal 
point of view, deemed as threatening to any member of the society. This leads us to a deeper 
exploration of the judicial side of fundamentalist expression. 
4.5.2. An Analysis of Fundamentalism as a Justification for the Restriction of Religious 
Manifestation in the Context of the ECtHR 
Fundamentalism as mentioned above might have a number of undeniable negative 
consequences, including the oppression of minority communities, the suppression of human rights, 
and a significant threat to societal security. In reality, though, the intricacies of the problem can be 
difficult to navigate, when determining the legality of religious dress in an academic setting, for 
example; the wearing of such attire in an academic setting is by no means an indication of 
adherence to fundamentalist belief, as in the cases of Leyla Şahin and Karaduman v. Turkey.611 
The law regarding fundamentalism according the courts in European countries differs on a 
case by case basis; in the Kalaç v Turkey612 (a case concerning a military judge who was involved 
in the fundamentalist group) applies the principle established in the case of Engel v the 
Netherlands613  that military discipline and codes imply by its very nature, the possibility of placing 
some limitation on the rights and freedoms. In other words, it is possible, then, for a state to enforce 
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a regulation banning certain behaviours and beliefs that are at odds with the ideology of the military 
and what a soldier is expected to be.614 To return to the Turkey case (Kalaç v Turkey), the legal 
proceedings were put into motion by the Süleyman sect, which was considered to practice 
fundamentalist activity, which was deemed illegal by Turkish authorities. Paper evidence supplied 
to the court suggested that Süleyman members had provided legal aid, helped to train soldiers, and 
had helped its members to secure a place in the military.615 The ECtHR found, that the military 
judge involved in this activity was guilty of the charges, that he had adopted a set of beliefs that 
had fundamentalist connotations, and that his behaviour was not that expected from somebody in 
his post, particularly in a country in which there was a clear separation of religion and state; the 
court called for the judge’s immediate retirement from service.616 According to the court, 
 “… His compulsory retirement was not an interference with his freedom of conscience, religion 
or belief but was intended to remove from the military legal service a person who had manifested 
his lack of loyalty to the foundation of the Turkish nation, namely secularism, which it was the task 
of the armed forces to guarantee. The applicant belonged to the Süleyman sect, as a matter of fact, 
if not formally, and participated in the activities of the Süleyman community, which was known to 
have unlawful fundamentalist tendencies. Various documents annexed to the memorial to the 
Court showed that the applicant had given it legal assistance, had taken part in training sessions 
and had intervened on a number of occasions in the appointment of servicemen who were members 
of the sect.”617 
 It is important to point out that, in the Turkish army, the soldiers are provided with the 
opportunity to openly practice their faiths, including the facilities for Muslims to pray five times a 
day and fast during Ramadan.618 The ECtHR claimed that the judgement was not made on the 
basis of religious opinions, personal ideology or the way one performs their religion, but rather 
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related to the way in which he conducted himself in the role of military judge.619 With respect to 
the foregoing, the court commented that 
 “The Supreme Military Council’s order was, moreover, not based on Group Captain Kalaç’s 
religious opinions and beliefs or the way he had performed his religious duties but on his conduct 
and attitude (see paragraphs 8 and 25 above). According to the Turkish authorities, this conduct 
breached military discipline and infringed the principle of secularism.”620 
Though the individual on trial would usually have the protection of article 9 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights, due to the military context, the presence of possible 
fundamentalist activity could not be covered by this legislation, as these beliefs posed a threat to 
the values of the army and upset the hierarchy inherent in the military system.621 Due to the 
difficulty in enforcing this sort of regulation in the case of the military, it has been decreed by the 
ECtHR that the army can impose limitations on the religious activity of its members, including 
preventing soldiers from participating in any activity with groups considered religiously 
‘fundamentalist’ in its conduct. This rule has been similarly applied both regarding the issue of 
wearing the headscarf and an active involvement in the fundamentalist group engaged in illegal 
activities notwithstanding the clear discrepancies in both cases’ surrounding circumstances. For 
instance, the commission argued in the case of Karaduman that  
“The Commission takes the view that by choosing to pursue her higher education in a 
secular university a student submits to those university rule; which may make die freedom of 
students to manifest their religion subject to restrictions as to place and manner intended to ensure 
harmonious coexistence between students of different beliefs. Especially in countries where the 
great majority of the population owe allegiance to one particular religion, manifestation of the 
observances and symbols of that religion, without restriction as to place and manner, may 
constitute pressure on students who do not practise that religion or those who adhere to another 
religion. Where secular universities have laid down dress regulations for students, they may 
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ensure that certain fundamentalist religious movements do not disturb public order in higher 
education or impinge on the beliefs of others.”622 
   This move has been widely criticised. It has been argued that the Kalaç case was initiated 
by the military, which had its own strict set of values and rules. This sentiment was reinforced by 
the US Supreme Court, who stated that  
“The essence of military service is the subordination of the desires and interests of the 
individual to the needs of the service... [W]ithin the military community there is simply not the 
same [individual] autonomy as there is in the larger civilian community. While the members of 
the military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First Amendment, the different 
character of the military community and the military mission requires a different application of 
those protections. The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for 
imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be 
constitutionally impermissible outside it”.623 
It is also important to note that the role of the military is, one could argue, to ensure the 
safety of the public from the actions of organizations or nations which may risk the security of the 
country in question.624 The individual investigated in the court proceedings was part of a 
technically illegal collective which was considered dangerous to the safety of the public that the 
military serve to protect; the ruling was largely based on a confession by the individual that 
confirmed that he was an active participant in the group’s activity.625 
During the Şahin case, no proof was provided as to the connection between fundamentalist 
thought or action, and religious headwear;626 even if the belief was present that applicant had 
fundamentalist ideals, this phenomenon could not be proven through the judicial process. In order 
to provide proof, there must be some sort of confession of membership to a fundamentalist group 
or ideological community, or an interrogation of their personal beliefs, all of which is a violation 
of privacy and religious rights i.e. article 8 and 9 of the ECHR.627 Human rights organisations, 
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Human Rights Watch most notably, argued that the ban on the religious symbols was “an 
unwarranted infringement of the right to religious practice”;628 the IHF (International Humanity 
Foundation) stated that the state had no right to legislate on religious expression which did not 
threaten the rights of others.629 
Furthermore, the application the reasoning in military cases to the case of Leyla Şahin does 
not make an awful lot of sense and, at worst, borders on illegality as it can be argued  a headscarf 
gives no indication of an affiliation to a fundamentalist group.630 Further, while in the military 
context, , this sort of ruling is at least understandable to some degree, this is not the case with 
regard to the Şahin v Turkey battle, as the site of the incident was a university, supposedly an 
inclusive and progressive environment.    
In light of the information that majority of Turkish Muslim women cover themselves in 
some way, therefore, from the ECtHR ruling in the Şahin case it can be deduced that over half of 
the Muslim women in Turkey to be fundamentalists. As Aydin comments, wearing the headscarf 
is a religious practice that is encompassed in Article 9(2) of the ECHR631; it must be acknowledged, 
however, that the terms ‘extremism’ and ‘fundamentalism’, to some extent, can be ambiguous and 
have political connotations. 
In accordance with the ECHR, the ECtHR acknowledged the difference between personal 
opinions and beliefs and fundamentalist behaviour in the case of Kalaç. As outlined in Article 9 of 
the ECHR, both internal and external freedoms are protected, though to different extents; the 
former is an unconditional freedom, as strongly held personal beliefs and convictions that are 
forged in a person’s individual conscience and cannot, in and of themselves, pose a threat to the 
rights of others or the security of the public, and so cannot be limited. From a legal standpoint, the 
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view of internal freedom is more or less identical; any form of internal belief or private ideology 
is legal, and unable to be made illegal. In other words, the ECHR protects a person’s private sphere 
of conscience but not necessarily any public conduct inspired by that conscience. As The ECtHR 
in the case regarding the freedom of expression claims that freedom of expression refer to not only 
ideas which “are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but 
also …those that shock, offend or disturb the State or any sector of population”.632  
On a related note, having fundamentalist ideas is an internal aspect of religious freedom633 
which must be protected from any violation, allowing that it does not violate or threaten the rights 
and freedoms of other members of the society. Similarly, human rights activists, Marthoz and 
Saunders, consider having a fundamentalist idea as an internal part of religious freedom that should 
be protected. They argue that human rights movement should do more to defend freedom of 
religion even for fundamentalists, “including those who would threaten liberal conceptions of 
rights if they were in power, so long as they do not physically attack or otherwise impinge on the 
rights of non-believers”.634 In the Şahin case, the judge Tulkens dissents from the consensus of the 
court, arguing that the decision was made based on the danger of  
“Extremist political movements” attempting to “impose on society as a whole their 
religious symbols and conception of a society founded on religious precepts”; this decision was 
considered in the court to be “a measure intended to ... preserve pluralism in the university”.635 
In court cases which cite fundamentalism as a factor in the ruling, it is argued that 
fundamentalists tend to impose their views and symbols on society. It is important to acknowledge 
that even if one wished to push their religious views on a student body, simply wearing a headscarf 
would not grant one the ability to do so. Taking the case of Leyla into consideration, it can be said 
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that the only way to spread fundamentalist ideas is through a discussion with the students, whereby 
the beliefs are explained; discussions such as these are a basic component of a democratic society. 
Judge Tulkens is in agreement with the notion that states are obliged to actively engage 
radical Islam; however, her objection is that the simple act of wearing a headscarf should not be 
synonymous with a manifestation of fundamentalism. Furthermore, she argues, it is crucial in this 
regard to make a distinction between those merely just wearing a headscarf and those actively 
promoting the imposition of the obligation to wear one; such distinction is commonly made in case 
of symbols of other religions.636  
Through his article, Golder expressed an agreement with Judge Tulkens. Golder argues 
that regardless of whether one acknowledges that Turkey is a special case given the country being 
more sensitive vis-à-vis religious fundamentalism, the Court’s duty of supervision was still to be 
enforced. More specifically, the Court was supposed to demand from the Turkish Government 
clear examples of what constitute a threat to public order and how rights and freedom of others are 
limited. The failure to do so is evident in the Court’s employment of very different criteria in order 
to evaluate whether a measure is necessary, than the criteria applied in cases of measures violating 
freedom of expression as stipulated in the Convention’s Article 10. Arguably, the Court’s approach 
in the Şahin case as well as in previous cases went directly against the principle of pluralism 
protected by Article 9. In other words, the Court and the European Commission’s decision to treat 
religious freedom in a different manner than the Convention’s other rights and to conclude that the 
wearing of headscarf is not consistent with the Convention amounts to a severe limitation of 
religious minorities’ right to profess their religion freely.637 
External freedoms, on the other hand, must be taken subjectively, in that some expressions 
of faith can be considered a threat to the safety or fundamental rights of other individuals or 
groups.638 The ECtHR acknowledges that freedom of religious thought does not necessarily extend 
to religious action; private belief is protected, public behaviour is often not, particularly when this 
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behaviour breaks national or state laws.639  However, in the case of Leyla the court, contrary to its 
precedent in the case Kalaç did not distinguish between faith and fundamentalist behaviour. The 
court disregarded the reality stemming from the social circumstances of a huge number of women 
who wear headscarf in Turkey, insofar as the court considered wearing of headscarf purely as an 
outward manifestation of fundamentalist behavior.640 
One particular case, Refah v Turkey641, exemplifies the way in which external freedoms 
can be legislated in a way internal freedoms cannot, as the Refah Party attempted to create a Sharia 
state, an act which is in direct defiance of the European Convention of Human Rights. In this case, 
the decision was taken to make this group and its activity illegal due to the threat it posed to the 
security of Turkey and its national values.642 It is undeniable that political fundamentalists groups 
are real threats to the rights and freedoms of humanity. In relation to this subject, historian and 
academic Daniel Pipes has argued that with “Communists and fundamentalists being invariably 
hostile to us, we should show not empathy but resolve, not good will but will power", calling for 
the "containment and rollback" of fundamentalist Islam.643 He goes on to say that fundamentalists 
challenge the West more profoundly than Communists did and do. “The latter disagree with our 
politics but not with our whole view of the world including the way we dress, mate and pray".644 
The court in its decision added that 
 “in a country like Turkey, where the great majority of the population belong to a particular 
religion, measures taken in universities to prevent certain fundamentalist religious movements 
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from exerting pressure on students who do not practise that religion or on those who belong to 
another religion may be justified under Article 9 § 2 of the Convention.”645 
It is clear that fundamentalist groups and individuals pose a number of legal and ideological 
questions; however, due to the ambiguity and vagueness of the concept of fundamentalism Judge 
Khovler in his dissenting view has asked that this concept not be used during the process of legal 
casework even in the political cases. Khovler was reported as saying that: 
“What bothers me about some of the Court’s findings is that in places they are 
unmodulated, especially as regards the extremely sensitive issues raised by religion and its values. 
I would prefer an international court to avoid terms borrowed from politico-ideological discourse, 
such as ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ (para. 94), ‘totalitarian movements’ (para. 99), “threat to the 
democratic regime” (para. 107), etc., whose connotations, in the context of the present case, might 
be too forceful”.646 
Similarly, (on the cases related to the wearing of the headscarf) Pimor demonstrates that 
the court ‘rather than focusing on the Muslim applicants’ actual freedom to manifest their religion, 
national and European authorities diverted the dialogue towards political considerations’.647  
The use of these ideas did not go entirely unopposed, particularly in the wake of the 
controversies brought about by the Refah case, particularly the grounds on which the dismantling 
of the party was achieved, with preventative methods cited as the justification.   
It is important to establish that all human rights treaties give priority to the rights rather 
than duties of the individuals. The main goal of the treaties is protection of certain individual 
fundamental interests not only from arbitrary interference of the state but also often protect the 
individual rights in excuse of protection of common interest. However, implementation of those 
rights and freedoms protected by the ECHR are not entirely rigid, as the articles contained within 
it can be avoided under mitigating or extenuating circumstances. This has been the case most 
notably with regard to articles 8 to 11, which lend themselves to subjectivity through their wording; 
they contain the phrase ‘proportional’ and the clause ‘necessary in a democratic society’, which 
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provide a certain amount of leeway. This wording is necessary for the protection of public interests, 
indicated in article 8 to 11.648 Rolv Ryssdall, the former president of the ECtHR, stated that 
“[t]he theme that runs through the Convention and its case law is the need to strike a 
balance between the general interest of the community and the protection of the individual’s 
fundamental rights.”649  
It is crucial then that the ECtHR allows for proportionality and necessity verdicts when 
ruling on religious cases if the state is to minimise interference with the rights and freedoms of 
people. Further, this ‘proportionality’ followed by the ECHR and, consequently, the ECtHR, is 
used to determine whether action which infringes on a right will obtain its aim, whether the action 
is necessary for achieving that aim, and whether the detriment to the individual outweighs the 
benefits that achieving the aim will bring.650 In the case of Şahin, the aim was to protect secular 
values, the rights and freedoms of others and to prevent a rise of fundamentalism through the 
removal of religious attire; this case was fallacious in a number of ways. In terms of secularism, it 
can be said briefly that wearing of headscarf does not imply that its wearer opposes secularism. 
For example, in the parliamentary election in Kurdistan held on 21 September 2013, Islamic 
Parties obtained 17 out of 111 seats with secular parties gaining 94 seats.651 In view of the fact that 
97% of Kurds are Muslim,652 many members of the secular parties support the wearing of the veil 
whilst a considerable number of Kurds at the same time support secularism.  
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To address the argument that Şahin’s headscarf was an affront to the secular sensibilities 
of her classmates and to the academic institution, it is important to note that there were no 
complaints made by her peers. In addition, the concept of infringing upon the rights of others is a 
very open one; if the ‘others’ refer to her classmate, then this claim is arguably false, and it was 
unnecessary of the government or teaching institution to take this action on their behalf. As Gunn 
points out, "[we] would not normally expect a human rights tribunal to be more solicitous of the 
sensibilities of those who do not like religious expression (which is not guaranteed by the European 
Convention) than on the right to manifest religion (which is guaranteed by the Convention)."653   
If it refers to the Turkish public, then this is contradicted by the fact that most Turkish women 
wear headscarves.654 Furthermore, religious attire does not indicate a hatred of unbeliever and non-
religious individuals and, while some fundamentalists do wear headscarves, it is not a charge that 
anybody can level at every headscarf wearer with any justification. Although it naturally follows 
that a female fundamentalist wears the headscarf, it should not be assumed in the same way that 
each female wearing headscarf is necessary a fundamentalist. As for the second point, the banning 
of the headscarf does not go any way towards reducing fundamentalist activity; one could argue 
that the persecution one feels when asked to remove ones religious attire for the safety of others 
may lead an individual to seek education elsewhere, leaving them more exposed to 
radicalization.655  
Though arguably necessary to protect the public and their rights in the military case656, (as 
the mandatory retirement of the applicant was a necessity to eradicate the threat of the situation), 
the process undergone by the Turkish judicial system in its dealings with Leyla Şahin was built 
upon unjustified assumption about religious wear and fundamentalism, and the inconvenient 
argument to fight for its removal on the grounds that the headscarf was a threat to public order, 
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safety, health and gender equality.657 In fact, during these proceedings, it is only the removal of 
Şahin from the education system which qualifies as a genuine affront to human rights and public 
order, an argument which is supported by the response of Şahin’s fellow students, who boycotted 
class to protest this decision.658 The argument that the headscarf posed a threat to the security 
and/or health of the public is therefore not a compelling one. Further, in some other countries, 
including the UK, there are no laws or regulations to ban headscarf based on protection of public 
order or health.659 Similarly, in the Netherlands, restrictions on religious dress, the headscarf most 
notably, is considered from the point of view of avoiding discrimination rather than upholding free 
religious expression; in the early 2000’s, it was agreed that places of education could enforce a 
uniform policy on the condition that it does not discriminate on any basis, that the uniform policy 
is clear on any literature pertaining to the school, and that punishment for deviating from the 
uniform are not excessive.660  A related example, greatly discussed in Western media in recent 
years, is the banning of the burka in a number of European countries due to issues of security and 
communication in schools, as well as its unsuitability for taking part in mandatory PE lessons; the 
latter point was deemed a valid justification for the ban in schools which did not amount to 
discrimination.661 Furthermore, in 2003 the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission ruled in favour 
of a ban on the niqab; the niqab restricts communication between teachers and pupils.662 In the 
West, the Burka is often confused with the niqab; the niqab is a garment which is worn with a 
headscarf and provides a gap for the individual’s eyes whereas the burka covers the entire face and 
body, with a mesh eye veil which allows the individual to see out.663 The headscarf is the most 
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common form of Islamic headwear, and poses no difficulty in terms of identification and no 
security implication. 
The Turkish state’s interference is not based on a belief that the headscarf encourages 
fundamentalism664, as this policy to remove the headscarf is not enforced outside of the university 
environment, or at the lower levels of the education system where individuals are more prone to 
be radicalised by ‘fundamentalists’. Studies in a number of Islamic countries have shown, that 
those who are less educated are, in fact, more at risk of radicalisation than their university educated 
peers. For instance, in six states in Nigeria, the participants of the study determined that one of the 
fundamental factors affecting whether young adopt extreme religious views was high level of 
illiteracy. The level of illiteracy in Gombe state was highlighted as being the second most 
important factor out of 16 with similar results in Yobe state. In Bomo state, illiteracy ranked 4th as 
a factor contributing to extremism and violence among the youth. Moreover, 75% of the 
participants in Kano state identified illiteracy as being an important contributing factor. The 
foregoing can be explained by highlighting how illiteracy prevents people from accessing further 
education, hence their ability to critically evaluate information and distinguish facts from 
propaganda or doctrine of extremist is significantly low.665 
The ECtHR provides its member states with a high degree of autonomy in dealing with the 
issue of religious clothing based ‘margin of appreciation’. In the case of Şahin, the dissenting 
judge challenged the member states’ authority to make decision vis-à-vis issues revolving around 
religious attire by questioning the principle of ‘margin of appreciation’ that was used as a 
justification of the claim that " the university authorities are in principle better placed than an 
international court to evaluate local needs.”666 As a response, this judge put forward two 
arguments as a critique of the majority's analysis, particularly concerning the claim that a wide 
margin of appreciation was necessary given “the diversity of practice between the states on the 
issues of regulating the wearing of religious symbols in educational institutions".  First, the judge 
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pointed out that none of the member states have enacted a ban on religious attire at universities. 
The diversity of state practice underlying the majority position simply did not exist. Secondly, 
regardless of whether the majority opts to deal with these issues by employing a margin of 
appreciation, the court should have not ignored its duty to facilitate provision of the required 
‘European supervision’ in this context. In other words, the issue raised in the application ... is not 
merely a 'local' issue but one of importance to all member states. European supervision cannot, 
therefore, be avoided simply by invoking the margin of appreciation.667 
Concerning the case of teacher and student, the court had to deal with a question of the most 
appropriate candidate for deciding the pertinent issues: local government authorities or 
international courts. In some aspects, these cases demonstrate the increasingly tension ensued from 
the internationalization of law, including "one of the most cosmopolitan, and controversial, trends 
in constitutional law: using foreign and international laws as an aid to interpreting"668 domestic 
constitutional law. Both cases including Şahin and Dahlab then illustrate the problems of enacting 
and maintaining something resembling a ‘European Jurisprudence of religious freedom’ according 
to Article 9 (2) of ECHR, particularly given the diversity of laws applied across the members’ 
states.669 This article guarantees religious freedom but also establishes the possibility of legally 
restricting religious freedom in the name of protecting public order and the rights and fundamental 
freedoms of others.  
Though the threat of fundamentalist Islam (which tries to impose its ideas on society) at its 
most extreme is very real and the prevention of radicalisation paramount, there is a plausible case 
to be made that there is the world of difference between a Muslim who chooses to wear the hijab, 
or headscarf, and a religious fundamentalist who wishes to attack others for a religious cause.670 
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Compelling argument was not provided to support claims that the headscarf represented an attack 
on secularism, and one could argue that an educated young woman is more equipped than most to 
resist radicalisation, though there was no evidence provided of any such attempt. While there is a 
rising concern surrounding fundamentalist activity, the right of the individual to express their 
religion through their dress cannot be infringed upon due to fear alone.671   
The department of the UN which concerns itself with religious persecution has created a gauge of 
legislation regarding religious freedom which can be used to assess whether such legislation is 
discriminatory or not672, which outlines that “dress should not be the subject of political regulation 
and calls for flexible and tolerant attitude in this regard, so as to allow the variety and richness of 
. . . garments to manifest themselves without constrain”.673  
  On this basis it may be deduced that the decisions of the court regarding the Leyla Şahin 
and Refah Party contradict international human rights criteria. Also, this decision is based on 
‘possibilities’, ‘hypothesis’ and ambiguous terms such as ‘secularism’, ‘totalitarian movement’, ‘ 
Islamic fundamentalism’674 which seem to be difficult to define and apply in the legal context. 
Furthermore, it seems that these decisions are beyond jurisdiction of the ECtHR particularly when 
it made a value judgment about the nature of Islamic religion. It would be more conceivable if the 
judges had passed judgment on the specific instruction of Islam that relate to the wearing of 
headscarf and not Islamic religion as a whole.   
It is vitally important the Court is clear about the distinctions to be made. Gibson states 
that such differentiation is crucial particularly with respect to Turkey as the country is duly worried 
about the imposition of fundamentalist ideas on those not willing to adopt or share them. By the 
same token, the country should assure that devout Muslims are protected from a secular 
fundamentalist’s form and any attempts to force its secular view of the world on society.675 
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4.6. Conclusion 
Though ‘fundamentalism’ is a word with a number of socially and politically cemented 
connotations most frequently used when talking about Islam, it is also a concept present in other 
religions. The term is a nuanced one, both in academia and in law, as it is either used to refer to a 
series of unconnected organisations and ideologies, or as a moniker for terrorism in the name of 
Islam. There is also little delineation in most of the literature regarding fundamentalism between 
orthodox theism and fundamentalist belief. Many of the ECtHR’s decisions have faced the 
criticism that orthodox religiousness has been mistaken for extremist behaviour, with oppressive 
acts often stemming from the latter but rarely from the former, which usually promotes tolerance 
and peace.676 
The inextricability of fundamentalism from religion means that connotations of the term 
should not trigger extreme responses from the general public towards those who practice orthodox 
religion; it is also important to differentiate between personal or collective orthodox faith and 
organised fundamentalist activity which encroaches on the rights of others. There are a number of 
individuals who turn to strict, one could call it ‘fundamentalist’, religious groups in order to 
achieve self-actualisation, personal wellbeing, and sense of community, or perhaps even to 
proclaim their purity; these individuals are not a danger to security nor to the rights of others. In a 
number of Islamic nations, religious dress is more of a traditional or cultural act than a religious 
one, as is the case in Turkey. Even those who express fundamentalist beliefs or live their lives in 
a way which could be considered fundamentalist are not necessarily a threat to anybody, as 
religious expression and freedom should be protected as long as these beliefs are not expressed in 
a way which infringes on the rights of others.677 
In the current geo-political environment, conflict is often centred on religious 
disagreement, or clashes of culture which have their foundation in deeply rooted prejudices; this 
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has been most notably observed in Balkan678, India and in Middle Eastern nations679, where large 
numbers of people are being radicalised by extremist religious groups and oppressive political 
parties. It is not the religious expression of individuals that pose a threat to security, rather large 
organisations that strive for power and use extremist rhetoric to recruit. In this regard it is of 
significant importance that international judges do not just simply assume that they understand 
perceptions and opinions of Muslims based solely on them wearing or not wearing headscarf. It 
needs to be emphasised that a large number of Muslims are opposed to fundamentalism and wish 
for the international community to acknowledge that they themselves are the target of 
fundamentalists.  
A more subjective element of the argument surrounding fundamentalism is that of 
legislating the same behaviours in different nations, as it is difficult for both international judges 
and lawmakers to amend these ideas of fundamentalism for very different and equally complicated 
cultures and national values. Countries often differ in their interpretation of ‘fundamentalism’, and 
so it is near impossible to create a system of human rights legislation which can be applied 
universally.680  
It is observed that in the cases that the states do not have a common understanding on the 
subject of complaint, states have wide margin of appreciation. As the court in the case Open Door 
and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland observed.681 However it doesn’t imply that states limit the 
circle of the rights and freedoms in the society. To identify the extent of the margin of appreciation, 
the Court has to consider the significance of the whole situation surrounding the case, mostly the 
necessity to protect religious plurality as a cornerstone of liberal democracy. Furthermore, in its 
role of a supervisor, the Court has to take into account the interference complained of on the basis 
of the facts as a whole”.682  
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In conclusion, legal objectivity cannot solve problems of religious fundamentalist 
expression, as this risks the state becoming an agent of oppression and subjugation; it is true that 
the law is often lacking the nuance demonstrated by the society it is attempting to govern.683 In 
terms of fundamentalism, the judicial system must place a greater focus on those acts which are 
undeniably illegal, in that there is a consensus of its wrongfulness. Alternatively, it should also 
direct its attention to those acts which are widely determined by the public to be a threat to them, 
which would require further investigation. When it comes to an issue as complex as religious 
freedom, the judicial system should at the very least be aware of its incapability to deal with the 
complexity such an issue presents, or risk exacerbating the problem it wishes to eradicate. Hence, 
the right to express views that might be considered fundamentalist is a part of the freedom of 
expression but only under the condition that 'words do not turn into violent deeds’. As McDonough 
argues the important issue concerning fundamentalism is not what fundamentalists believe, but 
what they do on the basis of their beliefs.684  
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
A Critical Analysis of the Concept of protection of ‘tolerance’ used as a 
Justification by the ECtHR to Ban the Wearing of the Headscarf 
5.1. Introduction 
Over the last century, scholars in the field of politics, such as Walzer and Rawls, have come 
to the conclusion that toleration was a ‘done deal’ and it is a fundamental element of any 
democratic state685. This concept has been upheld by a number of countries, particularly in the 
West, with some even going as far as including it in their constitutions. It can be argued, however, 
that tolerance with regard to religious beliefs is far from a ‘done deal’. Intolerance persists on a 
global scale, and religious intolerance has been at the core of some of the most significant conflicts 
in human history, including a series of religious wars ravaging Europe for 30 years in 17th century. 
Although wars like these are a thing of the past, many assert that religious intolerance is as 
ubiquitous as ever.686 It is generally accepted that intolerance derives from the belief that one’s 
own dogma or lifestyle has more value than that followed by others. The impact of intolerance can 
vary from rudeness and hostility towards people wearing religious attire such as the headscarf, to 
institutional marginalisation and subjugation, such as that demonstrated during the Apartheid 
system in South Africa. In extreme cases, intolerance can lead to the destruction of cultures and 
peoples through genocide or ‘ethnic cleansing’.687 
In recent years, there has been a palpable increase in intolerant behaviour and conflict on 
an international scale, often leading to attacks on minority groups; this has been most notably 
observed in Myanmar688, India689 and a number of Middle-Eastern nations.690 Due to its current 
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day relevance, issues of tolerance and intolerance has been widely discussed by those who study 
the social sciences, politics and theology, as this issue has a significant impact on all of these fields. 
Attempts to better understand tolerance and intolerance have been universal and, on a more official 
level, a number of treaties and proposals have been promulgated by world governments in order 
to address intolerance.691 One of the challenges faced by those attempting to tackle intolerance is 
a lack of a standard definition or overall conception of the term, which means that states may 
struggle to cooperate on matters of intolerance. This problem is exacerbated by religious factors, 
as an attempt to place legal or universal parameters on religious expression and religious 
intolerance often proves extremely challenging. While interpretations of the term may vary, it is 
generally agreed that tolerance must be considered a fundamental element of international and 
national peaceful-coexistence. The Director-General of UNESCO has posited that tolerance should 
be “integral and essential to the realisation of human rights and the achievement of peace… 
tolerance is affording others the right to have their persons and identities respected”.692 It is clear 
then that tolerance should not be merely an end goal but a process through which societies come 
to be more internally peaceful and understanding, as tolerance is a necessity for peace. It has been 
put forward that tolerance is one of the biggest steps left to make towards a more harmonious and 
peaceful society, and can only be undertaken gradually and through the evolution of a culture of 
peace.693 
These issues often have their roots in deep-seated historical perceptions, though it has been 
widely acknowledged that tolerance is conducive to religious freedom rather than an affront to 
religion. Therefore, tolerance must be encouraged for the safety of minorities and to avoid 
oppressive political systems. Work by Adeney (1926), included in the Encyclopaedia of Religion 
and Ethics, argues that ‘toleration’ both legally and theologically refers to the avoidance of 
subjugation and persecution.694 More recently, the issue of religious intolerance has come to the 
                                                          
691 Examples of International document include: Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981), proclaimed by GA Res. 36/55 of 25 November 1981, UN Doc. 
A/36/51 (1982)). Also see: A/HRC/28/47 “Combating intolerance, negative stereotyping, stigmatization of, and 
discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against persons on religion or belief”, Report of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights. Also see: Promotion of Religious and Cultural Understanding, Harmony and 
Cooperation. A/Res/60/11. 
692 B. A Reardon, ‘Tolerance: The Threshold of Peace, a Teaching/Learning Guide for Education for Peace, Human 
rights and Democracy’ (1994). UNESCO 1, 12. 
693 Ibid, 12, 14. 
694 A.T. Talib & Sarjit S. Gill, ‘Socio-Religious Tolerance: Exploring the Malaysian Experience’ (2012) 12.8 Global 
Journal of Human Social Science 48, 50. 
202 
 
fore with the increase in debates surrounding the headscarf and its contextual appropriateness 
whilst a number of countries have attempted to impose legal restrictions on the wearing of religious 
garment. In the case of Dahlab, the ECtHR observed “…It therefore appears difficult to reconcile 
the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above 
all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their 
pupils”.695  This research aims to determine whether the concept of the protection of tolerance is 
in principle to be used as a justification to ban the wearing of headscarf.  
 
5.2. The Roots and definition of tolerance 
Much of the previous literature696 on this topic relies heavily on pure legal arguments and 
largely ignores the context and subjectivity of the concept of tolerance; this research will transcend 
purely legal conceptions and attempt to consider tolerance under a wider, more longitudinal and 
more philosophical framework. Once the concept of tolerance is placed within its context, this 
allows the processes and consequences of tolerance to be better understood. Furthermore, it allows 
a consideration of the term as it relates to the ECtHR cases, which will be discussed further in the 
following sections. The absence of a historical framework for that which underlies tolerance means 
that any study on the topic is bound to suffer from an incomplete assessment of ECtHR policy. To 
this end, the thesis includes a historical overview of the concept as well as a semantic interpretation 
of the term, alongside a consideration of the term’s societal significance. In order to elaborate on 
a proposed definition, a discussion of attributes of tolerance will be provided, as this is crucial to 
identifying the phenomenon in context and in discerning whether the term was appropriately used 
in court cases. In summary, this chapter will present a discussion as to whether the wearing of a 
headscarf as a part of religious manifestation creates a culture of intolerance.  
In a historical sense, the term ‘toleration’ had been used predominantly by politician during 
the 17th and 18th century and was a key term in Enlightenment discourse. It has been argued that 
the prominence of the term can be attributed to John Locke (1632-1704), who included it in the 
titles of his works The Letter Concerning Toleration (1688) and Essay on Toleration, which was 
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published posthumously. Similarly to the philosopher’s other work, there is an appreciation for the 
separation of church and state and the necessity of such a separation when establishing a tolerant 
society with regard to religious expression.697 A movement of ‘religious toleration’ was observed 
in Europe as early as the latter half of the 16th century; this movement has been considered a 
reaction to religious conflict.698 The concept of toleration, however, was termed an embarrassment 
across Christian denominations, with Protestant and Catholic churches calling for its end. 
Toleration was maintained, however, as it was considered important to the long-term strategy for 
the restoration of unity.699 The general attitude towards toleration or tolerance is evidenced by its 
entry in the first edition of the Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (1694), which defined the 
term as sufferance, forbearance that one has for what one cannot prevent.700 Tolerance was 
considered the other side of the coin of intolerance; when intolerance of religious transgression 
could not be legally upheld, measures of tolerance could be enforced through official channels. 
Tolerance initially emerged as a side-effect of the inability to impose religious conformity, 
contrary to how we understand the term today, i.e. as an embracement of religious diversity.701 
Modern day conceptions of the term position tolerance as a state virtue and a component of rights 
surrounding religious expression which supports religious diversity, rather than religious 
uniformity. Semantically, ‘tolerance’ has its etymological origins in Latin, with the word 
‘tolerare’, which means ‘to endure’. The way in which each language has adapted the word from 
its Latin origin has led to a slight variation in definition across national borders, according to 
historical and cultural context. In cases where there is no Latin root due to the language having a 
different origin, there are separate synonyms used in its place which, again, have different 
connotations. It is hard to pinpoint an exact definition of ‘tolerance’, as its meaning varies 
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according to who is using it, why they are using it, and under what conditions.702 This has been 
evidenced by discussions surrounding tolerance which have taken place in recent years within the 
official languages of the UN.  
Tolerance has been defined by the ‘Oxford Concise Dictionary’ as a noun which refers to 
a “Willingness to tolerate” or “forbearance” or a verb which means to “Endure, permit (practice, 
action, behaviour), allow (person, religious sect, opinion) to exist without interference or 
molestation [. . .] Allowing of difference in religious opinions without discrimination”. 
Alternatively, Chinese definitions have defined ‘tolerance’ as follows: to “Allow, admit, to be 
generous towards others”. Across the world tolerance has been given the following synonyms: to 
pardon, indulgence, mercy, clemency, forgiving. In Russia, ‘tolerantnost’ refers to the “ability to 
tolerate (to endure, bear, stand; put up with) something or somebody, that is, to admit, accept the 
being, existence of something/somebody, to reconcile oneself to something/somebody, to be 
condescending, lenient to something/ somebody”.703 In general, the definitions of tolerance stated 
above do not explicitly perceive tolerance as an act of embracing transgressive opinions. However, 
the inclusion of words like ‘to admit’ and ‘to allow’ indicates that dissenting views are accepted. 
When considered in a broad sense, tolerance can be taken to mean an acceptance of 
“individuals and groups that abide by a set of values, norms, customs, and political goals that is 
different from one‘s own”.704 This is true only if one accepts a broad definition of the term, 
unaffected by cultural context; this may refer to any religious group or anti-religious group under 
any social conditions. The work of Bernard Williams argues that “A practice of toleration means 
only that one group as a matter of fact puts up with the existence of the other, differing, group. . . 
. One possible basis of such an attitude . . . is a virtue of toleration, which emphasizes the moral 
good involved in putting up with beliefs one finds offensive. . . . If there is to be a question of 
toleration, it is necessary that there should be some belief or practice or way of life that one group 
thinks (however fanatically or unreasonably) wrong, mistaken, or undesirable”.705 Promotion of 
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tolerance cannot rely solely on universal standards of morality, as this is no accurate way to 
measure true tolerance whilst this method is too subjective and fails to take into consideration 
variation in societal context. Morality, as a concept, is extremely subjective and changeable, as 
pointed out by the ECtHR706; while one interpretation of morality may be the accepted norm, this 
can change very over time. For example, norms which dictated that women were not fit for work 
which involved logical reasoning were once commonplace though, thankfully, such prejudicial 
views in some societies have become antiquated. Such norms still prevail in some societies and 
even in some communities in Western countries. This is evidence, if any were needed, that 
dominant attitudes must adapt and change over time, as old attitudes may no longer apply to a 
rapidly changing society.707 One must seek a more stable foundation on which to base conceptions 
of tolerance. 
The work of Talib and Gill conceives of religious tolerance as an openness to accepting 
differences in religious attitudes and practices under any societal or cultural circumstances without 
prejudice (even if it is in one’s power to reject or deny it), in order to achieve ‘well-being’ and a 
‘harmonious’.708 While widely accepted, there has been some debate over the accuracy of this 
definition, as it can be argued that those who hold prejudicial views may not necessarily be 
‘intolerant’. Tolerance, while implying an acceptance of difference, does not necessarily mean 
there are no prejudices present.  Prejudice and intolerance, then, do not always exist together, as 
someone with prejudices might be outwardly tolerant, assuming that they acknowledge their 
prejudices and so tolerance can exist as long as prejudice is contained.709 In other words, in 
situations where stereotyping and preconceptions create a negative evaluation, it does not follow 
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that such beliefs will lead to hostile actions; tolerant actions and prejudicial thoughts towards a 
certain group can coexist in the same person.710 Tolerance is often considered alongside the 
concept of ‘well-being’ and this concept is supported by a number of factors, most notably a desire 
to maximise positive outcomes and achievements. Well-being has been interpreted by the World 
Health Organisation to mean a process by which one can achieve “one’s physical, emotional, 
social, mental and spiritual potential”.  There are variations in the way different groups and 
individuals prioritise the different processes of well-being; these can range from a spiritual 
fulfillment to the improving one’s social life.711  
Toleration has been defined by Colin Gunton as a willingness to allow attitudes, beliefs 
and practices in others which the individual or group themselves does not believe to be true whilst 
this can be accepted for the sake of ‘higher good’- especially the well-being of human society’.712 
These definitions, though useful to a certain extent, still utilise terms such as ‘wellbeing’ or ‘higher 
good’ which are highly subjective and are conditioned by factors such as to culture, language and 
the temporal context under which they are used.  
Alternatively, John Christian Laursen argued that “Toleration is a policy or attitude 
toward something that is not approved and yet is not actively rejected”.713 Laursen later 
supplemented this definition with concepts of ‘dominant’ groups and ‘disfavoured’ ones in order 
to better apply to current social conditions and the actualities of social dynamics. This updated 
definition applies a “principle of toleration” in cases where ‘dominant’ groups, who are supported 
by prevailing hegemonies, take a negative stance against the practices or beliefs of a different 
group, which then becomes the ‘disfavoured’ group. The dominant group, in most cases, has power 
over the disfavoured group and may either marginalise or suppress that group or attempt to change 
their beliefs to better suit the prevailing ideology. Social harmony relies on the acknowledgment 
by the dominant group that, in the interest of peace and acting ethically, one should not restrict the 
expressions of the disfavoured group; in other words the dominant group acknowledges that there 
are moral or epistemic reasons (that is, reasons pertaining to knowledge or truth) to permit the 
disfavoured group to keep on believing and doing what it does; this constitutes what is known as 
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a pure/principled toleration.714 The use of the terms ‘dominant’ and ‘disfavoured’ in this definition 
is in favour of terms such a ‘majority’ and ‘minority’,  as being the largest group does not always 
add up to being the most influential group in a given culture. This is apparent in societies such as 
that of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, in which the Sunni sect were simultaneously the minority group in 
terms of numbers and yet the most powerful group in terms of influence; this led to a suppression 
of a Shia community; this was also the case in Bahrain, where the Shia majority is similarly 
oppressed by an influential Sunni minority.715 Problems arise with this definition when one 
questions the terms ‘ethical’ or ‘moral’ with regard to the motivations behind toleration, as these 
are highly subjective concepts dependent on culture and ideology.716 
  This definition has also made use of the term ‘epistemic’, which relates to conceptions of 
truth; when used in theological terms, the concept of ‘truth’ cannot be empirically defined or 
determined and so must rely on the way in which individuals and groups interpret it.717 Harell 
posits that “tolerance is traditionally understood to imply restraint when confronted with a group 
or practice found objectionable”718. A more generally agreed upon definition of tolerance has been 
presented by Andrew Cohen, who proposed that “An act of toleration is an agent‘s intentional and 
principled refraining from interfering with an opposed other (or their behaviour, etc.) in situations 
of diversity, where the agent believes she has the power to interfere”719.  
It can be argued that tolerance is only really applicable when the individual or group 
choosing to be tolerant has a capability to actively oppose the practices or convictions of other 
individuals or groups. When attempting to apply the concept of tolerance to legal systems, 
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problems arise due the lack of a widely agreed upon definition; the only official international 
recognition of tolerance comes in the form of the ‘Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief’ 1981, which neglects to provide a 
definition of ‘tolerance’. It does, however, detail the differences between actions designed to 
combat ‘discrimination’ as compared to actions which address ‘intolerance’. The aforementioned 
declaration states that nations should “make all efforts to enact or rescind legislation where 
necessary to prohibit any such discrimination” while fighting intolerance though an 
implementation of “all appropriate measures”.720 This creates a legal idea of ‘discrimination’ on 
which policy can be based, as it suggests specific actions to be taken, which is not the case with 
‘intolerance’ as the declaration suggests simply the ‘appropriate measures’ be implemented to 
address this issue. This is indicative of the lack of legal parameters and definitions in place for the 
concept of intolerance.721 
 
5.3. The Characteristics of tolerance 
The sheer number of proposed definitions with regard to tolerance strips the terms of any 
practical application; one can discern, however, from the suggested definitions, a number of 
common characteristics which are present in most interpretations of the term. Parsing these 
common characteristics makes the concept of tolerance more transparent and so renders 
applications of the term to the issue of the headscarf with reference to the ECtHR altogether easier. 
Of these common characteristics, amongst the most important is that tolerance may only exist in 
situations where there is a difference, as one can only be tolerant of a group, a belief system or a 
practice which varies in some way from one’s own. In order for one to be tolerant of another group, 
one must consider their ideology or way of life "wrong, mistaken, or undesirable" but allow it to 
exist without disruption.722 In a uniform society with no religious or ideological disparities, 
tolerance would be a redundant sentiment, as one cannot tolerate something which one believes to 
be true or correct. Tolerance, then, is the acceptance of others’ way of life in a manner which 
allows them to express and practice it in the way they wish to; however, one can respond to what 
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is considered ‘other’ in a variety of, (often negative), ways.723 
Toleration does not apply to groups that are largely disinterested in the beliefs or practices 
of each other.  For instance, I do not "tolerate" my neighbors who are religious or who are white 
just because I am indifferent as to the race or religious orientation of other members of the society. 
These cases are merely about indifference; consequently, they cannot be included within the scope 
of tolerance. Tolerance, according to most definitions, also involves an active discomfort with that 
which is different and so in order to tolerate another group, there must be an awareness and a 
reaction to the beliefs or practices of another group or collection of groups. One could argue that 
having a disinterest in or feeling indifferent about the beliefs and practices of others is a healthier 
and more socially agreeable notion than tolerating difference, as the former involves less 
judgement and no negative feelings which are simply being kept to oneself, as is often the case 
with ‘tolerance’.724 Because of the depth of feeling about matters of fundamental human concern, 
it is easy to see why human beings seem naturally inclined to intolerance. We invest ourselves into 
the things we care about and those who belief in different values sometimes deny that our concerns 
are worthy of such care and investment. Religious and moral disagreements are threats because of 
this disvaluing of the others’ beliefs and practices. When we find the other a burden, we naturally 
wish to preserve our own cares and investments. This often leads to oppression, marginalisation 
or persecuting people with differing practices and beliefs.725 It may also be the case that one could 
display an opposition to another’s beliefs while still accepting them as a person, for tolerance may 
be interpreted as an acknowledgment of the value of another human being despite their core beliefs 
or practices. Many have interpreted tolerance as a need to remove barriers between people and 
create connections between those with fundamentally different lives and identities. One who is 
tolerant, then, must value those with different beliefs on a human level if not on an ideological 
level. There must be an acknowledgement on the part of the ‘dominant’ group that differences do 
not warrant the loss of rights or personhood and so allowing these groups to exist grants these 
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individuals their freedom.  Conversely, intolerance equates differences of identity to fundamental 
human difference and so seeks to dehumanise that which is different; it is personal and often 
aggressive in nature.726 
It has been made clear that tolerance cannot exist without an opposition between two 
groups, whether mutual or singular.  The question has been raised, then, as to the severity and 
nature of this opposition. For example, disliking a certain food may be considered an opposition 
but one is not described as tolerant for not taking direct action against it. Alternatively, if one 
dislikes their partner’s haircut and it causes them embarrassment, but they do not urge their partner 
to change it and they remain good friends, can this be considered tolerance?  
The issue is complicated further when applied to religion and race, as if we consider 
‘tolerance’ an allowance of those we dislike, a racist who does not act on his prejudice may be 
considered a tolerant individual according to this definition. This definition needs adapting, then, 
as one who is a racist cannot be tolerant, only restrained in their prejudice. Tolerance then, has 
been repositioned by some as not being about dislike but, instead, about disapproval; the former 
merely refers to one’s preferences, which often have harmless roots and illogical foundations. 
Preferences cannot be separated into right and wrong, as preferences are not verifiable, whereas 
disapproval, on the other hand, often has logical foundations and is often based on selective 
reasoning which supports one individual’s view and discredits the other. This explains the way 
differences of view matter to us identified by the fact that the disapproval at the heart of tolerance 
can be on moral or non-moral grounds.727 
Thirdly, it should also be made clear that tolerance can only exist in a group that has the 
ability to actively oppose those beliefs which are different to those held by said group.728 To put it 
another way, the group must perceive themselves as influential enough to change or remove those 
beliefs which oppose their own; tolerance is the choice to refrain from doing this. In order to 
tolerate something, there must be a perception that one could influence it if they were so 
                                                          
726 Allison Harell. ‘The Limits of Tolerance in Diverse Societies: Hate Speech and Political Tolerance Norms among 
Youth’ (2010) 43. 02 Canadian Journal of Political Science 407, 408. See further, Kelly James Clark, ‘The Good of 
Diversity and the Virtue of Tolerance’ (2009) 1.1 Philosophical Meditations (Iran).  For further information see: Kelly 
James Clark, Abraham’s Children: Liberty and Tolerance in an Age of Religious Conflict (Yale University Press 2012) 
300, 11-12. 
727 David Heyd, Toleration: An Elusive Virtue (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1996; 1998) 280, 34, 35. See 
also:  Dalal Farhad, ‘The Struggle to Live and Let Live’: The Psychology, Ethics and Politics of Tolerance, or, Why 
Discrimination is Preferable to Tolerance’ (2013) 17.2 Journal of Psychotherapy Aotearoa New Zealand 159, 166 
728 John Horton, & Susan Mendus, Toleration, Identity and Difference (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1999) 200, 18-20,142. 
211 
 
inclined.729 If one does not consider a difference in attitude or belief to be disagreeable then they 
would be disinterested which, as has already been established, cannot describe a process of 
tolerance.730 This leads onto the next characteristic of tolerance, which is that one must not employ 
any action against the group that is to be tolerated.731  In order for tolerance to exist, then, there 
must be the presence of power but with the refusal or reluctance to use it to subdue another group. 
Tolerance relies on opting out of the opportunity to control or constrain groups which believe or 
practice differently. In other words, we cannot tolerate that which we cannot influence – we can 
only resign ourselves to it. The lack of interference must be deliberate and clear, and must be based 
on an acknowledgement of disapproval, as inaction without disapproval is disinterest and 
indifference. For example, one might privately oppose a belief or practice and have a desire to see 
it stop; if this person does not take action due to indolence (unless, perhaps, I endorse laziness as 
a value) then tolerance does not apply, as tolerance must have a basis in a principle of some kind.732 
There must be a cognitive process by which an individual considers the way in which they are 
going to treat those who live differently. Also, it should be pointed out that this decision cannot be 
forced by others, made unwillingly or made with the promise of personal reward. This principle 
has been expressed in a number of ways including assertions that tolerance should be “necessarily 
selective”, “purposeful and intentional”, and “a rational and conscious act”.733  
Also key to understanding tolerance is the importance of ‘non-interference’, though 
specifically deliberate and active non-interference. To provide an example, someone from one 
denomination of Christianity may disapprove of the way in which other denominations worship 
but not take any measures against the act. If this individual preaches to those of another 
denomination, encouraging them to follow what they consider to be the true way of worship then 
they may consider themselves to be not directly intervening; this, however, is not considered to be 
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indirect tolerance by a number of scholars as aiming to convert is interference, though some would 
argue that rational debate cannot be considered intolerance.734 The ECtHR has suggested that in 
some cases, such as that of Kokkinakis v. Greece735, attempts to convert may be divided into 
acceptable and unacceptable, in some cases illegal, forms. The court in the above- mentioned case 
observed that “...a distinction has to be made between bearing Christian witness and improper 
proselytism”. The Court also observed that Greek legislatures are reconcilable with the principle 
of human rights if and in so far as “they are designed only to punish improper proselytism”736.  
While forced conversion through threat of violence or other coercion may be considered unlawful, 
attempts to convert through the logic and conversation cannot, in most cases, be considered a 
violation of human rights.   
Finally, tolerance is usually considered an active, rather than a passive, pursuit and so care 
must be taken when translating this into the legal arena.  In other words, there must be awareness 
that human judgement and conception is highly fallible and any attempt to apply these concepts to 
the judicial system should be underpinned by an acknowledgement that absolute truth cannot be 
discerned. While different belief system can often by reconciled, any attempt to apply a concept 
of universal truth to state legal proceedings cannot be anything other than unhealthy for a 
society.737 Tolerance relies on the ability of human beings to make an active and conscious effort 
to see past differences and accept other people for their core virtues, those which all people share. 
Kofi Annan has phrased this sentiment thusly: “tolerance cannot simply mean passive acceptance 
of other peoples' perceived peculiarities”.738 Tolerance cannot be fully realised without an element 
of kindness and generosity; “Generosity as a component of tolerance means that we must not see 
others' viewpoints and virtues as temporary inconvenience that we allow until converted into our 
own; rather, generosity means an acceptance and celebration of another's right and ability to 
think and exist”.739 Difference cannot be considered a barrier to be overcome. Instead, tolerance 
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must support and accept the fundamentals of humanity and embrace difference if there is to be 
societal harmony.740  It can be argued that tolerance is a term that requires further specification as 
it encompasses several characteristics. This means that there are specific criteria according which 
one can deem certain behaviour as a demonstration of tolerance. It has been discussed that 
tolerance is a term that requires further specification as it encompasses several characteristics. This 
means that there are specific criteria according which one can deem certain behaviour as a 
demonstration of tolerance. Among the most important of these is the presence of awareness 
regarding the differences of others, accompanied by disapproval of these differences, and the 
ability to influence disfavoured groups but referring to apply it. 
 
5.4. Justifications of Tolerance 
From the very first conceptions of ‘tolerance’, academics have interpreted the term 
differently depending on cultural and personal context; there has also been much debate over the 
role of tolerance in modern society. Opinions on tolerance range from those who see it as an 
unfortunate necessity in combatting civil unrest, while others take the view that being tolerant is 
preferable to the risks and disadvantages associated with suppressing problem groups.741 Most, 
however, interpret tolerance as a virtue which leads to a more open and cooperative society, and it 
helps to reveal the truth. 
Toleration is commonly thought of in pragmatist terms, as professed by the philosopher 
David Hume742; while one collection of people, usually the majority, may privately object to the 
conventions or practices of other groups, attempting to ban or discourage these practices risks 
causing societal conflicts and, in some cases, violent behaviour. When one weighs up the pros and 
cons of acting to suppress the practices of others, often it is the most beneficial course of action to 
tolerate these behaviours in order to maintain peace, in spite of personal objections.743 Toleration, 
in its current manifestation, first emerged due to a frustration with the religious unrest of the 
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reformation, so argues Herbert Butterfield.744 While certainly not the remedy to these conflicts, 
toleration acted as a last ditch attempt to minimise the impact of religious disharmony, whereby 
toleration was the way forward “for those who often still hated one another but found it impossible 
to go on fighting anymore." 745 This same worldview was shared by those involved in the 16th 
century conflicts between the Catholic Church and the Lutherans, which was eventually resolved 
in 1555.746 
In these instances, toleration can be considered pragmatic in nature, as this form of 
tolerance does not take a principled or moralistic approach; instead, this toleration is effected for 
practical reasons and the pursuit of self-preservation.747 Those who advocate religious tolerance 
have criticised the pragmatic approach for being too dependent on unfixed and unpredictable 
factors. Pragmatism offers toleration as the best option only in cases where there are significant 
enough disadvantages of suppression to warrant tolerance; this can all change if barriers to 
suppressing the disfavoured community are lifted748. It has been argued then that tolerance should 
be thought of not as a tool to be picked up when convenient but as a characteristic and value which 
promotes peace and harmony across communities. When one weighs up the practical benefits of 
tolerance rather than accepting it as a part of a civilised society, one risks infringing on the 
maintenance of basic human rights through the justification of oppressive actions.  
One key failing of the pragmatic approach to tolerance is that there are moments when the 
behaviour of zealous citizens cannot be dictated by rational thought. Often, even if it is the most 
practical possible solution, groups are not willing to allow practices which they deem to be 
unfavourable; in fact, where religious intolerance is concerned, the true believer does not lay down 
the sword of God just to avoid unpleasant confrontations. Indeed, some groups or individuals may 
consider the opportunity to confront disfavourable behaviour a chance to test and demonstrate a 
commitment to their own religion.749 To provide an illustrative example of this, groups such as 
ISIL often act with aggression towards any groups which they disagree with on an ideological 
level despite the arguments in favour of tolerance as the most practical approach.  
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Having presented the views of pragmatists, it is pertinent to discuss John Locke’s argument 
that intolerance is an impractical pursuit and often does little to achieve change or progress.  Locke 
puts this sentiment thusly: 
“The care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power consists only 
in outward force: but true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, 
without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the understanding, that 
it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by outward force. Confiscation of estate, 
imprisonment, torments, nothing of that nature can have any such efficacy as to make men change 
the inward judgement that they have framed of things.”750  
In other words, attempts to suppress groups on the basis of religious practice do little to 
change or prevent these practices, which operate in the sphere of ideas and beliefs. Locke believed 
that enacting changes in thinking relied on acting rationally rather than emotionally, as the latter 
often results in violence; he puts forward the view that “only light and evidence that can work a 
change in men’s opinions; and that light can in no manner proceed from corporal sufferings, or 
any other outward penalties.”751 Locke uses the example of religious heresy in Christianity and 
argues that if one wishes to attain salvation, a high degree of faith is required. Yet, this faith cannot 
be acquired through coercion, as this is not true faith and would not save one’s soul from 
damnation. Therefore, Locke argues, the imposition of religious belief or practice by force is 
entirely nonsensical if one wishes to enact actual change.752 This argument, however, is based 
upon the assertion that the imposition of belief and attacks on religion cannot influence the beliefs 
and practices of others; Waldron argues that this assertion is largely false.753  
While pragmatic arguments for tolerance may be useful in a theoretical sense, they often fail to 
hold up when applied to complex real-life situations in which actual communities are being 
attacked and converted through coercion. Even if one assumes that altering religious belief through 
coercion is impossible, it is possible to use this fear to prevent one from practicing their religious 
beliefs openly or using legal apparatus to prevent one from openly preaching and raising awareness 
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of the practices and from effectively transmitting religious practices to future generations. Those 
who attempt to suppress disfavoured religious thought may consider this a satisfactory outcome. 
The French theologian Castellio754 was a prominent proponent of toleration and condemned 
religious suppression as an unreligious action which advocates violence against others is either an 
evil act or taints the virtue of religion as a whole.755 Some have put forward the view that the 
arguments made by Locke are not disparaging intolerance on the grounds that it is ineffective, but 
rather because it is a behaviour disfavoured by God. Clearly, this is not an empirical basis for 
discussions of toleration and so the unreligious may not accept this argument.756 From this 
interpretation presented by Locke emerged a closer focus on the specificities of the term (tolerance) 
during this time: this view was no longer considered applicable to those who preached intolerance, 
to Muslims (due to their allegiance to a foreign ruler), and to the non-religious. Locke went on, 
however, to promote the affording of rights to so called ‘pagans’ in the US.757 The arguments put 
forward by Locke, particularly those pertaining to the inability of intolerance to influence belief, 
are usually applicable to the devout or orthodox believer not all believers. Furthermore, those in a 
position of dominance through their power are able to undermine and demonise the practices of 
minorities, or they are able to use their power to coerce minorities into changing how they express 
their religion with the promise of reward or the threat of punishment. 
Having presented key arguments of pragmatists and Locke regarding the importance of 
religious tolerance, another perspective through which to discuss this topic is that offered by John 
Stuart Mill.758  Most notably, Mill argued that the idea of religious tolerance is one which centres 
upon the search for truth. Mill has been a prominent critic of arguments purporting that state bodies 
also serve the purpose of promoting and protecting beliefs that are deemed crucial for the state’s 
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prosperity. Mill in this regard asserts that such argument is problematic since it might be difficult 
to objectively assess the usefulness of a particular belief. Furthermore, tolerating other people’s 
opinions can be supported by arguing that both correct and false opinions are important in social 
discourses.759 It is pertinent to note that the assertions of Mill relate mainly to the beliefs presented 
by Rawls and Kant, in that they insist that human beings must be given the freedom to form their 
own beliefs, and so it is the responsibility of the state to allow this to happen with as little 
intervention as possible.760  
       Mill, in his work pertaining to liberty and the state, advocates for a secular basis to tolerance 
as he argues that within the religious sphere there exists insufficient rational grounds for verifying 
religions’ claims of knowing the truth. Essentially, being religiously tolerant means, according to 
Mill, acknowledging that there are no verifiable universal truths.761 There is also a consideration 
in Mills’ work of the negative consequences of stifling expression; Mill offers the possibility that 
some hidden opinions are correct though, due to the commonness of human error, this is no basis 
on which to advocate the determination of universal human morality. Mill also asserts that the only 
way for one to know that his convictions are true is if they are open to criticism by others, as 
accurate judgement can only be formed through a process of exchange and openness. The worth 
of a conviction is determined largely by how well it stands up to scrutiny, a process which requires 
the conviction to be public and available for assessment; this is the only process through which the 
value and validity of a conviction can be tested, if there is the presentation of alternative and 
opposing positions.762 The argument often cited by proponents of the epistemic approach, that 
tolerance is conducive to the illumination of truth, is most notably found in the writing of John 
Stuart Mill. He asserts that toleration often leads to truth-finding, which is important to epistemic 
thinkers as it is a key component of maximising utility; he also asserts that truth, or understanding 
the concept of truth in a useful way, can only be found in cases where there is a multitude of 
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differing opinion and the capacity for these opinions to be both expressed and scrutinised.763 
Mill emphasises, in his conception of toleration, that moral considerations are paramount, 
as one should not only care about finding truth, or at least finding the truths which Mill expresses 
as the correct truths, but also about using this knowledge to overall utility.764 It is important to 
understand, in this regard, that when Mill refers to ‘truth’, he is referring to both factual, empirical 
truth and truths relating to moral truths and those relating to how one should live; the epistemic 
approach considers these two types of truth to be highly comparable.765  
Both truths should be considered with knowledge of the fact that human beings are 
contradictory, complicated and prone to error. This is one reason to listen to and tolerate alternative 
opinions, as there is a significant possibility that our own convictions are false. Further, if we 
assume that there is at least some truth in our own convictions, there is significant value in 
considering alternative beliefs, which may be used to supplement our own in order to understand 
more widely and come closer to finding ‘truth’. It has also been suggested766 that if ones 
convictions are entirely true, they are most likely to be held for positive reasons and so can be 
considered less fallible as they are more likely to have been formed with tolerance and an openness 
to differing viewpoints, wrong or otherwise. The above- mentioned reasons are all cited by Mill as 
justification for the promotion of tolerance and openness towards differing or opposing views.  
With regard to truths which pertain to ethics and lived experience, they are more 
complicated, as they must be considered with more breadth; this is because they concern one’s 
actions and practices, as well as one’s personal beliefs. Mill argues that if one is to find truth, one 
cannot be content with just encountering other beliefs but also that the “experiment of living” 
allows for "the worth of different modes of life [to] be proved practically".767  
Mills asserts, then, that if we are to ascertain how one should ideally live their life, it is not 
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enough to for one to be just aware of different opinions and beliefs since it is necessary that one 
experiences a life lived according to these opinions to understand what is the ideal way of life for 
them. Mill provides the example of observing, or ideally experiencing, the lives of a satisfied 
animal and a dissatisfied human (Mill uses the example of a pig and Socrates). From this one 
realises that the human life is superior due to the higher threshold for satisfaction and the higher 
capacity for pleasure.768 
In terms of popular discourse surrounding Mill, his assertion that there should be a right to 
religious expression and open practice is often the most referred to amongst modern day scholars 
and liberals. This is based on the argument that self-determination is an important freedom for 
human coexistence and personal autonomy, which many have argued should be considered a 
fundamental human right.769 However, from the researcher’s perspective, Mill’s approach is not 
free of criticisms. Mill does have his critics, particularly in terms of his key principle that tolerance 
illuminates truth, as the concept of truth is highly dependent on cultural relativity and personal 
circumstance. Moreover, since religious beliefs are often dealing with supernatural concepts, they 
cannot be proven right or wrong by using methods of science or logic. Mill is also vague on who 
determines the level of ‘truth’ and under what circumstances; further, those who are firm in their 
views tend to accept their own opinions as fact and do not hesitate in using aggression to spread 
what they believe to be the ‘true way’.770 To put this into context, Bill Clinton the former US 
president addressed an audience at Harvard in November of 2001: “The Taliban and bin Laden, 
like fundamentalist fanatics today and everywhere and throughout time immemorial, believe they 
have the truth. They have it, the whole truth . . . We believe the limits of the human condition 
prevent anyone from having the absolute truth.”771 
Having presented various ways through which tolerance can be approached, it is apparent 
that whichever method one uses in order to advocate tolerance, there are a number of positive 
effects of the practice. Oftentimes tolerance, whether intentionally or otherwise, ends up 
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remedying the after effects of conflict and, in some cases, it goes so far as preventing potential 
catastrophe772. It is true, however, that when one attempts to support tolerant attitudes there is an 
underestimation of human will and complexity, as human behaviour and attitudes differ according 
to culture, race, background and national identification. In this regard, it should be highlighted that 
tolerance is required not only based on arguments of practicality, but also because tolerance is a 
key ingredient for preserving human rights. This is particularly true in the modern cosmopolitan 
and multicultural world where it is necessary to respect each other’s differences as achieving 
homogeneity of people’s opinions and beliefs is impossible. It has been asserted by UNESCO that 
“consistent with respect for human rights, the practice of tolerance does not mean toleration of 
social injustice or the abandonment or weakening of one's convictions. It means that one is free to 
adhere to one's own convictions and accepts that others adhere to theirs. It means accepting the 
fact that human beings, naturally diverse in their appearance, situation, speech, behaviour and 
values, have the right to live in peace and to be as they are. It also means that one's views are not 
to be imposed on others”.773 
There is no doubt that the rejection of coercion in religious beliefs and practices, inherited 
from the thoughts of scholars like Lock and Mill, has developed the concept of tolerance in the 
modern era and strengthened the religious diversity and peaceful coexistence of different sects and 
religions in the West. Taking into consideration the philosophy of tolerance and placing the views 
of Lock and Mill in a present-day context, it can be argued that the view of the ECtHR, which 
considers the wearing of the headscarf tantamount to intolerance, is a violation of the principle of 
tolerance. 
5.5. Restrictions on Tolerance 
It must be acknowledged that, currently, human existence is defined by pluralism and so it 
is commonly agreed that religious practice and thought should be embraced with openness as a 
valid way of life. Despite this, there are many who still need clarification on how one should, in 
reality, implement standards of tolerance. It has been suggested by a number of academics that 
there cannot be a blanket acceptance of all behaviour and even those most vehemently in support 
of tolerance would not advocate the toleration of certain acts. In particular, when it comes to 
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religious tolerance, opinion differs as to where one should draw the line. For instance, Richard 
Dawkins, amongst the most famous of Western atheist thinkers, argues that religion is a tool by 
which communities can suppress one another and spark conflict, and so should be removed from 
civilised society or at least considered less important to everyday life.774 Difficulties emerge when 
attempting to find the line with regard to religious tolerance, and particular attention has been 
given in the literature to the headscarf and ECtHR decision regarding its relationship with 
conceptions of tolerance. For example, prudential argument asserts that tolerance is a fundamental 
component of cohesive societies which contain a number of religiously and ethnically diverse 
communities.775 Due to this, states should judicially support the practices of those who do not act 
according to the hegemonic order, to the extent that members of society dispute the norms’ 
validity. A prominent example is in regard to sexual preference; if opinions regarding sexual 
conduct vary widely, then different attitudes regarding sexual behaviour should be fully accepted 
under the law of all states. This, then, should also apply to religious freedoms, particularly if a 
community has within it a breadth of different religions. The approach known as the ‘prudential 
approach’ accepts that tolerance may be overruled by cultural or local agreement on what is 
acceptable. This approach, then, does not include tolerance of the few, or of small groups who 
deviate from what is generally acceptable, especially when this diversion is in regard to religious 
practice.776 
When considering the human rights viewpoint, the application of prudential theory on the 
pertinent cases revolving around the issue of wearing headscarf is questionable. This is mainly due 
to this theory’s argument that ideas or behaviours that are different are tolerated by the society to 
a certain limit if they are first accepted as being within the range of what they deem as ‘normal’ 
by the members of society. Therefore, protecting human rights of individuals and minorities cannot 
be governed solely by the principle of acceptance by the majority. A good example of the foregoing 
is the decision of the Swiss government to hold a referendum on the question of building minarets, 
where the majority, out of their lack of acceptance, voted for banning minarets in the country. This 
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was done in spite of strong objections from human rights organisations.777 
Within the two approaches outlined above, the line is drawn dependent on the attitude of 
the state towards a practice as it relates to the national community. Laws and attitudes are then 
established based not on thought and belief but on the public practices which accompany beliefs. 
Whether a state follows the attitude of Mill or that of other thinkers, they must accept religious 
difference, which includes the belief of some groups that those who do not believe as they do are 
immoral sinners. State governments, however, are not required to accept religious action, 
particularly that which is violent and infringes on the rights of others. Extreme cases such as 
murder and torture are simpler to apply to toleration approaches, as the unacceptability of these 
actions is clear; it is far more complicated to try and place practices which are unclear and uncertain 
in their relationship to others, and whether or not they violation the freedoms of other groups. The 
ruling of the ECtHR was more in line with the latter, as the court did not put forward a convincing 
argument for the argument that the headscarf constitutes a violation of the rights of others. 
  Determining whether a religious practice has an overall harmful effect on a society is, 
therefore, extremely difficult. To return to Mill, he argues that “[E]ven opinions lose their 
immunity when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their 
expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act.”778  
This sentiment has been cemented by the US judicial system, which professes that 
expression which can be considered as having a "clear and present danger” is open to state 
intervention. This indicates that one can believe whatever they wish and express it openly, except 
in cases where there exists a tight causal nexus between speech and action.779 The Rawlsian 
approach is similar in its outcome, though the metaphors Rawls employs are different: stating that 
the threat to freedoms and rights is “securely established by common experience". This approach 
allows that the infringement not be as direct as Mill asserts, or as tangible as that dictated by the 
US government, as it allows for the relationship between attitude and action to be “securely 
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established”, which must be both ‘immediate and imminent’. For example, the practice of carrying 
a Sikh kirpan (a ceremonial knife or sword) as a religious symbol or requirement of faith is not 
banned in Canada due to the importance of religious diversity and the putatively slight risk of 
harm.780 
 
5.6. Protection of tolerance as an ECtHR justification for the ban on wearing of the 
headscarf  
In the past, some cultures have attempted to remove religious discourse from its state 
apparatus and public life. Attempts to suppress religious expression have been observed in the 
spheres of education, health, law enforcement and other secular bodies. It is generally accepted 
that, despite the often personal nature of religious belief, religious manifestation can be suppressed 
or prevented by citing ECHR codes of conduct, article 9 in particular. In this article, the means by 
which these expressions can be controlled should not be interpreted broadly, as any restrictions on 
religious manifestations often require specific evidence and justification. Therefore, for any 
judicial body to take action against religious expression there must be the provision of specific 
evidence; this may be difficult due to the shaky concept of acceptable religious expression. 
Tolerance, then, is a useful concept when attempting to defend various forms of religious 
expressions. In addition, legal establishments often see tolerance and related virtues as being 
highly civilised and democratic. This can be evidenced by the observations of the ECtHR, who 
asserted that Pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are hallmarks of a “democratic society”.781 
Despite the foregoing, the ECtHR in some cases has used the concept of ‘protection of tolerance’ 
as a justification to restrict religious manifestation, most notably wearing of headscarf by Muslim 
females. For example, the court stated during the proceedings for Dahlab v Swiss that: 
 “…In those circumstances, it cannot be denied outright that the wearing of a headscarf 
might have some kind of proselytising effect, seeing that it appears to be imposed on women by a 
precept which is laid down in the Koran and which, as the Federal Court noted, is hard to square 
with the principle of gender equality. It therefore appears difficult to reconcile the wearing of an 
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Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and 
non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their pupils.” 782   
This was also true of Leyla v Turkey.783 With reference to the Refah case, ‘tolerance’ was 
cited as a vital component of any democratic state. One should keep in mind that in the two 
aforementioned cases, the judges stated that governments were largely responsible for the upkeep 
of cooperation and cohesiveness in society. The ruling in the case Şahin of also stated that: 
“…The Court has frequently emphasised the State’s role as the neutral and impartial 
organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs, and stated that this role is 
conducive to public order, religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society. It also 
considers that the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any power on the 
State’s part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs and that it requires the State to ensure 
mutual tolerance between opposing groups.” 784  
Focusing on the Refah proceedings, the court asserted that attempts to establish a Sharia-
based judicial code was an effort based on inequality, subjugation, and violence, and was a 
detriment to harmony and progress. The court stated that:  
“… such a system would undeniably infringe the principle of non-discrimination between 
individuals as regards their enjoyment of public freedoms, which is one of the fundamental 
principles of democracy. A difference in treatment between individuals in all fields of public and 
private law according to their religion or beliefs manifestly cannot be justified under the 
Convention, and more particularly Article 14 thereof, which prohibits discrimination. Such a 
difference in treatment cannot maintain a fair balance between, on the one hand, the claims of 
certain religious groups who wish to be governed by their own rules and on the other the interest 
of society as a whole, which must be based on peace and on tolerance between the various religions 
and beliefs”785. 
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  While ‘tolerance’ was cited in both instances, it is important to distinguish between 
politically charged cases such as the Refah case, and that which relates to the headscarf and its 
place in educational environments. In the former case, the Refah Party, like all political parties, 
sought to control societal norms and gain political power in order to impose its vision of a social 
order on the rest of society. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that political organisations which have 
religious foundations are frequently accused of infringing on freedoms and attacking human rights. 
There were some academics and lawyers like Professor Boyle who disapproved of the methods 
and reasons used to issue the order to dissolve the Refah Party786; if one assumes the eventual 
ruling to be based on fact, and the Refah party did stand a chance at achieving real political power 
and to implement Sharia law within the state, one would agree that the ruling was fair and that the 
party represented a significant attack on liberty and tolerance. As in the characteristic of the 
tolerance mentioned, tolerance can only exist if there is an actual possibility of suppressing the 
group being tolerated, but the tolerant group avoids to use the opportunity to suppress. Experience 
proves that political parties based on religious ideology most likely use the power to crackdown 
on dissenting views and they have no tolerance for religious minorities. Examples of this include 
Iran787, Saudi Arabia, the Taliban in Afghanistan788 and ISIL789  that have no tolerance except for 
the dominant religion. Thus, its ability to gain power in parliament together with its consistent 
promotion of Sharia as a legitimate system rendered the Refah party dangerous to groups which 
did not adhere to practices prescribed by Sharia within Turkey. It is also important to point out that 
intolerance against religious expression may sometimes be embedded into state policy. In other 
words, restriction on religious expression is not merely confined to states with religious bases, but 
this policy is actively pursued by states like China and North Korea. For example, Tibetan 
Buddhists and Chinese Catholics have two sets of leaders, one set appointed by the Chinese 
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government, and another shadow clergy chosen outside China’s borders.790 Regarding the wearing 
of Islamic symbols authorities in Xinjian banned people wearing hijabs, niqabs, burqas or clothing 
with the Islamic star and crescent symbol from taking local buses.791 It is also true that tolerance 
applies to subjects that people care and are concerned about.  Alongside the attempts to implement 
a judicial system based on Sharia, the Refah party publicly expressed its intention to re-enact laws 
obliging women to wear headscarf, with one of their key legal stances being the lifting of the ban 
on headscarves in Turkey. Erbakan, the then chairman of the Refah party, was very vocal about a 
return to the wearing of the headscarf, stating that: 
 “... when we were in government, for four years, the notorious Article 163 of the Persecution 
Code was never applied against any child in the country. In our time there was never any question 
of hostility to the wearing of headscarves ...”792  
At the end of 1995, he also stated that:  
“... [University] chancellors are going to retreat before the headscarf when Refah comes to 
power.”793 The words of the leader of the Refah Party demonstrate a significant concern with 
regard to the issue of the wearing of the headscarf. Hence, if the Refah Party assumed a position 
of power, the party may have exerted pressure on Muslim females who were not wearing the 
headscarf to take up the practice. The Turkish government is required by ECtHR to follow 
principles of neutrality and impartiality in dealing with their citizens.794 Therefore, if a government 
insists that Turkish women wear the headscarf, this would violate the principle of equal treatment 
amongst its citizens. As the leader of the Refah Party approached the wearing of headscarf from a 
religious perspective, he considered it a religious virtue that gives women dignity. This implies 
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that women who do not wear the headscarf are, according to the Refah Party’s position, deprived 
of this virtue. Such a view automatically divides a society into those who are more virtuous and 
less virtuous believers. Therefore, equating to a form of intolerance against the latter795. 
While considered by some to be a pre-emptive strike against the Refah party and inspired 
by the desire to support the public safety, order and secularism796, the decision can be justified to 
some extent if one acknowledges that some attributes of the party together with its rhetoric are not 
compatible with the concept of religious tolerance. This is due to the perception of the party as an 
extremist religious group which aimed to marginalise and eradicate other beliefs and practices 
through discriminative legal and individual action. 
Although there is a substantial difference between the goals and structure of the political 
parties and education institutions, the court has equally used the concept of protection of religious 
tolerance to restrict religious manifestation in both political parties and education institutions. 
Political parties primarily wish to govern a country and gain access to power; however, the main 
mission and objective of education systems is to ensure the transition of knowledge. It is generally 
accepted that the role of education should go beyond the development of knowledge, and education 
institutions are now forums for personal development and attitude building, as education 
encompasses matters of community and social cohesion, aiding the youth to embrace tolerance 
and acceptance of differences.797 From the ECtHR perspective the headscarf has been a point of 
contention as it has not been embraced under the umbrella of ‘tolerance’ in a number of 
institutions. If one agrees with the assertion that schools should be places of tolerance and open 
mindedness, it is difficult to argue this point with regard to the headscarf issue. As already 
established, tolerance can only be achieved if that which is being tolerated is different from one’s 
own beliefs or practices. In the aforementioned cases, the applicants who initiated legal 
proceedings had fundamentally different convictions than the other group. Especially with 
reference to Dahlab and Leyla, it is important to note, the Muslim women concerned may have 
considered the religious expressions of those at their schools to be incorrect; it is true, however, 
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that the argument presented by the court did not encompass other facets of tolerance, including the 
ability to take action against what is perceived to be incorrect, inappropriate or immoral. In the 
presented cases, even if Dahlab and Leyla wished to object to a practice or promote an agenda, 
there was no power to do so.798 This was because both cases occurred in countries where the 
majority of women do not wear headscarf in the area of work, therefore the applicants did not 
represent a dominant party. In addition, laws in Turkey and Switzerland oblige the staff in 
educational institutions not to discriminate against any belief or practice and maintain their 
neutrality with respect to different religions and their manifestations. It is also against code of 
conduct for teachers to attempt to promote religious agendas to the students and/or to state matters 
of belief as matters of fact, which may be considered indoctrination.  
In the reviewed cases, then, the roles of the applicant and the defendant were not accurately 
established. If one applies conceptions of tolerance to this process, it is clear that the power lies in 
the hands of the state to be either tolerant or intolerant towards religious dress. In the related cases, 
for example, the wearers of the headscarf are not the parties with power and they are not able to 
suppress the rights and freedoms of others. If one adheres to the outlined definitions of tolerance, 
Leyla and Dahlab and their religious expressions are surely the ones which are to be tolerated, 
rather than to adopt a judicial approach which itself leads to intolerance. Taylor asserts that the 
claim that Dahlab was attempting to promote a religious agenda through the wearing of the 
headscarf raises doubts as to the presence of pluralism in the state; pluralism is not compatible 
with a regime in which one is condemned for expression their religious inclinations openly.799 The 
ban on religious dress in academic settings, particularly if the individual is from a minority group, 
means then that the individual is the subject of the intolerance rather than the instigator. It is also 
notable that so much of the ECtHR’s reasoning is based in mere speculation; the court, in this case, 
returned again and again to the presence of a “proselytising effect” which they claimed could not 
be ruled out. 
In most cases, the ECtHR emphasized the need to “ensure mutual tolerance between 
                                                          
798 It should be noted that restrictive secular systems, such as France, focus more on banning the religious symbols 
rather than the actual power to impose specific religious view. Hence, even in the above example, it is the religion 
symbols that are banned. In this chapter, the researcher challenges the rationale behind applying the concept of 
tolerance to justify the ban of the headscarf, not secularism itself. 
799 Paul M. Taylor, Freedom of religion: UN and European human rights law and practice (Cambridge University 
Press, 2005) 255,256. 
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opposing groups”800, which refers to the impartiality of the state when it comes to matters of belief; 
they are also required to create a space in which opposing beliefs can be expressed, discussed and 
challenged in a contained manner.  When it comes to matters of religion, toleration is based upon 
the assumption that the groups in question must peacefully co- exist within the same societal space, 
even in cases where one group or both groups are reluctant to do so. Tolerance, then, can be 
considered more a matter of societal harmony than an issue of personal expression.  
When considered in relation to human rights and equality, states may not show a bias 
towards any one religious or ethnic group, or preference of any one belief over another. In most 
societies, an element of unease between groups with differing beliefs and practices is 
commonplace, and it is the responsibility of the government to allow these groups to live alongside 
one another without infringing on principles of pluralism and democratic process. An example of 
this can be found in the case of Handyside v UK801, in which the court stated that freedom of 
expression can also be extended to those ideas which offend, are deemed to be unpalatable or those 
which outrage. Ideally, a society should accept that intercommunity tension exists and may never 
be completely eradicated, only managed; attempts should not be made to eradicate this tension 
then, for fear that fundamental rights may be attacked, but instead attempts should be made to 
ensure that coexistence is achieved  and that“…the competing groups Tolerate Each other”.802 As 
asserted by Lord Walker, the way in which the court often treats human rights, means that there is 
very rarely a “liberal tolerance only tolerant liberals”.803 In addition, Judge Tulkan highlighted the 
need for openness and tolerance if democracy and peace is to be preserved, when she stated the 
following:  
“pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are hallmarks of a democratic society and this 
entails certain consequences. The first is that these ideals and values of a democratic society must 
also be based on dialogue and a spirit of compromise, which necessarily entails mutual 
concessions on the part of individuals. The second is that the role of the authorities in such 
circumstances is not to remove the cause of the tensions by eliminating pluralism, but, as the Court 
                                                          
800 Şahin v Turkey (Application no. 44774/98) (ECHR, 10 November 2005) ECHR 819, para 107. 
801  Handyside v. United Kingdom (Application No.5493/72, A/24) (07 December 1976) ECHR 5. 
802Serif v. Greece (Application no.38178/97) (14 December 1999) EHRR 561, para 53. 
803 Cited in Mark Hill ‘Interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights in the United Kingdom Courts: The 
Impact for Religious Organisations’ (2007) Centre for Law and Religion, Cardiff University,p 1, 26. 
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again reiterated only recently, to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each other”.804  
The ECtHR, through the aforementioned legal proceedings, have considered religious 
garments an indicator of religious intolerance; not only this, but they have also questioned the 
tenets or principles of Islamic faith when commenting that: 
 “…it cannot be denied outright that the wearing of a headscarf might have some kind of 
proselytising effect, seeing that it appears to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down 
in the Koran and which, as the Federal Court noted, is hard to square with the principle of gender 
equality. It therefore appears difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the 
message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all 
teachers in a democratic society must convey to their pupils”. On a similar note, with regard to 
the Refah proceedings, the court asserted that “sharia, which faithfully reflects the dogmas and 
divine rules laid down by religion, is stable and invariable…it is difficult to declare one’s respect 
for democracy and human rights while at the same time supporting a regime based on Sharia”.805 
Further, the court stated that “the fundamental principles of democracy as conceived in the 
convention taken as a whole” could not coexist with Sharia law, which inevitably manifests itself 
in both private and public ways.806  It could be argued that the court has been rather harsh in its 
assessment of Islam; it is true, however, that the court puts into practice what is set out in the 
convention and must make rulings based on these principles. If a judge, then, initiated proceedings 
over holy texts, this would be inappropriate, even if there was a regulatory body of experts present. 
Problems with interpreting religious texts are frequent and conflict exist over this process even 
within the religious group themselves; it is therefore even more difficult for the state and court to 
involve themselves in matters of religious interpretation. In the Quran, some assert that there are 
passages which profess that Muslim woman must dress ‘modestly’; however, interpretations of 
these sections are a matter of much discussion within the Islamic community. Some Muslim 
women take these passages to mean the wearing of the headscarf, while others take this to mean 
                                                          
804  Dissenting view of Tulkan in the case Şahin v Turkey (Application no. 44774/98) (ECHR, 10 November 2005) 
ECHR 819. See also:  Ouranio Toxo and Others v. Greece (Application no. 74989/01) (20 October 2005) EHRR 8, 
IHRL 2806. 
805 Refah party and other v Turkey (Application nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98) (ECHR, 13 February 
2003) ECHR 491, ECHR 87, ECHR 495. 
806Refah party and other v Turkey (Application nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98) (ECHR, 13 February 
2003) ECHR 491, ECHR 87, ECHR 495. 
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full body coverings, which has been a matter of much legal discourse in the cases of ‘Begum807’ 
and ‘X’.808  
Often the way in which the individual chooses to dress is matter of textual and traditional 
interpretation. The head of the UK Committee for Inter-Faith maintains that appropriate religious 
symbols and dress are subject which must be discussed within the community themselves, rather 
than by outside legal bodies.809 In this regard Lord Bingham in the case of Begum said “It would 
in my opinion be irresponsible of any court, lacking the experience, background and detailed 
knowledge of the head teacher, staff and governors, to overrule their judgement on a matter as 
sensitive as this. The power of decision has been given to them for the compelling reason that they 
are best placed to exercise it. And I see no reason to disturb their decision.” 810  
  As such, those in the court should not have jurisdiction over religious text, particularly as 
the vast majority of members are non-Muslim and are often uninformed with regard to the 
specificities of Islam. It is not obvious which legal mechanisms were used when the ECtHR judges 
arrived at their conclusion, in a stark contrast with some Islamic scholars, that wearing of the 
headscarf and Islam cannot be compatible with tolerance and human rights. The decisions of the 
court are contradictory with judicial precedent, as evidenced by the decisions made in the case of 
Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria811; here, the court asserted that it was outside the jurisdiction of the 
public authority to determine whether religious beliefs, or the means used to express these beliefs, 
are legitimate.  
The best way to deal with the issue of religions is to encourage countries to avoid types of 
religious interpretation that lead to violence and suppression against women, as well as not 
appointing themselves religious scholars tasked with interpreting the religion of others. In this 
regard, PACE, or the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, has encouraged Muslim 
groups to move away from highly conservative or traditional conceptions of Islamic text, as these 
                                                          
807  (On the application of Begum (by her litigation friend Rahman)) v Headteacher and Governor of Denbigh High 
School (20006) UKHL 15 (22 March 2006); Heather Marie Akou, ‘Interpreting Islam through the Internet: making 
sense of hijab’ (2010) 4 Cont Islam 331. See also:   Tabassum F. Ruby, ‘Listening to the Voices of Hijab’ (2006) 29 
Women’s Studies International Forum 54. See also:  Lacey Sloan, ‘Women’s Oppression or Choice? One American’s 
View on Wearing the Hijab’ (2011) 26(2) Affilia: Journal of Women and Social work, Sage 218. 
808 X v Y School [2007] EWHC 298 at [26 et seq] 
809 Sylvie Bacquet, ‘Manifestation of Belief and Religious Symbols at School: Setting Boundaries in English Courts.’ 
(2009) 4.2 Religion & Human Rights 121, 132. 
810  (On the application of Begum (by her litigation friend Rahman)) v Headteacher and Governor of Denbigh High 
School [20006] UKHL 15 (22 March 2006). Para.34. 
811Hasan and chaush v Bulgaria (Application no.30985/96) (ECHR, 26 October 2000) 34 EHR55. 
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interpretations often advocate for the suppression of women and their rights.812  
The UN Special Rapporteur, when addressing religious disharmony, stated the following: 
“dress should not be the subject of political regulation and calls for flexible and tolerant attitude 
in this regard, so as to allow the variety and richness of . . . garments to manifest themselves 
without constrain”813. If one wears a headscarf, then, this is not an indication that tolerance has 
been abandoned, or that there is not an appreciation of other beliefs and practices.814 A commission 
in the Netherlands which concerns itself with Equal Treatment puts forward that if one holds 
beliefs which are represented by the headscarf, this “does not preclude her having an open attitude 
and being capable of teaching in accordance with the character of the school as a public 
educational institution”.815 
Intolerance, often stems from an intentional and pre-existing negative conception of a 
group of people; it does not happen suddenly or as a result of a specific event but, instead, exists 
in private thought before emerging in oppressive public speech or action. Although the headscarf 
may be worn as a result of pre-existence awareness and personal faith, the headscarf itself, as a 
piece of material, does not imply any hostility or intolerant message toward other religions. As 
such, it poses no legitimate danger, as it is an inactive signifier of religion, much like a necklace 
with the cross for Christians; it cannot actively suppress the beliefs or practices of others.  
When considering the case of Dahlab to that of Lautsi v Italy816, one notices that there is a 
significant difference in how these cases were treated by the court. In the latter, the court accepted 
that the cross or the crucifix in this case, was not an imposition on student faith when displayed in 
the classroom. The court, then, admits that passive symbols of faith are not an issue of intolerance; 
it can be argued, then, that there is an inconsistency that the court consider the headscarf 
differently, as was the case with Dahlab. The crucifix and the headscarf, if one conducts a 
comparative and deductive assessment, are extremely alike in that they are both passive symbols 
                                                          
812  Resolution 1743(2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the council of Europe page 24 Para 16. 
<http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-EN.asp?FileID=17880&lang=EN> accessed 10 
September 2017. 
813 Cited in Bahia Tahzib-Lie, ‘Applying a Gender Perspective in the Area of the Right to Freedom of Religion or 
Belief’ (2000) 2000. 3 BYU L. Rev 967, 983. 
814 Sawitri Saharso, ‘Culture, Tolerance and Gender: a Contribution from the Netherlands’ (2003) 10.1 European 
Journal of Women's Studies 7, 16. 
815 Cited in Sawitri Saharso, ‘Headscarves: a comparison of public thought and public policy in Germany and the 
Netherlands’ (2007) 10.4 Critical review of international social and political philosophy 513, 520. 
816 (Application no. 30814/00) [2011] Eq LR 633, [2011] ECHR 2412, (2012) 54 EHRR 3, [2011] ELR 176, 30 BHRC 
429. 
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of faith. In neither case concerning Muslim individuals wearing headscarves in schools did the 
court provide compelling reasons that the garment imposed any religious conviction onto the 
students.817 The crucifix, on the other hand, was not considered by the court to be a symbol 
necessary for Christian education and so it is perhaps unreasonable to assume that the headscarf 
acts as a teaching tool for Islamic thought. The court also professed, in the case of Lautsi, that the 
presence of religious imagery did not concern the court particularly, as the important factor was 
the virtues of tolerance and openness being taught in schools, an argument which can also be used 
in the case of Dahlab, a fact overlooked by the court. Further, Tulkens points out the contradictions 
present in the cases of Gündüz and Sahin, as the state of Turkey initiated legal proceedings against 
Gündüz818 on the grounds that he promoted Sharia law on public television, despite the fact that 
he did not advocate any violent acts; the state, then,  were acting in breach of Article 10. As pointed 
out by Tulkens, ‘‘manifesting one’s religion by peacefully wearing a headscarf may be prohibited 
whereas, in the same context, remarks which could be construed as incitement to religious hatred 
are covered by freedom of expression”.819 
It could be argued that the court’s decision, somewhat wrongly, portrays Muslim women, 
as preaching intolerance through their dress. It is the logic of the court, then, that Islamic nations 
should address intolerance in their societies, as the court argues that that tolerance should be 
practiced in all areas of life.  It is also true that the UDHR describes educational spaces as those 
which must “promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or 
religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of 
peace”820. If one posits, as the court does, that the headscarf, when worn by an educated woman, 
                                                          
817 Carolyn Evans, ‘The Islamic Scarf in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2006) 7 Melb. J. Int'l L 1, 8. For 
further information see: Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1138 (2009) (No. 07-665 (US). Also see: 
Leslie C Griffin, ‘Fighting the New Wars of Religion: The Need for a Tolerant First Amendment’ (2010) 62.1 
University of Houston Main Law Review 23.  Regarding this case Leslie C observed that  First Amendment of the 
U.S. constitution  imposes two requirements that the Court has ignored: first, it recognizes that crosses and the Ten 
Commandments retain their religious character and are not secular; second, it allows such religious displays to stand 
only if they are surrounded by other religious monuments and symbols, such as, the Summum Aphorisms, the 
Buddhist stupa, the Jewish Star of David, the Muslim crescent and star, or the Wiccan pentacle. Instead, the Court has 
employed a "tyranny of labels". 
818 Gündüz v. Turkey (27633/02) (2006) ECHR 709. 
819 Şahin v Turkey (Application no. 44774/98) (ECHR, 10 November 2005) ECHR 819, Dissinting opinion of Judge 
Tulkens; see also: Nicholas Gibson, ‘Faith in the Courts: Religious Dress and Human Rights’ (2007) 66.03 The 
Cambridge Law Journal 657, 675. For more information see case: Eweidand Chaplin v. UK (Application no. 
48420/10) (12 April 2011]) ECHR 738 the nation court followed idea that invisible cross is not sighing of 
indoctrination. Gündüz v. Turkey 27633/02) (2006) ECHR 709 at para. 46- 51. 
820 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), Article 26(2). 
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is a sign of intolerance when worn in a school, then it is fair to assume that the court considers this 
more of a threat when practiced by an individual with a lower level of education in the public 
space.   
Legal issues concerning the headscarf have been a topic of much debate in the West, 
particularly in the UK, the US and Canada, where Muslim women can wear what they choose. In 
Canada specifically, some religious symbols like kirpan which can be considered a threat to health 
and safety are tolerated, as the rights and freedoms of the people have been prioritised by the 
government and the court. The Canadian court has been forthright in advocating tolerance in all 
areas; in the case of the Sikh kirpan821, some students argued that a fellow student’s possession of 
the blade was unfair while they themselves were prohibited from carrying knives, but the court 
argued that schools more to educate students on religious diversity and tolerance. If the kirpan was 
to be banned in the school, this indicates to the students that some religious traditions are not as 
important or as worthy of preservation than others, such as the presence of a crucifix in the 
classroom. Gurbaj Singh was permitted to carry the Kirpan if he adhered to a number of conditions, 
which demonstrates a high level of tolerance on the part of the school and the court and a respect 
for the principle of freedom of religious expression.822 
 In a US hiring standards case823, Samantha Elauf wore a headscarf to the interview for a 
job in retail; later, the interviewer, Heather Cooke, stated that Elauf was a good and fit candidate 
for the job but questioned other managers in the store with regard to the headscarf and its 
connection to Elauf’s faith. Cooke was then informed by the district manager that Elauf would not 
be hired due to the headscarf, which it was claimed would be at odds with the image of the 
company. Legal proceedings which followed ruled in favour of Cooke and the company, arguing 
that individuals are required to explain any religious reasons for their choice of dress or garments, 
and that the employer has the right to refuse employment on the basis that an item of clothing 
breaches company policy. It is true, however, that in this case there was no consensus amongst the 
judges in the appeal court as to the final verdict; Judge Alito, for example, asserted that: 
“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire . 
                                                          
821 Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, 2006 SCC 6. 
822Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, 2006 SCC 6; See also: Lori G. 
Beaman, ‘It was all slightly unreal”: What's Wrong with Tolerance and Accommodation in the Adjudication of 
Religious Freedom?’ (2011) 23.2 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 442. 
823 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 575 U.S. (2015). 
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. . any individual . . . because of [any aspect of] such individual’s . . . religious . . . practice . . . 
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to [the] employee’s 
or prospective employee’s religious . . . practice . . . without undue hardship on the conduct of the 
employer’s business”.824  
The US Supreme Court, notably, which prides itself on the virtues of freedom and 
tolerance, ruled in favour of Elauf. Jenny Yang, the head of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, responded to this ruling by stating the following: “This ruling protects the rights of 
workers to equal treatment in the workplace without having to sacrifice their religious beliefs or 
practices”.825 
The UN Special Rapporteur Abdelfattah Amor expressed a similar sentiment, though with 
more emphasis on increased tolerance towards religious dress in public institutions.  
Amor has also highlighted, following an official visit to Iran, that religious practice and 
dress should be treated with open mindedness and respect, but conceded that this should not be 
used as a political tool. He also asserted that religious expression should be encouraged and 
embraced to avoid a culture of fear and repression, or of religious indoctrination. When it comes 
to matters of education, he encouraged teachers and students to adorn religious dress, though only 
for certain purposes and under certain conditions.826 If religious dress is culturally non-offensive 
and if it is used primarily to express personal faith without proven correlation between wearing of 
headscarf and intolerance then there should be no problems raised with it, even by state bodies.827 
As far as the freedom of religious manifestation is concerned, these practices should only 
be suppressed according to the exceptions outlined in the Covenant (second paragraph, article 9). 
Any attempt to suppress religious expression must be supported by a legitimate claim that the 
practice is a threat to “public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and 
                                                          
824 Lawerence Hurely, ‘U.S. top court backs Muslim women denied job over head scarf’ (Washington 1 June 
2015):Available online at:  <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/world/2015/06/02/U-S-top-court-backs-Muslim-
woman-denied-job-over-head-scarf.html[acceswed>  Accessed  13 May2016 
825 Cited in Jana Kasperkevech, ‘Top US court Rules for Muslim Woman Denied Abercrombie Job over Hijab’ (New 
York 1 June 2015) Available online at: 
<http://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/jun/01/supreme-court-rules-favor-muslim-woman-hijab-abercrombie-
fitch.> Accessed 13-05-2016. Similarly in the case Sumayyah Mohammed v. Moraniec(1995) 49 WIR 37; (action 
3000A of 1994)  in Trinidad and Tobago related to hijab the Supreme Court observed that enforce the girl to remove 
hijab is irrational and unlawful. 
826 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/95/Add.2 (1996), para. 97 (Iran). 
827 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/63 (2001), p. 7, para. 17 (Azerbaijan). And also see: (UN Doc. A/56/253 (2001), p. 48, 
para. 2 (Azerbaijan). 
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freedoms of others”. Further, these attempts must be approached within the scope of 
‘proportionality828’, as even in cases where there is a legitimate threat, the degree to which the 
state should impose restrictions must be minimal. In other words, the limitation of freedoms must 
always be confined to the minimum degree of interference that is necessary to pursue a legitimate 
goal. This is primarily in the interest of preserving values of tolerance and religious freedom, even 
in extreme cases. The response given to a perceived violation of these principles should, then, be 
comparable to the importance of the principle being threatened. 
  The ECtHR employs the principle of proportionality in all of its jurisprudence; an element 
of proportion is needed to justify any response to a potential violation. This proportionality is 
reliant on three factors: effectiveness/suitability, necessity, and the requirement of proportionality 
in the strict sense.829  In terms of effectiveness and necessity, this refers to how aims and apparatus 
interact to form a response to a threat. If intervention is found to be unnecessary, ineffective or 
inappropriate, then the intervention should not take place; this may be because the means are 
inexistent or that a less severe approach may prove to be more successful.  
When one analyses the history of the ECtHR with regard to court decisions on the 
headscarf, alongside conceptions of tolerance cited during these court proceedings, several 
inconsistencies emerge. If the restrictions on the headscarf were imposed for the sole aim of 
promoting tolerance and protecting freedoms, then this contrasts with common interpretations of 
tolerance, which consist of coexistence and an embracing of diversity830, which the ban directly 
opposes. Harmony and peace cannot come from strictness with regard to what can be worn, for 
what reason and by whom, regardless of the setting. If the aim of the ban was to maintain tolerance, 
then this measure cannot be deemed appropriate. It is, however, important to note that there may 
have been other considerations which influenced the ECtHR’s decisions apart from tolerance, such 
as secularism. 
  As mentioned previously, the third factor was that proportionality is not absolute, and is 
dependent on how the factors at work interact. This factor is concerned with an equivalency being 
                                                          
828 Tor-Inge Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law (2010) 16:2 European Law Journal, 
158.  
829 Janneke Gerards, ‘How to Improve the Necessity test of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2013) 11.2 
International journal of constitutional law 466, 469. See also: Tor‐Inge Harbo, ‘The function of the proportionality 
principle in EU law’ (2010) 16.2 European Law Journal 158. 
830 Kristen Deede Johnson, Theology, Political Theory, and Pluralism: Beyond Tolerance and Difference. (Vol. 15. 
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struck between positive outcomes of the intervention and the potential harmfully consequences; 
this is arguably the most important factor to members of the court. Again, religious freedoms may 
be restricted if they constitute a threat to freedoms of others, as per Article 9, (2); and this may 
present itself in a number of very different ways and to different degrees.831 It can be argued, 
however, that the ECtHR does not uphold this principle well in cases which involve the headscarf, 
as previous examples has demonstrated arguably disproportionate measures to intervene despite 
few interests being served by the measures. It is thus submitted that the cases which have been 
discussed demonstrate the frequency with which the courts suppress the religious manifestation of 
one group without producing any significant benefits for other groups involved.   
 
5.7. Conclusion 
From the inception of the term, toleration towards the religious beliefs of other people was 
a requirement in European nations to remedy the issue of religious conflict and civil unrest. This 
came about due to the realisation that true religious belief could not be coerced or formed 
involuntarily, and so religious conflict with the aim to conformity to the dominant religion was 
futile; tolerance arose as an alternative to violence.  
Modern day religious unrest and unease is not a geographically specific phenomenon, but 
rather a global occurrence which presents itself in a number of ways. The absence of tolerance can 
lead to atrocious acts, such as murder, violence, torture, terrorism and attacks on human rights; 
this is still the case in areas of Syria and Iraq. As a consequence, most nations have identified the 
need for immediate action to prevent acts of intolerance and promote cooperation between 
different religious groups. This has been evidenced by the creation of multiple policies and acts in 
support of tolerance, and the UN and its related bodies have explicitly stated their commitment to 
addressing intolerance. The Human Rights Conventions and other related organisations have been 
proactive in advocating tolerance and opposing oppression on religious grounds where they find 
it and consider tolerance a virtue which must exist on a global scale if peace is to be secured. 
Tolerance is vital to any society which wishes to be considered developed and the UN assert 
“tolerance and pluralism as indivisible elements in the promotion and protection of Human 
                                                          
831 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and others v. Moldavia (Application No. 45701/99) (13 December 2001) 
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Rights”.832 The UN acknowledges that tolerance is a vital component of any democratic process 
and also of overall civil wellbeing. It has also equally been acknowledged by the UN that 
acceptance and diversity is essential to the maintenance of a peaceful and successful nation, as it 
enhances national culture.  
While there are concrete answers and legitimate empiricism in science, where one solution 
will be agreed upon as correct, matters of ethics and religion are far more divisive and often never 
result in objective truths.833 Truths which relate to morality and lived experience are only agreed 
upon in societies which enforce a specific way of life. When groups of people are given the 
freedom to come to their own conclusions about morality and faith, tolerance and difference thrive. 
This has been illustrated by the history of political philosophy where in current circumstances; our 
central question is not Plato’s question - ‘what is the best way to live?’ – but rather the most 
fundamental question is ‘how should we live together given that we cannot agree about the best 
way to live?’.834 It can be argued that these affirmations have been largely set aside by the ECtHR 
in its rulings, as they have been using tolerance as a tool with which to further undermine Muslim 
women by curtailing their autonomy and freedom of choice with regard to the wearing of the 
headscarf. In apparent disregard of general conceptions of tolerance, the court has presented a form 
of religious expression, wearing of the headscarf, as an affront to tolerance, which to this researcher 
seems a self-contradictory pattern of thought.  
Tolerance, on a fundamental level, is based on an appreciation of religious or ethical 
convictions and centres upon acceptance. Accepting that others have different beliefs and practices 
is a cornerstone of harmonious societies and personal wellbeing; this requires individuals to rid 
themselves of their mistrust of the ‘other’ and accept difference. Those who disapprove of 
tolerance argue that diversity threatens the integrity of a society, though they themselves may be 
the subject of intolerant behavior.835 The legal system, however, purports to be an institution 
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Benjamin L.  Berger, ‘The Cultural Limits of Legal Tolerance’ (2008) 21.02 The Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 245. 
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committed to evidentiary justice, logical and legal reasoning. However, on closer examination its 
processes uncover a number of inconsistencies in this approach. Particularly in the cases involving 
Muslim women and the headscarf, it can be argued that the findings and conclusions regarding the 
relationship between intolerance and the wearing of the headscarf were based on conjecture and 
presumption, and the court failed to present a sound and sustainable rationale for its claim. The 
rulings made also seems to disregard the principle of proportionality which is the fundamental aim 
of intervention with regard to religious practice; there has not, in these cases, been an established 
or proven equivalency in the threat observed and the measures taken, nor between the harm done 
to one group and the benefit received by the other. The thinking surrounding tolerance tends to 
have the maintenance of peace as the key objective or outcome and most scholars consider 
tolerance conducive to harmonious coexistence. It can be argued that the ban on the veil, which is 
supposedly due to the protection of tolerance, has been unsuccessful in this aim, as it has only 
promoted division and eroded mutual respect between different sections of society.  
Differences in religious belief and religious practice exist in all areas of life, including in 
education, and questions as to whether the headscarf is appropriate in an educational setting should 
not be met with suspicion, fear and suppression, but rather with respect and acceptance. It is, a 
fundamental right for students and staff to be able to practice their religion in the way that they 
choose to, which includes the wearing of religious clothing and adornments. The acceptance of 
religious items in schools creates the idea early on that people are diverse in their thoughts and 
actions, and prepares children for the diversity of the wider world. In this sense, guaranteeing the 
freedom of manifesting one’s religious beliefs and prevention of religious suppression can raise 
levels of awareness and tolerance, thus promoting the observation and preservation of fundamental 
human rights.    
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CHAPTER SIX: 
Concluding Chapter 
6.1. Introduction  
This thesis has explored the role of the headscarf in the rulings and policy decisions of the 
ECtHR and within the framework of article 9 of the ECHR; the ECtHR has cited the protection of 
tolerance and democracy, as well as the importance of safeguarding against fundamentalism, as 
the reasoning behind their decisions in key cases such as Şahin and Dahlab. The motivation for 
this research originated from a fascination with adjudicative the processes institutions have gone 
through in order to address whether there is a direct, or indirect, relationship between the following 
three phenomena: the headscarf, fundamentalism, and intolerance. Key to this work is the 
argument that ECtHR has not conclusively established the link between the headscarf, and those 
who wear it, and a rise in fundamentalism, dogmatism and intolerance. Based on this argument, 
one could further submit that the court decisions concerning the ban the headscarf, on the ground 
it represents a symbol of fundamentalism and tolerance intolerance, may be considered as 
unfounded, an affront to human rights and inconsistence with other the ECtHR judicial decisions 
such as Handyside v UK , Chaush v Bulgaria and Folgerø v. Norway.836   
This chapter, the conclusion, will present the findings and recommendations of the thesis. 
Beginning with the introduction, this research outlined and evaluated the basic context of the topic 
and addressed the relevant case studies. The first chapter dealt with international approaches to the 
headscarf and the surrounding legal issues, as well as touching on the two key stances addressed 
in this thesis: the feminist approach and the traditional religious approach regarding the wearing 
of the headscarf.  The second chapter moved on to an overview of the existing literature on the 
topic, with a greater focus on a few key sources, chosen from both Islamic and secular writers; 
these sources were assessed and key approaches identified which were missing from the existing 
literature. The third chapter followed on from this by addressing the concept of religious freedom 
and applying it to the wearing of the headscarf as a religious symbol, with reference to internal 
and external aspects of religious freedom, alongside an assessment of the argument for restricting 
                                                          
836 (Application No.5493/72, A/24) (07 December 1976) ECHR 5; (Application no.30985/96) (ECHR, 26 October 
2000) 34 EHR55; (Application no.15472/02) (29 June 2007) ECHR 29 para 96. 
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religious practice and attire. The thesis contributions can be found in the fourth and fifth chapters; 
the fourth chapter attempted a major assessment of the argument of the court to ban the wearing 
of the headscarf on the grounds of curtailing extremism and fundamentalism while the fifth moved 
on to a criticism of the argument, presented by the ECtHR, that the wearing of the headscarf as a 
religious symbol has a direct link to an attitude of intolerance towards other members of society.  
The conclusion will summarise the points outlined in the thesis and reassess the arguments 
as a whole, as well as identifying the limitations of the thesis in order to make recommendations 
for further research. The final step will be to make suggestions as to how the ECtHR may re-visit 
and re-evaluate their stance on the headscarf in light of the arguments presented, according to the 
objectives put forward in the first section.  
 
6.2: Summary and Findings of the Research 
6.2.1. Chapter One: Introduction to the Thesis 
The first chapter presented a number of case studies with regard to the disagreement 
between different national and international bodies on the question of a universal approach to 
religious freedom and its importance in promoting harmony and social cohesion.  
The majority of European states profess religious diversity and a variety of beliefs as 
something to be protected and celebrated. Heterogeneity within a society has been upheld legally 
on a state level and by international bodies, most notably by the ECHR. This document was enacted 
in 1953 and is widely acknowledged as the most influential apparatus for upholding human rights 
internationally. The success of this legal instrument is perhaps surprising given the difficulty 
international bodies have faced historically in applying legislation universally though, in the case 
of the religious expression particularly religious symbols, it seems that legal cases have been 
marred by a lack of consistency in process and ruling, as well as an apparent disregard of 
fundamental human rights. In the introduction, a comparative and deductive assessment of the 
rulings of the Court in terms of the wearing of the headscarf with the displaying of crucifix has 
been presented alongside a selection of other relevant ECtHR proceedings. This discussion 
indicated that the court did not adhere to legal consistency and contradicts the standards prescribed 
by UN bodies such as the Human Rights Committee. 
The headscarf has been presented both as a religious symbol by the Muslim community 
and as a representation of gender, and so it was the choice of the researcher to approach the 
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headscarf from both an Islamic and a feminist point of view as a necessary step to determine the 
legitimacy of court decisions regarding related cases. By approaching the topic through these two 
perspectives, one religious and one secular, it was found that there was internal division within the 
two groups thus highlighting both the symbolic and legal status of the headscarf, highlighting the 
complexity of the topic. With regard to the approach taken by Islamic scholars towards the 
headscarf and the disagreements present within this group, it is difficult for anyone, no matter how 
well qualified they may be, to make value judgment about religion and religious symbols 
particularly from legal body such as the ECtHR which its members are legal experts. 
6.2.2. Chapter Two of the thesis 
Following on from the assessment of the literature on the subject of religious freedom and 
the ECtHR’s approach to the question, the author considers that there is legitimate reason to 
analyze the decisions of the Court with regard to the headscarf. Further, this assessment was 
necessary in order to determine how this thesis fits into the existing body of work. For one to 
examine and understand this corpus, literature review was grounded into distinct categories. The 
first focused on women academics and their writing on the topic, then provided a non-Muslim 
viewpoint. The third concerned Muslim writers and commentators who had written prominently 
on religious expression and religious dress, in relation to human rights and legal institutions.  
With regard to the chronological scope of the current thesis, the author has limited the literature 
cited to 21st century works as the Court began presiding over cases pertaining to the headscarf in 
the closing stages of twentieth century. In isolating this period, the collection of relevant cases may 
be examined in greater depth, allowing a deeper understanding of the relationship being explored. 
It also allows the author to determine where the gaps in the literature lie and how best to focus the 
objectives of the thesis.   
On examining the existing literature, it is clear that previous studies have analysed the 
decisions of the court based purely on the legal process itself, in this way that they condemned the 
decisions of the ECtHR based on the fact that the court failed to prove that Leyla and Dahlab were 
the members of fundamentalist groups or the they behaved in intolerant attitudes. The ECtHR often 
disregarding the historical and philosophical context of tolerance and fundamentalism, both used 
in the decisions of the court as justifications to ban the headscarf. This thesis argues that any 
position on court rulings on religious expression, particularly pertaining to the headscarf, which 
are removed from discussions of the historical and philosophical context of concepts such as 
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fundamentalism and tolerance lacks weight and validity. In other words, the main concern of the 
current thesis is not to prove whether the applicants of the cases were fundamentalist or intolerant, 
but the main concern is to critically consider whether it is legally acceptable to apply the concepts 
of fundamentalism and intolerance in these specific cases. 
 
6.2.3. Chapter three of the thesis 
Chapter three addressed the concept of human rights, the freedom of religious expression 
primarily, in relation to relevant international instruments. Here, the author attempted to discuss 
the conflict between state governments and international bodies on human rights standards and 
religious rights with regard to the UN Charter. It also outlines the reliance of states on the principle 
of sovereignty and their own national interests the consequence of which was the creation of 
international human rights documents which were not legally binding. This chapter also saw the 
author present the state of religious freedom and its protection in the UDHR.  Though there has 
been disagreement amongst Muslim countries with the view to allow religious conversion, the 
main bulk of the document does directly allude to this right. The UDHR presents a firm statement 
on religious freedom, arguing for the importance of its protection; however, the document does 
not hold any state legally responsible in any concrete way for their lack of adherence to the 
standards outlined therein. These standards were legitimized as a declaration and the Charter was 
created due to the reluctance of powerful states to agree to any legal obligations which would risk 
undermining their influence over the colonial territories. In these parts the researcher  gives a brief 
account of the history and position of the rights of religious freedom generally in the above-
mentioned documents as an introduction to narrow it down to  focus on the right to religious 
expression.  
After the Second World War, there was no legally binding document to protect civil or 
political rights and so nations were forced to forge their own legislation, and two decades later the 
Convention on civil and political rights was ratified. Unlike the Convention on Economic, Social 
and Cultural rights, which holds obligations which are progressive and vary dependent on the 
available resources of member states, the ICCPR outlines standards which must be implemented 
and with little leeway once a state has joined. While the Declaration includes the right to change 
religion, the ICCRP faced difficulties with this inclusion due to the objections of the majority of 
Islamic states; it was reworded for the ICCRP as the rights to hold “a religion…of his choice”, 
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avoiding the wording of the Declaration. Despite being a legally binding document, it does not 
have the power or influence that the ECtHR has on member states to the ECHR as its process 
requires states to submit reports relating to progression of human rights in their countries; ruling 
on legal cases rely on the consent of both parties to a dispute. This chapter also delineated between 
one’s right to have or adopt a religious belief and one’s right to publicly practice said belief. The 
former is considered an absolute right which cannot be limited by national governments under any 
conditions. The latter, on the other hand, is far more complicated and may be restricted according 
to a number of circumstances. The author assessed this using a number of illustrative examples 
exploring these circumstances and how these limitations impinged on religious expression and 
human freedoms. Included here was the argument that the General Comment of the HRC neglects 
the matter of ‘duress’, citing cases in North Iraq in which Yazidis were forced to convert on the 
threat of death; this comprises duress not coercion.  
The researcher analysed and examined the legitimate excuses, according to the ICCPR 
article18 (3), under which religious expression can be limited, including the maintenance of public 
order, public safety, and ‘health and moral and protection of the rights and freedoms of others 
reasons’. These concepts are complex and lack concrete definitions, and so the potential for them 
to be misused is high. Therefore, it is important that nations consider the concept of religious 
freedom broadly; the limitation of freedoms must always be restricted to the minimum degree of 
interference that is necessary to pursue a legitimate cause. With presenting the cases from the 
Committee of Human Rights and ECtHR the researcher assesses the wearing of the headscarf in 
the context of legitimate restriction clauses to consider whether wearing of the headscarf disturbs 
public order, moral, health, safety and rights and freedoms of others. Through the examination, it 
would appear that the ban of the wearing of headscarf based on the restriction found in clauses of 
article 18 (3) is legally problematic and questionable.   
The third chapter concluded by addressing the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on religion or Belief, widely considered amongst the most 
influential documents on religious freedom; it is one of the only documents to address international 
religious freedom directly and at length. On the other hand, the multiple setbacks to reaching an 
agreement about the document are indicative of the power politics present in the UN at that time 
as well as the controversy surrounding the very topic. 
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Those who had a hand in the creation of the Declaration had to overcome a number of 
obstacles, not least arguments as to the exact meaning of religion raised by the Communists and 
nations of Eastern Europe; there was a discussion as to whether secular approaches to religion, 
such as agnosticism and non-belief would be protected in a similar manner, as they were not 
mentioned in the document. It was also argued by some states that the focus on religious freedom 
priorities the rights of the religious over those of atheists and non-believers. It was countered by 
the West that it was, by design, a declaration for religious freedoms, and should not include 
atheism as this was not a religion. It was also pointed out that atheism is implicitly protected under 
the Declaration anyway. It was decided, as a compromise, that instead of ‘belief’, which indicated 
religion, the Declaration would state ‘whatever belief’, which suggests are wider usage. For 
example, the first article states: “… the right shall include freedom to have a religion or whatever 
belief of his choice...”.837 This has been accepted by both parties, an outcome which was not 
predicted by the bulk of the ICCPR and UDHR drafters. The amendment provides a reassurance 
that all convictions, whether religious or non-religious, would be protected by the Declaration. The 
Declaration does, however, neglect to reference religious conversion directly, though it is included 
in the UDHR. Phrased as a ‘change’ in religion, this wording has been criticised by some, 
particularly Muslim scholars, as lacking power when compared to the ICCPR. The ‘right to change 
religion’ was to be removed but protest amongst some groups forced the addition of Article 8, 
which stipulated that “nothing in the present Declaration shall be construed as restricting or 
derogating from any right defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenants on Human Rights”.838  The feeble and vague wording of this statement 
has opened it up to interpretation; there are worries that Islamic states may use this as justification 
to either ignore or compromise the right to convert. This has been the case in Iran, as conversion 
to Islam is permitted but conversion from Islam to an alternative religion is prohibited.839 
This research explores the use of ‘intolerance’ as a crutch to restrict religious freedom and 
so it is important to highlight the unclear definition of the term; it may refer to any number of 
personal, social, theological, ideological or psychological stances which contribute to 
                                                          
837 Walter, C “The Protection of Freedom of Religion within the Institutional System of the United Nations”. Universal 
Rights in a World of Diversity (2012) The case of religious freedom. Pontifical Academy of Social Science. P.591 
838 Ibid 
839 O'Connell, B, ‘Constitutional Apostasy: The Ambiguities in Islamic Law after the Arab Spring’ (2012) 11 Nw. UJ 
Int'l Hum. Rts, 83, 83. 
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marginalisation and hate.840 The absence of a universally acknowledged interpretation and 
definition of the term “intolerance” and its precarious position in international judicial cases has 
drawn attention to its potential for misuse when applied in a judicial or legal context. Evidence for 
this may be found in Article 2 of 1981 Declaration, in which the methods by which governments 
and courts may address intolerance or discrimination are outlined, with delineation between these 
terms. While discrimination, the article asserts, usually requires legal action, intolerance should be 
tackled using “all appropriate measures”, suggesting recourse beyond the legal system.  
The declaration lacks legal status but this does not diminish its power over legal action; 
this has been highlighted by Bahiyyih Tahzib, who points out that “States regard the 1981 
Declaration, or at least some of its provisions, as normative in nature and part of customary 
international law”.841 
The documents outlined in this section combine to form an overarching legal model on 
which the global protection of human rights rests, particularly with regard to religious freedoms; 
the clarity of these documents and a strong understanding of their impact are vital to assessing 
legal cases pertaining to freedom of religion.  
 
6.2.4. Chapter four of the thesis 
The fourth chapter, as with Chapter 5, attempts to present the wider implications of the 
research. The former addresses the two primary reasons often cited by the ECtHR in cases of 
religious freedom, particularly relating to the ban on the wearing of the headscarf: preventing 
intolerance and preventing fundamentalism. The chapter questions whether these reasons can 
provide a sound legal justification for the restrictive rulings. This was achieved through an 
examination of two prominent cases (Şahin v Turkey and Dahlab v Switzerland), supported by 
periphery case studies on European court process. Further, this thesis argues that a methodical and 
analytical approach to analysing the court’s decisions depends on first understanding the historical 
and ideological context of the concepts of fundamentalism and tolerance.  
Fundamentalism, too, is a challenging term to define rigidly, and this becomes more complicated 
still in discussions of Islam. An approach to the term has been attempted a number of times, with 
                                                          
840 Claydon, J, ‘Treaty Protection of Religious Rights: UN Draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, (1972) The. Santa Clara Lawyer, 12, 403. 
841 Bahiyyih G Tahzib, Freedom of Religion or Belief: Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection (Vol. 44. 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996) 600, 187.  
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a focus on history, culture, and personal faith. This thesis attempts to question how prevalent 
fundamentalism is across different faiths and how the concept is viewed when applied to non-
Islamic faiths. The objective of this chapter is to determine how fundamentalism is viewed by the 
ECtHR and the effect this has on religious freedom; in order to achieve this, approaches to defining 
fundamentalism must be explored with an emphasis on historical and philosophical context. It is 
the hope of the researcher that this will provide clarity as to what the term is and how it should be 
used.  
This chapter discussed fundamentalism as a concept with a number of socially-dependent 
firm definitions, most of which related to Islamic fundamentalism; some instances, however, 
referred to other religions. It is a complicated term, then, and the need for a workable definition 
for both scholarly and legal use is desired. It may be used to describe religious fundamentalism 
across disparate faiths and communities, or it may be used to refer solely to Islamic extremism and 
terrorist activity. When one considers the characteristic of fundamentalism’s reactionary nature, 
sharp boundaries in moral belief, absolutism and selective, it would be obvious that none of the 
above-mentioned traits can be legally acceptable as justifications for the ban of the wearing of the 
headscarf in the case of Leyla. It is notable that the bulk of the literature presents little distinction 
between traditional religious belief and fundamentalist religious belief and this has been reflected 
in the decisions of the ECtHR; the court has often equated religious strictness or piety with 
fundamentalism with regard to religion, despite the fact that oppressive acts often stemming from 
the latter but rarely from the former, which usually promotes tolerance and peace. 842 
The decisions of the ECtHR must be given weight by fact and evidence as followed in the 
case of Kalaç the military judge who was actively involved in the fundamentalist group; vagueness 
as to the exact definition of fundamentalism makes it difficult to identify and raise the question as 
to whether it should be used in reference to Islamic practice. Based on the findings of this chapter 
it could be argued that the court has applied an unclear concept (prevention of fundamentalism) in 
                                                          
842 Mårtensson, Ulrika and Jennifer Bailey, and Priscilla Marie Ringrose, Fundamentalism in the Modern World: 
Fundamentalism and Communication: Culture, Media and the Public Sphere (2011 IB Tauris) p66.67. For further 
information see: Ruud, Koopmans, ‘Religious fundamentalism and hostility against out-groups: A comparison of 
Muslims and Christians in Western Europe’ (2015) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 41.1: 33-57.p35. For 
further information on difference between religious orthodoxy and fundamentalism see: Ulrika Martensson, Priscilla 
Ringrose and Jennifer Bailey, Fundamentalism in the Modern World: Fundamentalism and Communication: Culture, 
Media and the Public Sphere (London: I.B.Tauris, 2014)49.70. 
248 
 
order to prohibit the headscarf despite the lack of compelling evidence linking its use with a 
tendency towards fundamentalism by the wearer. 
 
6.2.5. Chapter five of the thesis  
Similar to the discussion of fundamentalism outlined in Chapter Four, the fifth chapter 
entailed a discussion of the term ‘tolerance’ and the way in which its protection has been used as 
by the ECtHR a justification for restrictive rulings on the headscarf.  
In the Dahlab case the ECtHR observed that it “appears difficult to reconcile the wearing 
of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance etc.”843  This thesis argues that if one 
approaches the term ‘tolerance’ within its ideological and historical context, a greater 
understanding of the concept may be gained. This is particularly useful when examining the legal 
application of the term.  
When one examines the core of the concept, tolerance equates to embracing difference of 
the different; further, it requires an acknowledgement of difference and an implied unease, which 
must be accepted. In order for there to be tolerance, therefore, there must be knowledge of the 
activities or beliefs to be tolerated. The concept also assumes that those displaying tolerance must 
perceive themselves to be capable of removing or changing beliefs which oppose their own if they 
so decided; tolerance stems from resisting this behaviour.  
This understanding of tolerance has not been applied by the ECtHR in their decisions. 
Instead, the term protection of tolerance has been applied in order to restrict freedoms of Muslim 
women and limit their available forms of religious expression such as wearing of the headscarf. In 
ignoring the aforementioned understanding of tolerance, the court has placed the headscarf, a 
symbol of religion, in opposition to the concept of tolerance, which the researcher argues against. 
The argument presented in this chapter posits that the foundation of tolerance is an acceptance of 
religious belief and expression, and an acknowledgment that beliefs different to one’s own are 
equally valid and contribute to a society’s cultural diversity. Acceptance promotes personal and 
societal wellbeing and is a requirement of any peaceful, trusting multicultural community. The 
opponents’ enemies of tolerance would posit that celebrating difference only dilutes a society, 
despite perhaps being tolerated themselves. The decision of the ECtHR in the cases related to the 
wearing of the headscarf seems contrary to the judgment of the court in the case of Hndyside v 
                                                          
843 Dahlab v Switzerland (2001) 42393/98. 
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United Kingdom844 which asserted that freedom of expression not only covers views which are 
favourable or inoffensive but it also includes those views which shock, disturb the state or any part 
of society. 
Tolerance, as a concept, is closely related to the concepts of power, harmony and so 
tolerance is considered a fundamental quality necessary for a peaceful society. Legislation which 
restricts the headscarf and other religious manifestations in the name of tolerance does nothing to 
promote peace, causing only division and disillusionment. Based on the traits of tolerance it can 
be argued that tolerance is only really applicable when the individual or group choosing to be 
tolerant has an ability to actively suppress the disfavored practices or beliefs of other individuals 
or groups but referring to apply it. Thus, the role of power between the sides of tolerance in the 
judgments of the court should be taken into consideration which the court failed to do.   
A number of scholars have defined tolerance as the requirement to connect with other 
people despite difference and to find similarities outside of race and religious belief. These factors 
are present in all aspect of daily life, from work to school to the home, and the role of religious 
expression across these areas should not differ. In the case of education, the presence of a hijab 
should not shock and threaten, or be under scrutiny, but should be accepted as a personal choice. 
To reiterate, the right to freely practice religion is a protected human right and the headscarf exists 
under this right. It is ever more important that religious expression be demonstrated in schools as 
the earlier we can instil the virtue of acceptance and tolerance in children, the sooner they will 
begin to understand the breadth of humankind and embrace difference; this is only practical, as the 
world is a diverse place. By protecting the right to religious expression and refraining from 
restricting this right, tolerance will be protected and human rights will be maintained.  
 
6.3.1. Summary of Main Contributions: 
In addressing the gaps identified in the existing literature the main research contribution 
can be summarised as follows: 
                                                          
844 (Application No.5493/72, A/24) (07 December 1976) ECHR 5 
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1-Analysis of the concept of religious expression within the context of international human rights 
law and the scope of legitimate limitations which can be lawfully imposed on religious freedom 
(Chapter 3) 
2- Taking into consideration the traits and definitions of fundamentalism, the researcher argued 
that it is difficult, considering existing human rights principles, to justify banning the headscarf 
based on the concept of fundamentalism (Chapter 4). 
3- By exploring the historical and philosophical aspects of the term ’tolerance’  and refering to the 
ambiguity of this concept in legal documents, the researcher argued that the supposed link between 
the wearing of the headscarf and intolerant attiudes contradicts the nature of ’tolerance’ and is 
therefore legally problematic and unsustainable (Chapter 5). 
 
6.4. Recommendations 
This section will present some suggestions to the ECtHR in relation to legal proceedings 
involving the headscarf.  
The first is that the court should refrain from employing vague, ill-defined concepts such 
as intolerance or fundamentalism without being clear on their usage; these terms have little 
universal application and clear, well-defined concepts (such discrimination) must be used if an 
authoritative legal ruling is to be achieved.  
Further, as the court is made up of legal authorities rather than theologians, it may be 
pertinent for the court to refrain from making value judgments about a particular religion (Islam) 
and its compatibility or otherwise with democratic values.845   
Finally – there is an inconsistency between the views of the ECtHR and those of the HRC 
regarding the wearing of the headscarf. This research suggests that the ECtHR should bring its 
future judgments into line with the HRC’s pronouncements which offer wider protection to 
religious expression, including the wearing of headscarves and similar attire in a religious context. 
 
                                                          
845 See supra, page 11 of the thesis. 
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6.5. Limitations and Scope of the Research 
This thesis aimed to assess the rulings of the ECtHR on cases pertaining to the headscarf, 
particularly in academic settings. The research has, notably, not touched on the recent prohibitions 
on Islamic beach wear, which has seen particular controversy in France. This is, in part, due to the 
difference between this setting and that of a classroom, as the contexts are too dissimilar to be 
properly compared. It may be put forward that places of education may set their own standards 
with regard to their codes of conduct and so everyone is held to the same standards. The public 
setting of the beach, on the other hand, poses a more complex question as to whether restrictions 
should ever be applied here. 
While omitting it from the current study, the issue of the Islamic bikini is an important one 
with regard to the debate over public places and personal freedom of expression; the researcher 
acknowledges the potential for further research here. Another reason for its omission is the fact 
that this matter has not been submitted for adjudication to the ECtHR to date, and this thesis is 
concerned with the cases of this court.  
Notably, this thesis is also does not include the debate surrounding the Niqaab and the 
Burqa, both highly concealing forms of religious dress, across Europe, though most notably in 
France. As this thesis is concerned primarily with the cases related to the wearing of the headscarf, 
these forms of religious attire were not addressed. It has been argued846 that the prohibition of the 
complete covering, as with the burqa, is justified in academic settings due to the practicalities of 
teaching and learning; facial expression and eye contact are deemed very important here, as social 
skills and interactivity are also being learnt. Furthermore, in terms of limitation, developments 
regarding the politics behind the headscarf cannot be disregarded, particularly in the light of the 
current Turkish government’s change of policy. Abolishing the ban on headscarves raises a very 
important question about the legality of the rulings of the ECtHR relating to headscarf restrictions, 
and raises even more questions about the future of the headscarf. 
                                                          
846 Frances Perraudin, ‘Schools Can Decide whether to Ban full-face Veils, Says Morgan’ (19 January 2016) available 
at::<https://www.theguardian.com/education/2016/jan/19/schools-can-decide-whether-to-ban-full-face-veils-says-
morgan> accessed 20 September 2017; see further, Jess Staufenberg, ‘Germany Bans Muslim Student from Wearing 
Niqab Face in School’(23 August 2016) available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-
muslin-student-banned-niqab-face-veil-school-islam-a7204671.html> accessed 20 September 2017. 
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6.6. Conclusion 
In the last few years, religious conflict has been more frequently debated by scholars and 
social commentators due to its ubiquity in modern life. Religious debate has always been widely 
accepted due to the protection of free speech. However, the legal side of this debate, it has been 
argued, should be considered with more care as rulings often have significant real-world effects 
on religious communities. A pragmatist approach together with the proportionality principle 
require public authority to make a balance between the rights and freedoms of individuals and 
public interest; in a way that the court needs to determine whether the action is necessary for 
achieving the aim, and whether the cons to the individual outweighs the benefit that achieving the 
aim will bring. Prevention of fundamentalism and intolerance as two aims of the judgments of the 
court will not be achieved through banning the passive symbol of religion such as headscarf; 
fundamentalist and intolerant attitudes are violent and aggressive actions that emerge from prior 
belief and awareness. In the cases related to wearing of the headscarf it seems that the court made 
judgments based on assumption, prediction and strict perception of secularism and political 
motivations rather than legal reasoning. The different positions of the Conseil d’Etat and Stasi 
Commission towards dealing with headscarf and recent political development in Turkey which has 
removed the ban on the wearing of the headscarf in public space has brought the legality of the 
decisions of the court into question. In the case of the headscarf, which has been frequently 
restricted by the court on the ground of the protection of tolerant society and prevention of 
fundamentalism, a consideration of the philosophical and historical background of the associated 
concepts can inform the legal process. Limiting religious practice and manifestation for Muslim 
women based on those concepts is from legal standpoint problematic, as there is no rational 
justification for assuming a link between the headscarf and extremist ideology or intolerant 
behaviour.  This thesis, by exploring the historical and ideological background of these concepts, 
has sought to provide a deeper understanding of the rationale behind court decisions and has argued 
for a reassessment of the underlying philosophical considerations which have influenced judicial 
reasoning on the subject.  
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